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DUKE 

UNIVERSITY 

LIBRARY 

Treasure  %oom 

•M-    ».-*J^.    -                                     , 

THE 


ELEMEJS'TS         -^*<r^7^o  ^ 


METAPHYSICAL  SCIENCE. 


BY  A  LADY. 


"Prove  all  things.'" 
"The  things  which  are  seen,  were  not  made  of  things  which  do 
"appear." 


HARRISBURG,  Pa. 
PRINTED   BY    HUGH   HAMILTON. 


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PREFACE. 


The  author  of  the  following  little  work  has  no  apo- 
logy to  offer  for  having  presumed  to  present  it  to  an 
enliglitened  puhlic,  except  the  natural  desire  which 
burns  in  every  bosom  to  communicate  thoughts  or  dis- 
coveries which-  seem  to  itself  new  and  important.  It 
has  been  written  amidst  numerous  diflBculties  and  con- 
tinual interruptions — which  it  is  lioped  will  excuse 
many  inaccuracies,  and  nothing  but  an  unconquerable 
propensity  to  such  speculations,  and  a  conviction  that 
some  of  its  suggestions  might  promote  the  interests  of 
science,  and  accelerate  the  "march  of  intellect,"  could 
have  sustained  the  author  under  the  toil  witli  which 
those  "subtle  and  mysterious  things"  have  been  laid 
hold  on  and  presented  in  a  tangible  form  to  the  reader. 

The  author  was  led  to  the  undertaking  in  the  fol- 
lowing way.  Addicted  to  metaphysical  studies,  espe- 
cially that  of  the  mind,  the  existing  systems  appeared 
unsatisfactory,  or  not  sufficiently  supported  by  evidence 
Endeavoring  to  investigate  the  foundation  of  those  sys- 
tems, it  was  discovered  that  thoy  weit;  uot  founded  in 
fact,  that  the  principles  to  which  they  ultimately  ap- 
pealed, were  not  established  in  a  logical  investigation 
of  the  phenomena  of  nature ;  but  rested  on  a  vagrant 
kind  of  light,  or  of  inspiration,  denominated  intuition. 
On  farther  inquiry  it  was  observed,  that  intuition,  not 
imfrequently,  embraced  error  for  truth,  that  what  to  one 
mind  seemed  intuitively  true,  to  another  seemed  intui- 
tively false — that,  in  a  word,  the  perception  of  truth  is  in 


IV  PREFACE. 

every  case  a  deduction  of  reason,  and  that  what  seemed 
to  be  perceived  intuitively,,  or  without  reasoning,  rested 
in  fact  on  some  other  principle  adopted  unconsciously 
without  investigation.  It  plainly  aj)peared  tliat  the 
pursuit  of  science,  on  the  principles  considered  as  esta- 
blished in  intuition,  more  frerpiently  led  to  absurdity, 
and  to  scepticism,  than  to  a  knowledge  of  tlie  truth. 

In  keeping  close  to  the  same  method,  the  investiga- 
tion of  facts,  it  was  discovered  that  the  criterion  of 
truth  is  a  simple  phenomenon,  or  form,  in  which  truth 
invariably  presents  itself  to  the  mind,  and  which  is  ac- 
tually, thoTigh  tacitly  recognized  in  mathematics,  in  phi- 
losophy, and  in  all  the  arts  and  sciences  as  characteris- 
tic of  truth,  and  necessarily  connected  with  it,  or  as  con- 
stituting  demonstrative  evidence. 

It  was  farther  discovered,  or  observed,  that  to  detach 
the  philosophy  of  mind  from  general  metaphysics,  is  not 
the  way  to  cultivate  the  former  with  success  ;  but  tliat 
the  metaphysics  of  mind  is  intimately  connected  with 
the  metaphysics  of  matter  and  of  truth ;  and  that  to 
establish  sound  principles  in  the  philosophy  of  mind,  it 
is  necessary  to  ascend  to  the  ver^'  first  and  simplest  prin- 
ciples of  metaphysics,  to  discover  the  generic  character- 
istic of  substances,  or  that  which  all  substances  partake 
in  common. — The  first  principles  of  metaphysics  were 
discovered  to  ho  facts  which  are  familiar  to  every  mind, 
are  continually  acted  on  in  common  life — but  are  virtu- 
ally denied  in  philosophy.  What  success  has  crowned 
the  labour  will  be  judged  of  by  those  who  attend  us 
in  the  adventurous  excursion,  through  a  region  here- 
tofore deemed  a  trackless  and  barren  waste. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Introductory.     General  Observations  on  the  Nature  and 

Objects  ot  Metaphysical  Science, •    7 

CHAPIER  n. 
Ot  the  General  Character  of  Substances, 11 

CHAPTER  III. 
Of  Material  Substance, £3 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Of  Spiritual  Substance,       ------ fi 

CHAPTER  V. 
Ot  the  Nature  of  Truth, _...     102 

CHAPTER  VI. 
Ot  the  Essence  of  God,    ----------,    145 


THE 


ALPHABET  OF  THOUGHT, 


ELEMENTS  OF  METAPHYSICAL  SCIENCE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

INTRODUCTORY— GENERAL  OBSERVATIONS  ON  THE 
NATURE  AND  OBJECTS  OF  METAPHYSICAL  SCI- 
ENCE. 

Metaphysics  is  the  science  which  investigates  effi- 
cient causes,  and  the  necessary  relations  of  things. 

Every  one  who  perceives  the  existence  of  substances — 
every  one  who  knows  or  believes  the  reality  of  an  nivis- 
ible  world,  is  a  metaphysician,  or  has  performed  that 
metaphysical  analysis,  through  which  process  alone  the 
existence  of  those  invisible  objects  is  discovered.  Meta- 
physics then,  is  as  old  as  the  creation ;  every  contempla- 
tive mind  speculates  on  these  things.  But  it  is  a  field 
which,  however  long  trodden,  has  not  yet  been  cultivated 
to  the  best  advantage ;  the  ground  has  never  been  broken 
up ;  the  seeds  of  science  lie  buried  beneath  rubbish  ac- 
cumulating for  ages.  The  first  principles  of  metaphysics 
have  not  been  unfolded ;  and  it  is  yet  a  dispute  as  to 
what  are  the  proper  and  genuine  objects  of  the  science; 
and  whether  or  not  any  scientific  principles  arc  attain- 
able respecting  invisible  objects. 


8  THE  ALPHABET 

An  eleDientary  treatise  oa  metapliysics  must  analyse 
this  chaos,  and  reduce  it  to  order.  The  first  husiuess  of 
the  metaphysician  is  to  investii^atc  the  f.icts.  the  percep- 
tion of  substances f  and  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  efli- 
cient  causes;  as  the  first  principles  of  the  science  should 
be,  the  definitions  of  the  several  species  of  these  invisible 
objects  of  knowledge. 

We  will  not  stop  here  to  inquire  how  the  human  mind 
ori£;inally  acquires  the  idea,  or  knowledge  of  an  efiRcient 
cause ;  we  shall  discover  this  in  an  iuvestlgntioQ  of  par- 
ticulars.— It  is  a  fact  that  mankind,  generally,  recognise 
several  efficient  causes ;  and  it  is  a  fact  that  we  believe 
certain  axioms,  or  recognise  certain  necessary  relations 
of  the  phenomena  of  nature  to  these  efficient  causes. 

All  the  objects  of  luiraan  knowledge — all  things  which 
have  a  real  existence,  may  be  classed  under  two  heads, 
these  are,  Efficient  Causes  and  Operations ;  or,  what  are 
the  same,  Substances  and  Phenomena.  The  substan- 
ces which  form  our  world  and  its  inhabitants,  are  neither 
more  nor  less  than  the  efficient  causes  of  the  phenomena; 
and,  in  fact,  they  are  tacitly  recognised  as  such  by  all 
mankind. 

Mankind  perceive  and  acknowledge  three  specific  ef- 
ficient  causes,  or  substances ;  which  are  perfectly  simple, 
or  uncompounded;  and  which  are  essentially  different 
from  each  other,  having  no  one  quality,  or  no  one  02)era. 
tion  in  common.  These  three  simple,  efficient  causes  are 
denominated  Power,  Spirit,  and  Truth.  The  following 
treatise  consists  of  a  disquisition  intended  to  demonstrate 
that  these  three  objects  of  knowledge  are,  all  of  them,  in- 
the  same  prerficame?i«— that  they  are  efficient  causes; 
and  that  they  form  the  elementary  principles  of  all  the 
Substances  known  to  the  human  mind.  But  to  give 
some  illustration  of  this  subject,  in  a  general  way,  it  may 


OF  THOUGHT.  9 

be  observed,  that  there  are  known  in  nature  three,  and 
only  tliree,  simple  phenomena^  or  operations,  correspond- 
ing, severally,  to  the  three  elementary  efficient  causes  just 
mentioned.  These  three  simple  phenomena  are  Mntion, 
PerceiHion,  and  Harmony.  These  three  simple  pheno- 
mena, or  operations,  require  each,  and  to  each  is  actual- 
ly assigned  by  the  common  sense  of  mankind,  a  specific 
efficient  cause ; — and  these  three  simple  phenomena  con- 
stitute all  the  varied  and  complex  phenomena  of  nature. 
This  fact  will  be  established  hereafter,  as  far  as  a  princi- 
ple implying  a  negative  is  capable  of  being  proved ;  but 
to  shew  at  once  that  the  assumption  of  it  here  is  not  so 
extravagant  as  may  at  first  view  appear,  let  it  be  remark- 
ed that  the  words,  or  artificial  signs  called  verbs,  are 
they  which  express  operations,  and  that  all  the  verbs  in 
human  language  are  comprised  in  three,  to  move,  to  per- 
ceive, and  to  harmonize — and  their  various  compounds. 
Verbs  are  the  artificial  signs  of  operations ;  while  opera- 
tions are  the  natural  signs  of  efficient  causes. 

The  natural  sign  is  that  which  is  properly  and  strict- 
ly signified  by  the  term  idea  or  image ;  it  is  that  by 
which  an  invisible  object  makes  itself  known  to  the 
mind.  Thus  motion  or  impulse  is  the  natural  sign,  or 
idea  of  Power;  perception  is  the  idea  of  Spirit,  and  har- 
mony,  of  Truth. 

The  table  below  presents  these  efficient  causes  and 
their  operations,  or  these  substances  and  their  phenome- 
na, in  one  view,  connected  as  they  are  in  nature,  and  in 
fact. 

TABLE. 
Efficient  causes.  Phenomena. 

Power  .        .        ,        Motion. 

Spirit       .         ,        •         .     Perception. 

Truth  .        ,        Harmony. 


10  THE  ALPHABET 

If  any  one  alledge  that  there  are  other  simple  elemen- 
tary phenomena  beside  the  three  above  mentioneil,  he 
has  only  to  point  thera  out,  and  his  exception  to  our 
theory  will  be  supported  by  fact.  It  would  be  futile  to 
stop  here  to  answer  the  objections  that  will  promptly 
arise  out  of  a  spurious  metaphysics,  against  our  hypo- 
thesis. Each  of  the  simple  invisible  objects  above  men- 
tioned, will  be  the  subject  of  a  logical  analysis,  in  which 
it  will  be  demonstrated  that  they  agree,  severally,  with 
the  idea,  or  characteristic  of  an  efficient  cause ;  and  with 
the  signification  of  the  word  substance.  In  discussing 
each  subject  separately,  the  objections  which  appear 
most  plausible  will  be  investigated. 

The  definitions  of  Power,  Spirit,  Truth,  Motion,  Per- 
ception, and  Harmony, — or  the  general  terms  which  de- 
signate these  objects,  together  with  the  first  truths,  or 
axioms  relating  to  them,  constitute  the  ^Alphabet  of 
Thought,  or  the  elementary  principles  of  all  our  know- 
ledge. 

Before  we  proceed  to  investigate  the  several  speciesy 
it  is  proper  and  necessary  to  define  the  general  terms  ef- 
ficient cause  and  phenomenon.  In  the  definitions  we 
of  course  give  the  same  signification  to  the  terms  which 
is  most  commonly  annexed  to  them,  but  in  the  axioms 
and  corollaries  we  shall  take  the  liberty  to  enlarge  on 
those  commonly  received,  so  as  to  exhibit  a  more  ex- 
tended view  of  the  truths  implied  in,  or  arising  immedi- 
ately and  necessarily  out  of  the  definitions,  or  out  of  the 
predicament  of  the  things  defined. 

Definition.  An  efficient  cause  is  that  which  is  able, 
in  itself,  to  produce  an  effi-ct,  or  an  operation. 

Corollary.  A  spec  fie  efficient  cause  is  that  which  is 
able,  in  itself,  to  produce  a  specific  operation. 

Corollary.    An  efficient  cause  is  an  ultimate  cause; 


OF  THOUGHT.  11 

for  that  cause  which  depends  on  another  cause  for  its  ex- 
istence, is  dependent  also  for  its  opea-ation;  it  is  not  able, 
in  itself,  to  produce  an  operation. 

tdx-iom.     Like  causes  produce  \ike  effects. 

Corollary.  The  same  simple  eiRcient  cause,  produces 
uniformly  the  same  simple  operation,  and  no  other. 

JJpjlnifiov.  A  phenomenon  is  an  operation  addressed 
to  the  senses,  or  to  the  mind. 

Jlxiom.  Every  operation  requires  an  operator,  or  a 
cause  which  is  able  to  produce  it,  that  is,  an  eificient 
cause. 

Cor.  Iwery  phenomenon  is  the  operation  of  an  effi- 
cient cause. 

Ax.  A  specific  operation  requires  a  specific  efficient 
cause. 

tAx.  An  efficient  cause  must  be  present  with  its  ope- 
ration ; — in  other  words,  every  phenomenon  is  the  imme- 
diate effect  of,  and  takes  place  within  its  efficient  cause. 


CHAPTER  11. 

OF  THE  GENERAL  CHARACTER  OF  SUBSTANCES. 

It  has  been  long  the  practice  with  writers  on  General 
Metaphysics,  to  set  out  in  their  discussions  and  inquiries 
about  the  general  character  of  substance,  witli  tacitly 
assuming  the  principle,  that  substances  are  no  the  pffi. 
cieiit  cauaes  of  the  phenomena;  that  consequently,  the 
phenomena  have  no  necessary  conneccion  with  the  sub 


12  THE  ALPHABET 

stances;  and  that  of  course  they,  the  phenomena,  fur- 
nish no  logical  evidence  of  the  existence,  or  nature  of 
the  substances.  But  while  metaphysicians  tell  us  what 
substances  are  not,  they  omit  to  tell  us  what  tliey  are. 
In  so  doing  they  have  acted  like  an  unskilful  general, 
who  leaves  an  unsubdued  fortress  in  his  rear;  from 
whence  the  garrison  frequently  sallies,  and  renders  nu- 
gatory the  rest  of  his  progress.  In  fact,  the  farther  me- 
taphysicians proceed  on  the  above  mentioned  principle, 
Ihe  more  they  find  themselves  enibarrassed;  lliey  have 
adopted  without  investigation  a  principle,  which,  were  it 
correct,  should  be  the  key  to  all  their  future  discoveries; 
they  have  taken  their  very  first  step  in  the  dark,  con- 
trary to  all  the  rules  of  philosophizing;  they  have  relin- 
quished that  which  should  be  the  first  object  of  the  me- 
taphysician, to  ascertain,  what  is  the  general  cliaracter 
of  those  invisible,  or  metaphysical  objects,  called  sub- 
stances; or  what  it  is  which  the  mind  actually  perceives, 
and  which  we  denominate  substance. 

Jl  substancp  is  that  which  subsists  of  itselff  and  is  the 
subject  of  modes,  that  is,  of  qualities.  Or  more  correct- 
ly, a  substance  is  an  efficient  cause,  or  the  agent  in  the 
production  of  some  operation,  or  phenomenon.  There 
is  nothing  which  subsists  of  itself,  or  is  self-existent,  ex- 
cepting efficient  causes.  In  fact,  the  things  called  sub- 
stances, are  nothing  else  than  the  efficient  causes  of  the 
phenomena  which  attend  them;  and  they  are  really, 
though  tacitly  recognized  as  such  by  all  mankind.  The 
proof  of  these  propositions  is  the  main  design  of  the  fol- 
lowing treatise. 

It  has  been  common  to  define  substance  thus,  "A  sub- 
^^stance  is  that  which  subsists  of  itself,  independently  cf 
''all  created  beings^  and  is  the  subject  of  raodes.'^  But, 
with  deference,  it  is  no  definition  at  all  to  tell  us  v<  hat  a 


OF  THOUGHT.  13 

thing  does  not  depend  on,  or  whence  it  is  not  derived  j 
we  should  l)e  told  whence  it  is  derived,  if  derived  at  all. 
If  the  existence  of  the  elements  of  substances  depend  on 
a  creator, — if  substances  are  made  of  nothins;,  the  fact 
should  l)e  establislied  on  clear  and  rational  evidence,  be- 
fore it  is  made  the  ground  work  of  philosophy.  If  it 
cannot  be  estaldished,  then  we  are  free  to  inquire  whe- 
tiier  the  elementary  substances  subsist  of  themselves  abr 
solutely,  or  necessarily,  and  in  their  own  nature. 

But  let  us  not  l)e  misunderstood ;  substances  subsist 
of  themselves  in  tiieir  elementary  state, — Power,  Spirit 
and  Truth  subsist  of  themselves, — and  these,  it  will  be 
seen,  are  the  constituent  elements  of  all  substance.  But 
the  existing  combinations  of  substances,  all  the  combina- 
tions which  ever  have  existed,  or  ever  will  exist,  depend 
on  a  Creator.  There  are  in  fact  no  other  simple  substan- 
ces than  such  as  enter  into  the  constitution  of  God  him- 
self; that  is,  there  is  no  other  species,  or  kind  of  simple 
elementary  substance,  than  those  which  constitute  Deity. 
It  is  plainly  revealed,  that  Power,  Spirit  and  Truth  be- 
long essentially  to  God,  the  only  question  is,  are  these 
things  substances,  essences  ?  and  are  they  the  elements 
of  all  substance;  or  are  they  only  attributes,  qualities? 
Bnt  this  is  a  question  of  pui'e  liietapliysics,  it  is  not  de- 
cided by  revelation. 

To  create,  is  to  combine  several  substances  in  one. 
Before  the  creation  sul)stances  were  in  an  uncombined, 
or  chaotic  slate ;  "the  earth  was  without  form,  and  void;-' 
it  was  void  of  any  sensible  form,  or  quality ;  yet  it  ^''was,'" 
or  existed.  But  there  is  no  such  thing  in  the  created 
earth,  as  a  substance  existing  in  a  perfectly  simple  state. 
It  is  a  fact  known  in  chemistry,  that  a  simple  substance 
passing  from  one  compound  into  another,  carries  with  it 
a  portion  of  the  substance  ^vith  which  it  was  previously 


14  THE  ALPHABET 

combined;  and  it  is  known  that  there  are  substances 
which  never  exhibit  themselves  sin^l.v  to  the  senses, 
^Qcb  are  nitrogene,  oxifgene  and  hydvos;pne.  It  is, 
therefore,  not  in  a  chemical,  but  in  a  metaphysical  ana- 
lysis, that  the  simple  substances  disclose  themselves. 
Chemistrj''  possesses  no  criterion  of  the  simplicity  of  its 
subject ;  that  criterion  must  be  a  metaphysical  principle ; 
as  substances  are  metaphysical  objects  of  perception, 
even  wliile  ihey  are  subjects  of  chemical  analysis. 

It  is  a  curious  fact  in  the  annals  of  philosophy,  that  its 
votaries  disclaim  a  knowledge  of  what  constitutes  sub- 
stance, and  assert  thai  its  gciierical  characteristic  is  un- 
discoverable ;  at  the  same  time  that  without  hesitation 
they  call  things  by  the  name  of  substance^  and  enumerate 
a  variety  of  kinds ;  and  would  deem  it  absurd  to  deny 
the  substantiality  of  certain  things  with  which  th»'y  are 
familiar.  On  what  principle  are  the  metals  or  the  earths 
called  substances?  It  may  be  said  these  are  known  to  be 
substances  by  their  gravity  and  solidity.  But  gravity 
and  solidity  characterize  the  species,  not  the  s;enus ; 
they  characterize  matter,  but  do  not  belong  to  any  other 
species  of  substance.  Mind,  or  spirit  is  neither  solid 
nor  ponderous,  yet  it  is  a  substance.  M'^hy  is  spirit 
called  a  substance?  Why  is  caloric  tailed  a  substance? 
it  is  not  known  to  gravitate.  There  must  be  some  gene- 
ral idea  annexed  to  the  things  so  called ;  there  must  be 
some  known  cljaracter  which  includes  this  class  of  ob- 
jec^ts,  and  excludes  all  others.  It  would  be  palpably 
absurd  to  call  motion,  or  perce/ption,  or  any  operation 
whatever  bv  the  name  of  substance  What  then,  is  the 
.signification  which  is  in  fact  annexed  to  the  term  sub. 
stance  ?  This  question  will  be  answered  as  we  proceed. 

There  is  another  remarkable  fact  to  be  gathered  from 
the  annals  of  philosophy.     It  is  this,  tiiat  philosophers 


OF  THGUGHT.  15 

and  metaphysicians,  one  and  all,  designate  the  mattery 
and  the  mind  of  this  lower  world,  by  tlie  same  genencal 
4erm  which  they  apply  to  the  Being  of  the  Supreme  God- 
The  common  terms  substance  and  essence  are  applied 
alike  to  both.  Xow  if  matter  is  made  of  nothing,  and  is 
not  the  efficient  cause  of  its  phenomena ;  and  if  mind  is 
in  the  same  predicament,  how  can  they  possil)ly  have 
that  substantiality  which  characterises  the  great  first 
cause?  How  can  they  have  the  same  generical  character- 
istic? If  the  penetrating  minds  of  philosophers  do  prac- 
tically feel,  or  perceive  this  infinite  diflerence,  this  entire 
discrepancy  between  the  Being  of  God,  and  the  beings 
he  has  made,  is  it  conceivable  that  they  would  unani- 
mously agree  in  classing  both  under  the  same  denomina- 
tion? Or  does  not  this  fact  plainly  shew,  that  they  couM 
not  separate  the  one  from  the  other,  in  a  philosophical 
arrangement  of  categories ;  or  that,  according  to  the  gen- 
eral sense  of  mankind,  the  atfribute  of  substantiality,  or 
self-existence,  is  common  to  the  Being  of  God,  and  to 
the  substances  which  constitute  the  world  ? 

We  cannot  prove,  in  a  direct  manner,  the  general  prin- 
ciple that  substances  are  the  efficient  causes  of  their  phe- 
nomena, otherwise  than  by  an  investigation  of  particulars. 
This  attempt  will  be  prosecuted  in  the  following  chap- 
ters. But  previous  to  this  investigation  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  inquire  into  the  foundation  and  authority  of  two 
principles  which  have  long  received  the  general  belief, 
and  which  are  opposed  to  the  general  principle  just  men- 
tioned. These  two  principles  are,  first.  The  World  is 
made  of  JSTothing ;  and,  secondly,  that  The  Essence^  cr 
Substance  oj  Deity  is  simple,  or  uncompounded :  or,  that 
G  d  is  a  simple  efficient  cause. 

The  connexion  of  these  principles  with  the  subject  in 
hand,  will  be  obvious  to  the  reader.    It  is  evident  then' 


16  THE  ALPHABET 

can  be  no  other  efficient  causes  tbau  those  which  enter 
into  the  constitution  of  God ;  that  is,  there  can  be  no  other 
species,  or  kind,  of  efficient  cause,  than  those  which  con- 
stitute the  Supreme  Efficient  Cause ;  for  an  efficient  cause 
cannot  arise  out  of,  or  be  created  from,  nothing.  Hence, 
if  God  is  a  simple,  or  uncompounded  efficient  cause, 
there  is  then  but  one  efficient  cause,  in  the  phih)sophical 
sense  of  the  term,  in  the  universe.  And  if  substances  are 
efficient  causes,  and  nothing  else,  there  is  then  but  one 
simple  substauce.  On  the  otlier  liand,  if  the  worhl  is 
made  of  nothing,  and  substances  are  not  the  efficient 
causes  of  the  phenomena,  then  indeed  there  may,  for 
a,ugbt  we  know,  be  a  variety  of  substances,  or,  for  aught 
we  know,  there  may  be  but  one;  there  wouUl  be  no 
ground  for  any  rational  conclusion  respecting  this  matter; 
we  could  not  reasonably  infer  different  substances  from 
different  phenomena;  and  the  phenomena  of  mind,  as 
we  are  wont  to  call  thougiit  and  perception,  may,  for 
aught  we  know,  belong  to  matter;  since  on  this  hypo- 
thesis, the  connexion  of  substance  and  phenomenon,  or 
of  substance  and  quality,  would  be  merely  arbitrary.  If 
substances  are  made  of  nothing — if  they  are  not  the  effi. 
cient  causes  of  the  phenomena,  there  is  then  no  logical 
evidence,  that  is,  no  evidence  at  all,  to  determine  in  any 
case  what  the  substances  are,  and  the  dispute  about  the 
materiality,  or  the  immateriality  of  the  njiud,  is  idle. 

The  Supreme  Being  contains  within  himself  the  source 
or  substance  of  all  possilile  good.  No  one  will  be  so 
hardy  as  to  deny  this,  unless  he  can  point  out  some  otlier 
source  of  good.  Hence  the  beings  and  things  which  He 
has  created,  are  either  composed  of  the  same  substances, 
or  essences  which  constitute  His  own  Being,  or  He  has 
created,  from  notiiing,  beings  and  things  which  are  not 
good.    But  this  is  wholly  inadmissible;  it  would  be  im- 


OF  THOUGHT.  17 

puting  to  Grod  the  origin  of  evil.  If  God  made  things  of 
nothing,  he  would  make  them  incapable  of  evil ;  but  the 
self-existent,  self-sustained  elements  of  substance,  retain 
their  primitive  powers  and  tendencies  in  all  their  varied 
combinations.  If  evil  originates  in  good,  it  is  not  because 
it  is  inherent  in  any  good  thing;  every  simple  substance 
is  good  in  itself;  every  elementary  efficient  cause  is 
good ;  Power  is  good,  and  Spirit  is  good,  and  Truth  is 
good;  but  every jinite  combination  of  tliese  things,  every 
finite  mind,  not  possessing  all  truth,  is  liable  to  err,  to 
reject  truth.  Hence  the  origin  of  evil, —  hence  decompo- 
sition, or  corruption, — which  begins  in  mind,  in  the  rea- 
soning mind.  Evil  is  a  negative  thing,  it  has  no  direct 
efficient  cause. 

We  will  not  stop  to  shew,  in  this  place,  by  abstract 
reasoning,  the  absurdity  of  supposing  that  a  simple  effi- 
cient cause  is  capable  of  producing  a  variety  of  imme- 
diate eflects,  or  that  a  simple  principle  of  operation  may 
produce,  or  exhibit,  a  variety  of  operations.  Nor  shall 
we  adduce  here  any  direct  evidence  in  proof  of  the  posi- 
tion, that  Power,  Spirit  and  Truth  have  all  the  same 
generic  character,  that  they  arc  all  efficient  causes.  All 
that  is  intended  in  this  place,  is  to  investigate  the  testi- 
mony from  scripture  which  is  supposed  to  support  the 
principles,  that  God  is  a  simple  Essence,  and  that  the 
world  is  made  of  nothing. 

The  principle  that  God  is  a  simple  Essence,  is  found- 
ed, or  is  supposed  to  have  a  foundation,  in  a  single  pas- 
sage of  sacred  writ,  "Hear,  O  Israel,  the  Lord  our  God 
^*is  one  Lord.'' — What  is  the  plain  and  obvious  meaning 
of  this  passage?  Laying  aside  all  pre-conceived  opinion, 
and  listening  to  the  dictates  of  common  sense, —  if  she 
may  presume  to  have  a  voice  in  the  matter, — do  the 
words  one  Lnrd^  *?i2;nify  one  f^impU  Essence?  Common 


18  THE  ALPHABET 

sense  says,  No. — King  David  was  one  king;  yet  every 
chemist  knows,  and  every  metaphysician  knows,  that 
king  David  was  composed  of  several  simple  essences. 
What,  then,  was  the  import  of  the  words,  which  all 
Israel  was  called  on  to  hear?  Was  it  a  metaphysical 
theory  respecting  the  Essence  of  Deity,  or  respecting 
the  constitution  of  His  Being?  The  word  essence  does 
not  occur  throughout  the  whole  of  the  sacred  volume; 
and  though  its  synonyma,  substance,  docs  occur  in 
many  places,  it  is  not  used  in  a  metaphysical  sense. 

The  meaning  which  the  passage  presents  to  a  plain 
understanding,  is  this.  He  who  is  the  God  of  Jacob,  He 
who  sits  between  the  Cherubim,  who  brought  Israel  out 
of  the  land  of  Egypt,  is  one  Lord, — one  King ;-^ one 
Ruler  of  the  universe;-— He  rules  in  heaven  above,  and 
He  rules  all  the  nations  of  the  earth.  It  Avas  evidently 
intended  to  coiitradict  the  heathenish  belief,  that  the  se- 
veral different  efficient  causes,  which  manifest  their  ex- 
istence by  their  phenomena,  were  each  a  distinct  deity. 
The  heathens  Avorshipped  Power  under  the  names  of 
Jupiter,  Hercules,  ^c.  Spirit  under  that  of  Jinio,  and 
perhaps  some  others.  Perhaps,  Minerva,  represented. 
Truth.  Tliese  separate  objects  are  digcovered  by  the 
unassisted  faculties  of  the  human  mind;  they  exhibit 
themselves  continually  to  common  sense,  or  reason, 
through  the  medium  of  their  phenomena.  But  it  is  from 
revelation  alone  we  acquire  the  information,  that  Power, 
Spirit  and  Truth  are  united  in  one  supreme  Lord,  Avho 
is  the  same  yesterday,  to-day,  and  forever. 

It  c&nnot  be  believed  that  any  one  who  will  turn  his 
attention  to  this  subject,  will  maintain,  that  the  passage 
under  consideration  furnishes  any  ground  for  the  meta- 
physical theory  that  is  built  upon  it.  It  is  hard,  indeed, 
to  imagine  how  aay  one  could  be  led  to  conceive,  that 


OF  THOUGHT.  JS 

tliere  is  auy  connexion  between  the  passage  "Hear,  0 
Israel/'  &c.  and  the  principle,    God  is  a  simjjle  £s- 
sence.     The  text  declares,   "The  Lord  our  God  is  one. 
Lord;^^  and  upon  this  authority  it  is  asserted,  that  God  is 
one  simple  Essence.     Surely  the  one  is  an  expression 
quite  different  from  the  other;  one  Lord,  and  one  sim- 
ple Essence^  are  not  terms  of  the  same  import.     Kiugv 
David  wa§  one  king  of  all  Israel  and  Judah  ;  yet  king 
David's  person  was  a  compound  of  several  essences,  or 
substances.     The  body  and  spirit  are  different  essencer, 
yet  they  form  together  but  one  man.     And  surely  it  is 
a  perversion  of  the  scriptural  text  to  make  it  a  prop  to  a 
mere  metaphysical  theory ;  for  it  is  not  in  fact  a  princi- 
ple in  theology : — the  unitij  of  God,  and  the  simple  city 
of  His  Essence,  are  two  distinct  principles;  the  one,  of 
theology,  the  other  purports  to  be  a  fundamental  princi- 
pie  of  metaphysics.     If  the  divine  historian  had  given 
us  the  words  one  simple  essence,  instead  of  one  Lord; 
if  the  passage  had  stood  thus,  The  Lord  our  God  is  one 
simple  essence,  or  one  simjile  uncompounded  Beins;,  or 
one  simple  efficient  cause;  if  the  prophet,  descending 
from  his  high  vocation  to  give  a  lesson  in  metaphysics, 
had  said  this,  or  any  words  of  the  same  import;  then 
we  must  have  submitted  to  take  on  the  credit  of  such 
high  authority,  a  principle  which  we  could  not  reconcile 
to  the  dictates  of  reason.     But  the  passage,  if  taken  in 
its  plain  and  obvious  meaning,  offers  no  such  difficulty; 
there  is  nothing  in  it  to  tempt  reason  to  revolt ;  nothing 
but  what  is  perfectly  reconcilable  to  the  principles  of  ge- 
nuine  philosophy. — And  surely  it  is  rendering  no  service 
to  the  cause  of  religion,  to  set  her  at  war  with  reason  and 
philosophy. 

There  is  no  mode  of  rational  interpretation,  by  which 
the  passage  of  scripture  iiudcr  consideration  can  be  made 


m  THE  ALPHABET 

to  prove,  that  God  is  a  simple  Essence.  But  tlicie  is 
abundance  of  evidence  to  be  drawn  both  from  scripture, 
and  from  reason,  thattbe  supreme  Being  is  compounded, 
or  consists  of  three  distinct  essences,  or  of  tlu-ee  simple 
efficient  causes,  which  are  essentially  different  from  each 
other.  The  solution  of  this  problem  will  turn,  almost 
entirely,  on  the  signification  annexed  to  the  word  es- 
sence; which  will  be  the  subject  of  inquiry  hereafter. 

We  next  proceed  to  analyse  the  scriptural  foundation 
of  the  principle,  that  Matter  is  made  of  nothing.  In- 
deed, this  principle  has  been  extended  to  Muni,  or 
Spirit,  also,  and  it  is  confidently  affirmed  that  All  things 
are  made  of  nothing. — It  is  plain  that  if  the  mind,  or 
spirit,  is  made  of  nothing,  it  cannot  I)e  an  efficient  cause, 
or  able  of  itself  to  produce  an  effect;  if  it  cannot  sustain 
its  own  existence,  it  cannot  sustain  the  ejects  of  its  ex- 
istence; it  cannot  be  the  real  eflBcieot  cause  of  its  own 
phenomena,  or  ihe  real  agent  in  thought,  feeling,  or  voli- 
tion. We  w^ould  not  then  be  accountable  beings,  nor 
proper  subjects  of  rew^ards  and  punishments;  a  conse- 
quence which  every  sober  mind  must  deprecate. — We 
shall  be  told  that  the  Creator  made  of  nothing  the  human 
spirit,  and  then  gave  it  the  power  to  perceive.  But  the 
power  to  perceive  is  the  very  substance  or  essence  of 
spirit;  spirit  itself  is  the  power  to  perceive, — or  it  is  the 
eflficient  cause  of  perception.  But  more  of  this  again. 
At  present  the  discussion  will  be  limited  to  an  examina- 
tion of  the  passages  of  sacred  writ  which  are  supposed 
to  uphold  the  principle,  that  the  world  is  made  of  noth- 
ing. 

It  is  written,  <'God  made  all  things  by  the  word  of 
^*His  Power.^^  And  again,  it  is  written,  ^^'By  faith  we 
'^unders^tarid  that  the  worlds  w  ere  framed  by  the  word 
<^of  God;  so  that  the  things  which  are  seen  were  not 


OF  THOUGHT.  21 

••made  of  things  which  do  appear."  This  testimony  is 
infallible  as  far  as  it  goes ;  w  hat  sacred  writ  affirms,  it 
were  folly  and  impiety  to  controvert,  or  to  evade.  It  is 
granted  thcu,  that  the  worlds  were  framed  by  the  word 
of  God,  or  made  by  the  word  of  Iiis  Power,  But  if 
this  means  that  the  worlds  are  made  of  nothing,  it  would 
at  least  require  a  prophet  to  tell  us  so,  ere  we  should  be 
entitled  to  give  such  interiwetation  to  these  passages. 
That  God  made  the  world  by  the  word  of  His  Poicer^ 
and  that  God  made  the  world  of  nothing,  are  proposi- 
tions of  quite  diifcrent  import,  if  we  take  the  words  in 
their  usual  acceptation ;  and  it  seems  impossible,  by  any 
logical  alchymy,  to  produce  a  transmutation  of  the  one 
proposition  into  the  other,  or  to  make  both  represent  the 
same  ideas.  There  is  not  a  word  in  either  phrase  tliat 
is  found  in  the  other,  excepting  the  preposition  of. 

I^hall  we  be  accused  of  assuming  too  far,  if  wc  ven- 
ture to  express  the  simple  language  of  common  sense, 
as  to  the  signification  of  the  above  passages  of  scripture? 
It  is  not  with  theology  that  we  would  presume  to  enter 
the  lists,  but  with  a  spurious  metaphysics,  which  has 
surreptitiously  connected  itself  with  theology.  That  the 
world  is  made  of  nothing,  purports  to  be  a.  fact;  but 
this  fact  is  not  attested  in  sacred  writ,  nor  is  it  establish- 
ed on  any  rational  ground.  God  made  all  tilings  by  the 
word — that  is,  by  the  expression,  or  operation  of  His 
Power.  The  words  which  in  grammar  are  called  verbs, 
literally  words,  represent  operations.  The  words  of  a 
language  are  the  artificial  signs  of  things ;  operations  are 
the  natural  signs  of  efficient  causes,  or  substances.  Thus 
motion  or  impulse  is  the  natural  sign  of  power;  or  it  is 
the  word  of  power.  It  will  be  proved  in  another  place 
that  the  Word,  or  the  Son  of  God,  is  the  operation  of 
the  three-fold  Essence,  or  Efficient  Cause, — that  is,  of 


S£  THE  ALPHABET 

Power,  Spirit  and  Truth  combined  in  One;  or  rather, 
that  He,  the  Son,  is  the  product,  or  register  of  this 
operation.  God  made  the  world  by  the  Wrd,  or  the 
Operation  of  His  power; — He  regenerates  the  world  by 
the  Word,  or  expression,  or  manifestation  of  His  truth. 
"For  this  cause  came  I  into  the  world,  that  I  might  bear 
"witness  to  the  truth." 

Impulse  is  the  word,  or  the  operation  of  power,  but 
power  operating  on  nothing,  impels  nothing,  produces 
nothing.  But  power  operating  on,  or  within  itself,  pro- 
duces,  or  forms  itself  into  a  concrete,  or  solid  substance. 
This  will  be  shewn  at  length. 

St.  Paul  says,  "The  things  which  are  seen  were  not 
^^made  of  things  which  do  appear."  That  they  were 
then  made  of  things  which  do  not  appear  to  the  senses, 
seems  plainly  to  be  implied.  And  if  St.  Paul  really 
had  known  that  things  were  made  of  nothing,  there 
could  not  have  been  a  more  convenient  opening  for  him 
to  have  made  the  declaration  in  plain  terms.  But  he 
did  not  make  it,  and  this  alone  is  indirect  evidence,  that 
the  things  which  are  seen  are  made  of  things  unseen. 

That  the  world  is  made  of  nothing,  is  a  metaphysical 
dogma,  unsupported  either  by  reason,  or  revelation.  It 
is  thus  that  a  false  philosophy  puts  carnal  \veapons  into 
the  hands  of  theology,  who  persuades  herself  that  she  is 
wielding  the  sword  of  the  word,  while  in  reality  she  is 
lighting  under  the  banners  of  a  ^'cry  diflerent  warfare. 


OF  THOUGHT.  33 

CHAPTER  III. 

OF  MATERIAL  SUBSTANCE. 

Matter  is  that  which  is  solid  and  ponderous,  or  mat- 
ter is  that  which  gravitates  and  repels.  This  is  the  usual 
way  of  defining  matter.  But  "A  definition  strictly  and 
^'logically  regular,  points  out  the  genus  of  the  thing  de- 
'^fined,  and  the  specific  difference  by  which  that  thing 
''is  distinguished  from  every  other  species  belonging  to 
"that  genus."*  According  to  this,  the  above  definition 
of  matter  is  not  logically  regular;  it  points  out  the  spe- 
cific difference,  but  not  the  genus.  Gravitation  and  re- 
pulsion distinguish  matter  from  every  other  species  of 
substance,  but  do  not  form  the  character  of  the  genus,  or 
of  substance  generally.  Matter,  indeed,  is  called  by  a 
generical  name;  it  is  called  a  suhstance;  and  it  has  this 
name  in  common  M'ith  several  other  objects  of  knowledge, 
— or  there  are  several  species  of  substance  actually  re- 
cognized by  mankind  generally ;  and  this  \vould  seem 
to  imply,  or  rather  it  does  most  plainly  imply,  a  tacit  re- 
cognition of  the  generical  characteristic  of  substance, — 
or  of  that  which  constitutes  any  thing  a  substance.  But 
we  are  admonished  by  the  grave  philosopher,  that  the 
generic  chai  ccteristic  is  unknown,  and  that  the  knowledge 
of  it  is  beyond  the  reach  of  the  human  intellect.  We  arc 
told  i\mi  facts  are  the  only  proper  subjects  of  philosophi- 
cal investigation ; — and  he  who  launches  into  the  invisi. 
hie  world,  with  a  view  to  explore  its  depths,  or  who  at- 

♦•Arjftotle. 


'24  THE  ALPHABET 

tempts  to  speculate  on  the  metaphysical  cliaracter  of  sub- 
stances, is  viewed  nearly  in  the  same  light  with  the 
alchymist  in  search  of  the  philosophei-'s  stone. 

If  it  were  really  the  fact,  that  the  generic  characteris- 
tic, or  that  which  constitutes  substance,  were  unknown, 
or  unperceived  by  the  human  mind,  then  substance  would 
be  a  word  without  any  signification — at  least  without  any 
metaphysical  application.  But  if  the  generic  character 
of  substances  were  really  unknown,  on  what  principle,  it 
might  be  asked,  are  the  several  species  referred  to  the 
same  genus?  What  is  the  ground  of  this  classification?' 
Why  is  matter,  and  why  is  mind  called  substance  ?  How 
does  it  come  to  pass,  that  mankind  generally  recognize 
certain  things  as  substances?  There  must  be  some  prin- 
ciple which  has  the  common  consent  of  mankind,  at  the 
bottom  of  this  classification. 

The  only  rational  solution  of  the  problem  is  to  be 
found  in  the  fact,  that  the  metaphysical,  or  generical 
characteristic  of  substance  is  perceived  by  mankind  gen- 
erally,  by  the  teamed  and  by  the  unlearned.  The  busi- 
ness of  philosophy  is,  not  to  deny  this  palpjible  fact,  but 
to  analyse  it,  to  inquire  what  is  indeed  the  object  of  the 
mind's  eye  in  the  perception  of  substance.  A  logical 
analysis  of  the  fact,  that  the  mind  perceives  certain  things 
to  be  substances,  will  detect  the  metaphysical  character 
of  substance,  because  it  will  discover  w  liat  it  is  that  the 
mind  actually  perceives  as  constituting  substance.  It 
will  unfold  and  demonstrate  the  principle,  that  substan- 
ces are  the  efficient  causes  of  tlieir  respective  phenomena  j 
and  it  will  shew  that  they  are  actually  recognized  as 
such.  And  it  is  a  fact,  that  in  all  our  theorizing  respect- 
ing matter,  and  in  all  the  common  transactions  of  life,  a 
specific  efficient  cause  is  tacitly  recognized  as  constituting 
material  substance. 


OF  THOUGHT.  25 

Mutter  is  the  efficient  cause  of  gravitation  and  re- 
f  vision;  in  other  Mords,  material  substance  is  mechani- 
cal power.  It  is  proposed  to  estahlish  this  definition  of 
matter  in  the  disquisition  which  follows. 

It  is  common  to  apply  the  word  power  to  efficiency  in 
general,  or  to  any  species  of  efficiency.  There  is  the 
poif-er  nf  truth,  and  the  power  to  think,  as  w  ell  as  the 
power  to  impel,  or  to  move.  But  when  the  word  is  used 
absolutely,  it  signifies  a  certain  species  or  kind  of  effici- 
ent cause,  that  is,  mechanical  power,  ov  the  power  to 
impel. 

In  opposition  to  our  hifpothesis  \\t  shall  be  told,  that 
thoui;h  matter  gra\itates  and  repels,  it  is  not  the  real  ef- 
ficient cause  of  these  phenomena.     We  shall  be  told  that 
matter  is  made  of  nothing,  and  that,  consequently,  it  pos- 
sesses no  real  power,  or  efficiency,  and  is  incapable,  in 
itself,  of  producing  any  operation ;  that  though  it  is  the 
apparent,  it  is  not  the  real  efficient  cause  of  gravitation 
and  repulsion.     These  consequences  have  been  admitted 
on  all  hands,  as  flowing  from  the  principle   that  matter 
is  made  of  nothing;  and  that  matter  is  not  the  efficient 
cause  of  the  phenomena,  is  the  ground  on  which  it  has 
l>een  contended  that  matter  has  no  existence.     It  is  al- 
ledged  by  those  who  contend  for  the  existence  of  matter, 
that  gravitation  is  produced  by  a  physical,  or  secondary 
cause,  an  impression,  or  impulse,  produced  ah  extra.  It 
is  believed  that  this  operation,  ab  extra,  is  necessary  to 
the  production  of  gravitation,  because  matter,  as  it  is  said^ 
does  not,  in  itself,  possess  the  power  to  gravitate.     It  is 
believed,  if  we  rightly  understand  this  scheme,  that  the 
uniformity  of  the  gravitation  of  matter,  is  maintained  by 
llie  immediate  superintendence  and  energy  of  the  Su- 
preme First  Cause,  or  rreator;  and  that  all  the  pheno- 

l 


26  THE  ALPHABET 

mena  of  mattev  are  produced  in  the  same  Avay,  or  tliat 
God  is  the  immediate  ageut  in  their  production. 

This  scheme  implies  that  the  Deity  is  the  only  effi 
cient  cause  in  the  universe,  and  that  every  operation  in 
nature  is  the  effect  of  a  divine  volition,  and  the  operation 
of  divine  power.  To  maintain  consistency,  this  doctrine 
has  been  carried  into  the  philosophy  of  mind  also, 
and  the  Supreme  Being  is  represented  as  the  only  effi- 
cient agent  in  every  action,  or  operation,  whether  intel- 
lectual, moral,  or  physical.  Some  have  supposed  that 
events  are  produced  simjdy  by  divine  volition,  without 
any  exertion  of  power.  But  it  is  so  absurd  to  suppose 
that  a  simple  volition  can  produce  the  effects  that  are  pro- 
per only  to  power,  that  it  would  l)e  an  insult  to  common 
sense  to  go  about  to  refute  it.  That  Divine  Providence 
controuls  and  directs  all  events,  is  undeniable;  it  is  a 
fact  that  is  established  in  revelation  and  in  reason:  but 
to  suppose  that  He  is  the  sole  efilcient  cause,  or  agent,  in 
all  operations,  moral  and  physical,  while  He  at  the  same 
time  controuls  all  events,  is  to  suppose  Him  to  controul 
His  own  operations.  It  would,  in  fact,  imply  the  sup- 
position, that  the  Deity  controuls,  or  that  He  only  sus- 
pends His  own  operations,  Avhen  He  restrains  the  actions 
of  the  wicked.  These  are  t!ie  legitimate  consequences 
of  the  principle  that  the  world  is  made  of  nothing;  the 
Deity  would  be  the  real  agent  in  all  the  operations  of 
the  human  mind,  as  well  as  in  tlje  gravitation  of  matter. 

Some  pliilosophers,  perceiving  the  absurdity  of  tiiis 
theory  of  gravitation,  and  perceiving  also  that  it  dero- 
gates from  the  dignity  of  the  divine  character,*  have  in- 
vented another  scheme  to  account  for  the  gravitation  of 


•It  is  a  heathen  maxim,  but  a  wise  one,  that,  We  should  nrver  make  (t 
god  appear,  but  on  an  occasion  worthy  of  a  g'Ofl. 


OF  THOUGHT.  Sr 

matter,  which  shall  be  noticed  after  a  short  examination 
of  the  one  already  before  us. 

Let  us  inquire  tlicn,  Is  it  a  real  fact,  that  the  gravita- 
tioii  of  matter  is  produced,  not  by  matter  itself,  but  by 
divine  power  operatiug  upon  matter?  Has  it  been  ascer- 
tained by  experiment  and  observation,  that  bodies  gra- 
vitate, not  by  their  own  inherent  tendency  and  power, 
but  in  consequence  of  an  impulse  produced  upon  them 
from  without?  By  no  means.  It  has  never  been  observed 
ill  a  single  instance  lliat  gravitation  is  produced  by  an 
extraneous  impulse.  13ut  it  is  said,  this  extraneous  im- 
pulse, or  some  extraneous  cause,  is  necessary  to  the  pro- 
duction of  tlie  phenomenon,  for  that  matter  possesses  no 
power  in  itself,  nor  any  necessary  tendency  to  gravitate. 
Tliis  is  a  begging  of  the  question ;  or,  at  best,  it  is  a  de- 
duction from  the  principle  that  matter  is  made  of  nothing ; 
a  principle  intirely  witliout  foundation. 

The  other  theory,  above  alluded  to,  invented  to  a.c- 
count  for  the  gravitation  of  matter  consistently  with  the 
principle,  that  matter  is  made  of  nothing,  is  this,  that 
matter,  having  no  efficiency  of  its  own,  is  endowed  with 
the  power  to  gravitate,  or  impressed  with  the  tendency, 
at  its  creation.  But  this  is  a  mere  gratuitous  assumption. 
And  it  might  Ije  asked,  What  was  the  thing  that  Avas 
impressed  with  the  tendency  to  gravitate?  It  was  not 
material  substance  until  it  had  that  tendency;  for  matter 
is  that  which  gravitates;  What  was  it  then  before  it  was 
matter,  or  before  it  had  gravity?  It  was  notliing  that  was 
iuipressed  with  the  tendency,  or  v»'hich  received  the  pow- 
er to  gravitate.  It  is  nothing  still  if  it  do  not  gravitate 
really.  And  the  difficulty  returns  upon  us,  that  matter 
gravitates,  either  necessarily  or  vuluntarihj.  That  gra- 
vitation is  a  voluntary  operation,  as  it  respects  matter 
itself,  cannot  be  admitted — \^  ill  not  be  believed  by  any 


28  THE  ALPHABET 

one:  that  it  is  the  effect  of  divine  volition,  and  the  ope- 
ration of  divine  power,  is  equally  inadmissahle;— ^this 
will  appear  more  fully  by  and  by  ; — jiiul,  if  gravitation 
is  a  necessary  operation  of  mattei',  if  it  is  the  nt'ccssary 
consequence  of  its  nature,  how  is  that  nature,  or  neces- 
sity, known  to  be  ssiperinduccd,  and  not  involved  m  the 
existence  of  the  substance? 

If  matter  gravitates  necessarily,  tlien  it  is,  apparently, 
and  there  is  no  good  ground  to  sujjpose  lljat  it  is  not 
really  the  ellicient  cause  of  gravitation.  Jjut  if  the 
former  theory  be  the  true  one,  that  matter  lias  no  real 
agency  in  producing  the  phenomenon ;  then  matter  gra- 
vitates neither  recessarily  nor  voluntarily;  it  is  not  real- 
ly matter  which  gravitates.  But  tlien,  matter  has  no 
existence  that  we  know ;  we  had  imagined  that  we  ]>er- 
ceived  matter  in  its  phenomena,  or  through  the  medium 
of  its  operations,  but  we  certainly  perceive  nothing  but 
that  vrhich  gravitates,  really,  we  perceive  mechanical 
power,  and  nothing  else. 

But  matter  manifests  its  existence  so  plainly  through 
the  medium  of  its  solidity,  or  its  phenomenon  repul- 
sion,  that  it  would  be  absurd  to  deny  its  existence, 
even  though  we  give  up  gravitation  as  f»irnishing  evi- 
dence of  that  existence.  Is  repulsion,  then,  the  real 
operation  of  matter?  Is  material  substance  the  real  ef- 
Jicient  cause  of  repulsion?  If  so,  then,  tliat  material 
substance  exwts,  is  a  logical  deduction  from  the  exist- 
ence of  the  phenomenon.  But  if  matter  is  the  real 
agent  in  tlie  one  case,  why  not  in  the  other?  Repulsion 
is  an  energy,  or  operation,  of  the  same  species,  or  kind 
with  gravitation,  and  requires  the  same  species  of  ef- 
ficient cause;  and  if  matter  is  the  real  cflBcient  cause  of 
this  phenomenon,  why  not  of  gravitation  also?  But  those 
who  tell  us  that  matter  is  made  of  nothing,  are  bound  to 


OF  THOUGHT,  £9 

conleiul"  that  matter  is  not  the  real  efficient  cause  of 
either  pljeMOiuciiou;  or  iliat  repulsion  is  not  necessarily 
c<Minected  with  the  substance,  any  more  than  gravitation. 
Tliey  will  tell  us  that  the  phenomena  furnish  no  logi- 
cal evidence  whatever,  of  the  existence  of  matter,  be- 
cause they  have  no  necessary  connexion  with  it.  How 
then  do  you  know  tliat  matter  exists?  Take  away  gra- 
vitation and  repulsion,  or  take  away  the  necessary  con- 
nexion of  these  pheooniena  wilh  matter,  and  tlie  sub- 
stance vanishes  like  the  ^'baseless  fabric  of  a  vision,  and 
^'leaves  not  a  wreck  beliind."  We  perceive  matter  in 
lliCiiC  phenomena;  gravitation  and  repulsion  constitute 
tliG  sensible  Jorniy  or  the  idea  of  matter.  We  have  no 
other  idea  of  matter  than  this ;  all  other  ideas,  or  sensi- 
ble forms  may  be  a!)stracted  from  matter,  but  gravitation 
and  repulsion  caiinot. 

The  only  avenues  to  the  mind,  are  the  senses,  and 
the  reasoning  faculty;  in  other  words,  every  object  of 
human  knowledge  is,  either  a  phenomenon,  that  is,  an 
operatiun  wliich  presents  itself  immediately  to  the  senses 
or  to  the  mind,  or  it  is  an  object  invisible  to  the  senses, 
and  perceived  only  by  reason,  or  by  way  of  inference 
from  the  phenomena.  We  infer  the  invisible  efficient 
cause  from  the  visible  operation.  But  substances  made 
of  nothiug  are  not  perceived  in  either  of  these  ways. 
This  is  granted  on  all  hands.  A  substance  does  not 
present  itself  immediately  to  the  senses,  like  an  ope- 
ration ;  neither  are  substances  made  of  notiiing,  perceiv- 
ed by  reason;  the  operations  of  nature  furnish  no  logical 
evidence  of  a  substance  which  does  not  really  operate. 
Nor  is  it  alledged  that  the  human  mind  possesses  any 
faculty  of  perception,  other  than  reason,  sense,  and  con 
sciousness. 


30  TllK  ALPHABET 

But  Me  are  told,  that  though  we  have  uo  lo^Ril  evi- 
dence of  the  existence  of  matter,  and  though  it  is  not 
perceived  immediately,  as  motion,  perception  and  other 
operations  are,  yet  that  it  is  jjerceived ;  w^  know  that  it 
exists,  for  it  is  a  fact  that  it  is  perceived.  We  perceive, 
gravitation  and  repulsion  by  the  senses,  but  beside  this, 
we  perceive  the  substance  which  gravitates;  or  we  per- 
ceive something  which  gravitates  and  rrf>els;  that  is, 
we  perceive  that  there  must  be  an  operator  v.'.here  there 
is  an  operation  ;  we  perceive  tliat  there  ^*must  be  somc- 
^Hliing  which  gravitates  and  repels/''-  Very  good. 
But  this  perception  that  there  must  he  something  which 
gravitates  and  repels,  ir,  a  deduction  of  reason;  it  is  in- 
fering  the  agent  from  the  operation.  Then  substances 
arc  not  perceived  immediately,  as  has  been  supposed, 
but  their  existence  is  inferred  from  t!ie  phenomena. 

It  is  a  fact  too.  that  avc  infer  a  specific  opes-ator,  from 
a  specific  operation ;  from  gravitation  and  repulsion  we 
infer  the  existence  of  that  specidc  thing  w  hich  v/e  call 
material  substance. — If  the  substance  were  perceived 
immediately,  or  without  an  exercise  of  reason,  there 
could  then  be  no  ground  for  dispute  about  whetlier  the 
substance  which  s^ravitates,  be  the  same  with  that  which 
perceives.  If  these  substances  were  perceived  imme- 
diately, as  operations  are,  the  question  wouhl  be  settled 
at  once  by  immediate  perception.  We  never  dispute 
about  whether  blue  and  yelUjw  are  tlie  same,  or  diiler- 
ent  colours;  or  whether  motion,  and  perception  are  the 
same,  or  different  phenomena.  In  the  perception  of  a 
phenomenon,  or  operation,  there  can  ])c  no  ground  for 
dispute  about  Avhat  the  object  is;  it  is  just  what  it  ap- 
pears to  ])e.     The  case  would  be  just  the  same  with 

•Dr.  Reid. 


OF  THOUGHT.  31 

respect  to  substances,  if  tliey  were  perceived  immedi- 
ately; they  would  then  appear  to  be  just  what  they 
really  are;  their  appearance  would  ho.  occidar  demon- 
stration. 

It  is  an  imperious  dictate  of  reason,  that  wherever 
there  is  an  operation,  there  is  an  operator,  and  that  a 
specific  operatiiju  requires  a  specific  operator,  or  a  spe- 
cific cilicient  cause, — a  cause  which  is  able,  and  has  a 
direct  tendency  to  produce  that  specific  operation.  It  is 
in  fact  a  specific  operator  that  is  uniformly  inferred  from 
gravitation  and  repulsion,  and  that  is  dcnomiuated  ma- 
terial substance ;  for  it  is  undeniable  i\v:A  mankind  ge- 
nerally perceive  this  substance,  and  that  they  look  no 
deeper,  nor  higher  than  tlic  substance  itself,  for  the  ef- 
ficient haais  of  the  phenomena.  None  but  philosophers 
of  a  certain  school  ever  speculate  on  the  efTicieucy,  or 
inefficiency  of  the  substance;  and  they  do  not  pretend  to 
have  ascertained  the  alledged  fact  of  its  inefficiency,  in 
a  philosophical  way ;  they  have  not  even  investigated 
the  metaphysical  principle  on  which  their  doctrine  is 
founded,  the  principle  that  the  world  is  made  of  nothing. 

In  opposition  to  tliese  arguments  it  will  be  urged,  that 
the  substance  actually  perceived  is  not  tlie  efficient  cause 
of  the  phenomena,  but  that  it  is  something  else,  a  thing 
which  is  made  of  nothing,  an  inert  thing,  which  cannot 
of  itself  produce  the  phenomena. — It  is  thus  that  it  is 
attempted  to  reconcile  the  metaphysical  dogma,  that  the 
world  is  made  of  nothing,  with  the  known/acf  that  sub- 
stances are  perceived  by  the  human  mind.  It  is  assert- 
ed that  we  perceive  suhstances  which  are  made  of  noth- 
ing, and  which  are  not  the  efficient  causes  of  the  pheno- 
mena ;  and,  in  conformity  with  this,  it  is  asserted,  that 
the  perception  of  substance  is  not  a  deduction  of  reason- 
These  alledged  facts  are  believed  to  he  sufficient  to  prop, 


S2  TJIR  ALPHAIJET 

or  even  to  support  the  whole  of  the  mysterious  fnhriv 
that  is  reared  upon  them ;  among  other  tilings,  that  the 
metaphysical  object  called  material  substance  h  perceiv- 
ed, and  yet  its  metaphysical  character  is  not  perceived ; 
that  it  is  perceived  neither  hy  sense,  nor  by  reason,  nor 
by  any  known  faculty  of  the  mind^  yet  it  is  perceived. 

Facts  are  stubborn  things;  and  it  is  a  certain  fact  that 
v/e  perceive  material  siU)slance;  we  are  conscious  that 
we  perceive  it.     And  if  we  are  equally  certain  that  we 
perceive  siibfitnnces  which  are  made  aj  nothing,  if  we 
were  conscious  of  this,  or  if  we  were  conscious  that  the 
perception  of  su!)stance  is  not  a  deduction  of  reason, 
then  indeed  there  would  be  ground  to  conleud  for  tl;c 
nothingness  of  matter.     But  is  it  a  real  ft^t  that  we  per- 
ceive substances  that  are  made  of  nothing,  and  which 
are  not  the  efficient  causes  of  the  phenomena?  Are  we 
conscious  of  perceiving,  in  material  substance,  a  tiling 
which  is  made  of  nothing,  and  which  has  no  necessary 
connexion  with  the  phenomena?  Are  we  couscinus  of 
jjerceiving  that  the  ptsenomena  are  connected  arbitrarily 
with  the  substance;  and  that,  if  it  had  pleased  tjje  Crea- 
tor, we  might  have  perceived  a  material  substance  vvhicl» 
did  not  gravitate  and  repel ;  or  that  Me  might  have  had 
the  phenomena  just  the  same,  but  unconnected  with  any 
«u])stance,  or  being,  except  the  Deity  ?  Certainly  we  are 
not  conscious  of  perceiving  all  tliis ;  on  the   conlrary, 
common  sense  revolts  from  the  doctrine  thus  carried  out 
to  its  genuine  results.     When  the  phenomena  of  matter 
are  addressed  to  the  senses,  Ave  perceive  that  there  must 
be  a  substance,  we  perceive  that  the  operation  is  neces- 
sarily connected  with  a  specilic  operator,  or  with  some- 
thing which  has  a  tendency  to  produce  that  specific  ope- 
ration ;  and  we  never  dream  of  the  hand  of  Deity  being 
immediately  concerned. 


OF  THOUGHT;  S3 

It  is  granted  on  all  hands,  tliat  we  perceive  in  matter 
something  -which  gravitates  and  repels.  But  if  tiiat  which 
prodnce««  these  phenomena,  is  not,  really,  material  sub- 
istance,  but  the  hand  of  Deity,  then  it  is  the  hand  of  De- 
ity that  i?  perceived — or  it  is  the  j^oicer  of  Deity  that  is 
perceived ;  and  if  we  do  not  choose  to  call  the  power  of 
God  I)y  the  name  of  material  substance,  then  there  is  no 
material  substance.  There  is  nothing  in  the  universe 
that  does,  or  that  can  gravitate  and  repel,  excepting  that 
which  is  able  to  gravitate  and  repel,  that  is,  the  eflScient 
cause  of  gravitation  and  repulsion.  Nothing  but  power 
can  gravitate  and  repel;  in  fact,  whatever  does  gravitate 
and  repel,  or  produce  any  modification  of  impulse,  is  de- 
nominated iiowev.  The  word  'power  signifies,  that  which 
moves,  or  impels.  These  phenomena  are,  on  all  hands, 
referred  to  power  as  their  iiltlmafe  cause;  but  one  party, 
or  sect,  contends,  that  there  is  an  intermediate  something, 
called  matter;  something  which  comes  between  the  cause 
and  the  eftect — between  the  operation  and  the  real  ope- 
rator. But  this  is  a  bare  assumption ;  for  this  interme- 
diate thing  is  not,  in  fact,  perceived  nor  known  to  exist. 
The  thing  perceived  through  the  medium  of  the  pheno- 
mena, is  the  efficient  cauee  of  the  phenomena;  it  is  that 
which  gravitates  and  repels  really;  we  are  not  conscious 
of  perceiving  any  thing  beside.  It  is  a  maxim  of  the 
Newtonian  philosophy,  to  ^'Admit  no  more  causes  than 
"are  true  [real]  and  are  sufficient  to  account  for  the  pl>e- 
••nomena.'^  If  matter  is  not  the  real  cause  of  the  phe- 
nomena, its  existence  is  not  necessary  to  account  for  the 
phenomena. 

Before  wc  quit  this  subject,  it  is  perhaps  necessary  to 
inquire  a  little  further  into  this  theory  of  the  perception 
of  matter.     After  the  adoption  of  the  principle  that  mat- 
ter is  made  of  nothing,  it  was  perceived  to  be  a  necessa- 
5 


gi  THE  ALPHABET 

ry  consequence,  that  matter  is  not  the  real  efficient  cause 
of  its  pbeuomena;  and  that,  of  course,  the  phenomena 
could  have  no  necessary  connexion  with  the  substance. 
Hence  it  became  necessary  further  to  admit,  that  there 
existed  no  logical  evidence  of  the  existence  of  material 
substance ;  and  some  pursued  this  train  of  reasoning  until 
it  led  to  the  conclusion  that  matter  1ms  no  existence. 
Those  who  still  contended  for  the  existence"of  matter,  in 
spite  of  philosophy,  admitted  all  these  results,  (the  last 
excepted) — they  acknowledged  they  could  not. establish 
the  fact  of  the  existence  of  matter,  on  rational  grounds. 
In  truth,  if  the  fundamental  principle  of  this  theory  were 
true— if  matter  w^ere  made  of  nothing,  it  w  ould  be  im- 
possible to  prove  its  existence — it  would  be  impossible 
to  know  or  perceive  its  existence. 

But  the  modern  attempt  to  establish  this  theory  on 
fact,  is  perhaps  the  most  ingenious,  and  is  certainly  the 
most  sophistical  that  has  been  recorded.  Ever  since  the 
invention  of  the  new  organ  of  investigation  by  Sir  Fran- 
cis Bacon,  the  induction  of  facts  has  been  considered  the 
only  legitimate  method  of  philosophizing.  Considering, 
very  justly,  that  the  study  of  metaphysics  should  be  pro- 
secuted in  the  same  method  w  ith  that  of  physical  science, 
by  induction  of  facts,  it  has  occurred  to  our  modern  me- 
taphysicians that  the  perception  of  matter  should  be 
considered  an  ultimate  fact,  or  a  law  of  the  mind,  just 
as  the  gravitation  of  matter  is  an  ultimate  fact,  or  a  law 
of  matter.  This  appears  to  have  been  intended  as  an 
application  of  the  Baconian  method  in  the  science  of 
Logic,  to  determine  tlie  predicament  of  a  particular ^c/, 
or  to  induct  that  fact  into  a  class;  that  is,  to  class  the 
liercejption  of  matter  with  ultimate  facts.  But,  unfor- 
tunately for  the  attempt,  it  seems  to  have  been  forgotten, 
that  according  to  the  Baconian  metliod,  investigation,  or 


OF  THOUGHT.  S3 

analysis,  should  precede  induction.  If  tbe  authors  of 
this  new  theory  of  perception,  had  analysed  the  fact — the 
perception  of  matter— tliey  would  not  have  classed  it 
with  ultimate  facts.  But  they  seem  to  have  considered 
a  simple  statement  of  the  fact,  and  of  its  character,  to  be 
all  that  is  called  for  by  the  method  that  they  profess  to 
follow. 

Professor  Stewart,  of  Edinburg,  w  ho  is  the  oracle  in 
metaphysics,  will  speak  for  the  whole  sect  on  the  theory 
of  the  perception  of  matter.  On  this  sulyect  the  Profes- 
sor has  the  following  observations. — "Singular  as  it  may 
<'^appear,  Dr.  Reid  was  the  fust  person  who  had  courage 
"to  lay  completely  aside  all  the  common  hypothetical 
^'language  concerning  perception,  and  to  exhibit  the  dif- 
"ficulty  in  all  its  magnitude,  by  a  plain  statement  of  the 
"fact.  To  what  then,  it  may  be  asked,  does  this  state, 
"ment  amount? — Merely  to  this,  that  the  mind  is  so 
"formed,  tliat  certain  impressions,  produced  on  our  or- 
"gans  of  sense  by  external  o])jects,  are  followed  by  cor- 
'^respondent  sensations ;  and  that  these  sensations  (which 
"have  no  more  resemblance  to  the  qualities  of  matter 
"than  the  Avords  of  a  language  have  to  the  things  they 
"denote)  are  followed  by  a  perception  of  the  existence 
•'and  qualities  of  the  bodies  by  which  the  impressions 
"are  made."  The  author  goes  on  to  observe,  that,  "for 
"aught  Ave  knoAV,  the  connection  betAvecn  the  perception 
*'and  the  sensation,  as  Avell  as  that  between  the  sensation 
"and  the  impression,  may  be  arbitrary ;  and  that  at  any 
*^rate,  the  consideration  of  these  sensations,  which  are 
"attributes  of  mind,  can  throw  no  light  on  the  manner  in 
"which  we  acquire  our  knowledge  of  the  existence  and 
"nature  of  bodies.  And  though,  by  the  constitution  of 
"our  nature,  certain  sensations  are  rendered  the  constant 
"antecedent*  of  our  perceptions,  yet  it  is  just  as  difficult 


36  THE  ALPHABET 

*^io  explain  how  our  perceptions  arc  obtained  by  tlieir 
''means,  as  it  would  be  upon  the  supposition,  that  we 
"were  all  at  once  inspired  with  them,  without  any  con- 
'^comitant  sensations  whatever."*  The  Professor  else- 
where tells  us,  that  the  perception  of  material  substance, 
or  "the  belief  in  the  existence  of  the  material  world,'"  is 
a  ^'fundamental  law  of  human  hclipf''\ 

Professor  Stewart  and  Dr.  lleid  are  intitled  to  much 
credit  for  having  had  the  candour  to  ^'exhibit  the  diffi- 
^^culty  in  all  its  magnitude,"  instead  of  pursuing  the 
beaten  track,  and  not  incpiiring  how  our  sensations  and 
ideas  are  connected  \a  ith  a  substance  which  is  made  of 
nothing;  or  in  what  manner  the  mind  acquires  a  know- 
ledge of  such  substance.  But  it  is  strange  that  such 
minds  should  still  have  been  so  shackled  by  the  false 
principle,  that  matter  is  made  of  nothing  and  has  no 
iiecessary  connexion  with  the  phenomena;  it  is  strange 
that  the  very  nature  and  magnitude  of  the  difficulty  did 
not  lead  them  to  analyse  the  subject,  and  to  shake  off 
their  chains  by  a  detection  of  tlie  fallacy.  Men  of  tran- 
scendent talents,  professing  to  reject,  as  spurious,  every 
thing  which  did  not  come  supported  by  established  fact, 
yet  voluntarily,  and  without  an  investigation  of  its  evi- 
dence, binding  themselves  down  to  a  principle,  which, 
like  the  stone  of  Sisyphus,  is  continually  dragging  tJiem 
down  again  from  the  summit  which  seemed  to  beckon 
their  ascent. 

The  professor  proposes  to  himself  to  ''lay  aside  all 
the  common  liypothetical  language  concerning  percep- 
tion, and  to  exhibit  a  plain  statement  of  the  fact."  This 
fact  is  expanded  into  a  pretty  long  paragraph ;  though 

•Elements  of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind,  pages  86,  87,  first  vol. 
Amer.  ed. 
fVol.  2,  p.  55,  New  York  ed 


OF  THOUGHT.  37 

all  tliat  is  reaUy  fact,  may  be  expressed  in  a  short  sen- 
tence.    ^'CerLain  imprcssioivs  produced  on  our  organs 
"'•'of  sense,   are   followed  by  correspondent  sensations ; 
"'^and  these  sensations  are  followed  by  a  perception  of 
*^the  existence  and  qualities  of  the  bodies  by  which  the 
impressions  are  made.'^     These  few  words,  and  they 
are  sufficiently  prolix — express  the  vvhole  of  the /acf; 
the  remainder  of  the  paragraph  is  hypothetical.     And 
we  are  compelled  to  observe,  tiiat  the /acf  is  stated  in- 
correctly; there  is  a  radical  error  contained  in  it,  which 
it  is  necessary  to  have  corrected,  before  it  be  received  as 
A  principle  in  pliilosophy;  '•the  sensation  is"  not  uni- 
formly or  necessarily  "followed  by  a  perception  of  the 
^^existence  and  qualities  of  the  bodies  by  which  the  im- 
"pressions  are  made."'     The  mind  is  not  "so  formed,'* 
that  the  impression  on  the  external  oi'gan  is  necessarily 
followed  by  a  perception  of  the  bodies  w  hich  make  the 
impression.     The  author's  "statement  of  fact/'  as  he 
terms  it,  assumes  the  very  point  in  dispute,  that  the  per 
ception  of  substance  is  not  a  deduction  of  reason:  but 
that  "by  the  constitution  of  our  nature,"  the  impression 
on  the  external  organ  is  followed  by  a  perception  of  the 
bodies  by  w  hich  the  impressions  arc  made. — If  it  be  a 
truth,  that  the  impression  and  sensation  are  uniformly 
followed  l)y  a  jjerception  of  the  existence  and  qualities  of 
the  bodies  which  make  the  impression,  if  in  persons  in- 
capable of  reasoning,  that  perception  uniformly  follows 
the  impression  and  sensation,  then  that  perception  is  not 
a  deduction  of  reason,  it  is  not  an  inference  from  the  im- 
pression.    But  let  us  analyse  the  "fact,"  and  see  whe- 
ther it  is  as  the  author  has  conceived  and  has  stated  it. 

It  is  a  pretty  plain  fact,  that  "impressions  produced  on 
'^the  external  organs  of  sense,  are  followed  by  corre- 
••p})ondent  sensations." — -And  yet  this  fact  is  not  so  plain 


S8  THE  ALPHABEr 

and  simple,  as  it  may  appear  at  first  view,  or  as  the 
author  seems  to  have  conceived  it  to  be.  He  states,  not 
merely,  tliat  the  impression  is  followed  hy  a  sensation — 
but  that  'Hhe  impression  is  followed  by  a  correspondent 
^^sensation/'  He  says,  moreover,  that  ^Hhese  sensations 
'^have  no  more  resemblance  to  the  qualities  of  matter, 
'•'than  the  words  of  a  laaguage  have  to  the  things  they 
'•denote."  The  correspondence  then,  of  the  sensation 
to  the  impression,  is  a  mere  arbitrary  correspondence, 
like  that  of  the  words  of  a  language  to  the  things  they 
denote.  But  if  this  be  so,  the  author  should  have  re- 
vealed the  manner  in  which  we  acquire  a  knowledge  of 
the  impression,  or  of  the  qualities  of  body :  for  if  the 
sensation  has  no  necessary  connexion  with  the  impres- 
sion, if  the  sensation  is  not  the  efl'ect,  of  which  the  im- 
pression is  the  exciting  cause;  then  it  will  be  just  as  dif- 
ficult to  explain  how  we  come  by  a  knowledge  of  the  im- 
pression, as  how  M'e  acquire  a  knowledge  of  the  body 
which  makes  the  impression.  If  the  sensation  is  only 
the  arbiirarif  sign  of  the  impression  on  the  external  or- 
gan, as  words  are,  of  the  thmgs  they  denote,  how 
do  Avc  learn  the  signification  of  the  sign?  how  do  we 
know  that  there  is  an  impression  ?  the  sensation  is  the 
only  sign,  or  the  only  notice  we  have  of  the  impression  ; 
and  if  it  is  an  arbitrary  sign,  and  lias  no  necessary  con- 
nexion with  the  impression,  how  do  we  learn  the  exist- 
ence of  the  impression?  Arbitrary  signs  have  no  natural 
or  necessary  relation  to  the  things  they  denote;  the  words 
of  a  language  convey  no  intelligence,  until  we  have 
learned  their  signification,  by  comparing  them  with  the 
things  signified.  But  how  shall  we  compare  the  sensa- 
tion within  the  mind,  (which  is  perceived  by  conscious- 
ness,) with  the  impression  without,  which  is  not  perceiv- 
ed by  consciousness^  and  of  which  we  know  nothing, 


OF  THOUGHT.  t39 

until  w«  learn  its  existence  through  the  medium  of  the 
sensation.  We  know  nothing  of  the  impression,  unless 
the  sensation  is  the  evidence  of  its  existence. 

But  what  is  the  fact  ?  is  tlie  connexion  of  the  sensa- 
tion with  the  impression,  an  ^'arbitrary"'  connexion? 
Bodies,  or  material  substances  produce  certain  impres- 
sions on  the  external  organs  of  sense.  These  impres- 
sions are  the  same  that  are  called  the  piienomena,  or  the 
sensible  qualities  of  bodies,  though  the  Professor  docs 
not  seem  to  have  identified  in  his  own  mind,  the  ^-quali- 
"ties  of  matter,"  and  the  "impressions  produced  on  the 
'^external  organs  of  sense. '^  Matter  has  no  qualities  but 
those  which  are  addressed  to  the  senses.  For  example, 
solidity,  or  repulsion  is  a  quality  of  matter;  and  repul- 
sion produced  on  the  organ  of  sense,  is  the  'Hmpression 
^^produced  on  the  organ  of  sense.''  The  "qualities  of 
"matter"  then,  arc  ihe  same  with  the  "impressions  pro- 
"duced  on  the  organs  of  sense  by  external  objects."  But 
what  is  the  sensation  which  follows  the  imjjression  '^  It 
is  simply  i\\y^ 'perception  of  the  impression;  or  rather, 
it  is  the  perception  of  the  change,  or  configuration,  pro- 
duced within  the  organ  by  the  impression.  AVhen  a 
hard  body  is  held  in  the  hand,  the  repulsion  of  that  body 
produces  a  compression  within  the  organ  of  feeling;  the 
organ,  or  nerve,  is  conscious,  or  sensible  of  this  com- 
pression; or  it  perceives  the  compression;  this  is  the 
sense,  or  sensation  of  hardness,  or  of  solidity;  it  is  the 
perception  of  the  impression,  or  quality  of  matter.  It  is 
thus  that  the  sensation  corresponds  to  the  impression ; 
it  is  the  perception  of  the  impression ;  this  is  not  an  ar- 
bitrary correspondence ;  it  is  the  correspondence  of  cause 
and  effect,  for  the  impression  is  the  exciting  cause  of  the 
sensation. 


40  THE  ALPHABET 

It  certainly  does  appear  to  the  common  sense  of  man- 
kind, that  there  is  a  natural  and  necessary  connexion  bc- 
tneen  the  impression  on  the  or2;an  of  sense  and  the  sen- 
sation which  follows;  and  tliat  tlie  sensation  is  ti;e  coz- 
nizance,  or  the  perception,  of  the  impression.     The  way 
in  which  we  obtain  a  knowledi;e  of  a  substance  and  its 
qualities,  is  to  apply  it  to  the  senses.     But  the  Professor 
says,  "the  consideration  of  these  sensations,  which  are 
^'attributes  of  mind,  can  throw  no  lidit  on  the  manner  in 
'^vhich  we  acquire  our  knowle»!ge  of  the  existence  and 
'^nature  of  bodies."'     And  it  is  true  that  sensation,  ab- 
stracted from  its  object,  and  considered  only  as  it  relates 
to  the  mind,  will  afford  no  light  on  this  subject:  but  there 
is  no  such  thing,   in  fact,  as  abstract  sensation ;   every 
sensation  has  an  object,  or  exciting  cause,  as  well  as  a 
subject,  or  an  efficient  cause.     The  mind  is  the  efficient 
cause  and  subject  of  tiie  sensation ;  but  the  impres-ion  on 
the  organ  is  the  exciting  cause  and  object  of  the  sensa- 
tion;— and  our  sensations  differ  from  one  another,  only 
according  to  the  differences  of  the  exciting  causes.  Thus 
it  is  in  considering  our  sensations  in  relation  to  their  ex- 
citing causes,  that  we  derive  the  light  which  explains  the 
perception  of  substances;  for  when  we  have  discovered 
the  impression  through  the  medium  of  tlie  sensation,  we 
are  then  naturally  led  by  reason  to  perceive,  that  there 
must  be  something  which  makes  the  impression — that 
there  must  be  a  substance,  or  an  efficient  cause  of  the 
impression.   Our  sensations  correspond  to  the  secondary 
qualities  of  matter,  in  the  same  way  that  they  do  to  the 
primary,  to  solidity  and  gravity.     This  will  be  the  sub- 
ject of  some  further  consideration  by  and  by.     But  to 
return. 

It  is  a  fact,  that  "impressions  produced  on  our  organs 
"of  sense,  are  followed  by  correspontUng  sensations ;  and 


OF  THOUGHT,  41 

^^ilietJe  sensations  are  followed,''  sometimes,  "by  a  per- 
'*^ce|)tion  of  the  existence  and  qualities  of  tlie  bodies  by 
^'uhicli  the  impressions  are  made."  But,  we  submit  the, 
question,  Is  it  the  fact,  that  tlie  imjyressions  are  uniform- 
ly followed  by  a  perception  of  the  existence  and  qualities 
of  the  bodies  by  which  the  impressions  arc  made?  Do 
infants  jrcrceive  substances  as  soon  as  the  impressions 
are  produced  on  their  organs  of  sense  ?  Do  infants  per- 
ceive at  all  the  existence  and  qitalities  of  the  bodies  by 
"Nvhich  the  impressions  are  made  ?  There  is  reason  to 
believe  that  infants  havfc  no  conceptions  of  any  thing  be- 
yond their  own  ideas  and  sensations;  they  certainly  have 
no  conceptions  w  hatever  of  the  impressions  produced  on 
their  organs,  until  they  have  acquired  that  knowledge  by 
frequent  experiment  and  observation. 

If  impressions  produced  on  the  organs  of  sense,  were 
uniformly  followed,  by  a  perception  of  the  substances 
which  make  the  impression,  then  the  percejjtlon  of  mat- 
ter Avould  appear  to  be  altogether  unaccountable  ;  for  it 
is  evident  that  the  impression  has  no  tendency  to  pro- 
duce the  2ierce2}tion  nf  matter ,  unless  it  be  addressed,  as 
evidence,  to  a  reasoning  mind  ;  and  it  is  equally  evident, 
that  the  mind  has  no  innate  tendency  to  jJerceive  matter. 
If  the  mind  were  originally  "^'so  formed,'^  as  to  perceive 
substance  whenever  an  impression  is  produced  on  the 
organ  of  sense,  then  it  should  perceive  matter  as  soon  as 
it  exists,  for  impressions  from  external  objects  are  con- 
tinually presenting  themselves.  As  soon  as  matter  ex- 
ists, it  gravitates ; — and  as  soon  as  mind  exists,  it  per- 
ceives. As  soon  as  there  is  life,  impressions  produced 
on  the  external  organs  of  sense  .will  be  felt,  or  perceived. 
As  soon  as  a  sensative  organ  exists,  it  feels,  or  perceives 
the  changes,  or  vibrations  produced  within  itself  by  the 
impressions  of  external  objects.'  It  is  true,  then,  tjiat 
6 


^  THE  ALPKABET 

impressious  produced  on  the  organs  of  sense,  are  follow- 
ed by  perception,  or  feeling;  but  not  always  by  a  per- 
ception of  tlie  substance  or  body,  M'hich  makes  the  im- 
pression.  Perception  then,  simple  perception  is  a  law 
of  mind;  whenever  mind  is  excited,  or  acted  on,  it 
perceives;  that  mind  perceives,  is  an  ultimate  fact 
which  cannot  be  accounted  for ;  that  is,  w^e  cannot  give 
a  reason  for  it,  we  cannot  tell  why  mind  perceives,  any 
more  than  we  can  tell  why  matter  gravitates.  We  can 
only  say,  it  is  the  nature  of  the  one  to  gravitate,  and  of 
the  other,  to  perceive.  But  we  cannot  with  equal  pro- 
priety say,  that  it  is  the  nature  of  mind  to  perceive  mate- 
rial substance,  or  any  particular  object.  The  mind  has 
an  innate  tendency  to  perceive,  but  it  has  no  innate  ideas, 
or  particular  perceptions.  Perception  is  its  own;  but 
ideas,  or  impressions,  come  to  it  from  without. 

The  gravitation  of  matter  is  an  ultimate  fact;  it  is  a 
fact  which  cannot  be  accounted  for,  that  is,  we  cannot 
give  a  reason  for  it;  it  is  a  universal  law  of  nature,  that 
matter  gravitates.  And  it  has  been  conceived,  tliat  by 
representing  the  perception  of  matter  as  an  ultimate 
fact,  or  a  law  of  the  mind,  that  the  whole  difficulty  re- 
specting the  perception  of  matter,  would  be  obviated ; 
that  if  it  is  a  lata  of  the  mind  to  perceive  substances 
which  are  made  of  nothing,  no  farther  account  of  the 
matter  could  reasonably  be  demanded.  But  the  percep- 
tion of  matter  is  not  an  ultimate  fact,  as  we  have  seen — 
it  is  not  a  universal  law  of  mind,  the  perception  oj  mat 
ter,  is  by  no  means  a  parallel  to  the  gravitation  of  mat- 
ter. The  two  facts  are  quite  dissimilar,  in  a  logical  as 
well  as  in  a  philosophical  point  of  view.  That  matter 
gravitates,  and  that  mind  perceives,  are  facts  precisely 
analogous,  in  a  logical  sense,  they  are  both  ultimate 
facts;  the  one  is  a  universal  law  of  matter,  the  other,  of 


OF  THOUGHT.  4S 

mind.  But  rtiat  inind  perceives  material  substance^  is 
quite  a  dift'ereiit  species  of  fact.  Perception  relates  to 
mind,  in  the  same  way  that  gravitation  relates  to  matter; 
these  are  necessary  relations;  but  the  perception  ofmat- 
ter  has  no  necessary  relation  either  to  mind^  or  to  mat- 
ter;  yet  it  relates  to  bothf  to  matter,  as  its  exciting 
cause  and  object;  and  to  mind  as  the  efficient  cause  of 
perception.  That  mind  perceives,  is  a  general  fact,  and 
it  is  a  fundamental  principle  of  metaphysical  science; 
but  that  mind  perceives  matter,  is  a  particular  instance 
of  that  general  fact.  The  efficient  cause  of  perception 
is  every  where  the  same,  nothing  but  mind,  or  spirit, 
perceives ;  hence  the  relation  of  perception,  to  mind^  is 
a  necessary  relation  ;  but  perception  is  excited  by  an  in- 
finite variety  of  objects,  or  exciting  causes,  which  arc 
foreign  to  the  mind,  but  incidentally  come  in  contact 
with  it;  hence  the  relation  of  perception  to  its  object  is 
an  incidental  relation. 

Before  we  have  done  with  this  subject,  we  shall  essay 
to  trace  the  process  in  which  the  mind  discovers  the  ex- 
istence  of  material  substance.  In  the  mean  time  we  will 
endeavor  farther  to  illustrate  the  position,  that  Power  is 
the  substance  of  matter,  and  the  efficient  cause  of  gravi- 
tation and  repulsion. 

It  may  be  alledged,  that  though  it  were  admitted  that 
Power  is  the  substance  of  matter,  still  this  would  not  re- 
move the  difficulty  respecting  the  gravitation  of  matter; 
it  would  not  account  for  the  phenomenon,  without  a  recur- 
rence  to  mind  as  the  ultimate  cause.  It  will  be  asked, 
Why  does  matter  gravitate  ?  Supposing  the  anbstance 
of  matter  to  be  Power,  why  should  power  uniformly  act 
toward  a  center  ?  Why  should  the  most  distant  bodies 
approach,  or  be  deflected  toward  each  other?  Power 
possesses  no  faculty  of  choice;  mailer  and  power,  are 


44  TKE  ALPHABET 

alike  incapable  of  choosing  in  what  direction  to  act,  or  to 
vhat  end.  How  then  can  it  be  accounted  for,  that  mat- 
ter uniformly  gravitates,  or  acts  toward  a  center  of  gra- 
vity, unless  this  direction  is  given  it  by  mind,  unless  tliis 
phenomenon  is  produced  by  the  power  and  influence  of 
the  supreme  first  cause,  the  divine  mind  ? 

This  appears  to  be  the  grand  diificulty.  Yet  it  is  not 
thought  necessary  to  inquire,  Why  does  matter  repel  ? 
or  why  is  it  solid  ?  It  seems  to  be  universally  aduiiUed, 
that  repulsion  is  inherent  in  the  substance.  Yet  repul- 
sion is  an  operation  of  power,  as  well  as  gravitation ;  it 
is  an  energy  of  the  same  kind,  and  requires  tlie  same  ef- 
ficient cause ;  and  if  matter  is  not  the  efficient  cause  of 
repulsion,  this  phenomenon  is  as  hard  to  be  accounted 
ior,  as  gravitation.  It  is  conceived,  that  as  matter  gra- 
vitates uniformly,  that  uniformity  must  be  the  effect  of 
volition  some/where,  and  be  produced  by  mind.  Some 
philosophers  have  attributed  that  volition  to  matter  itself, 
and  the  material  world  was  believed  to  liave  a  soul. 
But  the  more  enli^ited  moderns  perceive  that  matter 
does  not  act  voluntarily;  yet  they  have  fallen  into  the 
opposite  error,  in  supposing  that  matter  is  in  its  nature 
a  clog  to  our  volitions,  and  to  our  intellectual  enjoy- 
ments. All,  however,  who  deny  that  matter  has  a  soul, 
and  acts  voluntarily,  attribute  the  phenomena  to  the  dl 
vine  will  and  power. 

But  gravitation  is  not  the  elTect  of  volition  any  where. 
Gravitation  is  not  a  voluntary,  but  necessary  operation 
of  matter ;  contraction  is  not  a  voluntary,  but  a  necessa- 
ry operation  of  power.  Contraction  is  the  modus  ojm- 
randi  of  power;  it  is  the  primary  operation,  or, that  by 
which  every  modification  of  motion,  or  impulse,  is  ori- 
ginated. 8ir  Isaac  Newton  tells  us,  that  <*Every  parti- 
"cle  of  matter  is  continually  deflected  toward  every  other 


OF  THOUGHT.  45 

•particle  of  matter."  Matter  uniformbj  gravitates,  or 
power  uniformly  contracts,  simply  because  this  operation 
is  not  voluntary,  ])ut  necessary ;  because  power  has  no 
choice,  nor  a  capacity  to  originate  motion  in  any  other 
way.  Jllind  can  no  more  than  matter,  choose  before 
hand,  whether  it  shall,  or  shall  not,  perceive — nor  what 
it  shall  perceive.  The  appropriate  operation  of  an  ef- 
ficient cause,  cannot  be  varied  even  by  that  cause;  much 
less  is  it  to  be  controulcd,  or  produced  by  any  foreign, 
or  extraneous  cause.  Mind  or  spirit,  is  in  the  same  pre- 
dicament wilh  matter,  in  this  respect ;  it  is  its  nature  to 
produce  a  specific  operation ;  it  perceives  necessarily, 
*nd  has  no  choice  or  direction  in  the  matter.  For  this 
reason,  the  simple  spiritual  substance  ^  cannot  choose  at 
any  time,  whether  its  operation  shall  be  perception,  or 
some  other  phenomenon;  its  operation  is  jjerception 
necessarily;  it  has  no  power  to  originate  motion.  The 
supreme  mind  cannot  choose — let  it  be  spoken  with  re- 
verence— whether  He  shall,  or  shall  not  know,  or  per- 
ceive; He  perceives  necessarily;  Spirit  is  a  constituent 
element  of  His  Being,  or  Essence ;  and  Spirit  is  the  ef- 
ficient cause  of  perception.  The  Deity  can  no  more 
cease  to  perceive,  than  he  can  cease  to  exist. 

Gravitation  or  contraction,  or  the  approach  of  the  parts 
toward  each  other,  is  the  modey  or  manner  in  which 
power  operates;  it  is  the  mean  through  which  power 
produces  all  its  more  remote  eflects,  or  by  which  it  ori- 
ginates every  degree  and  modification  of  motion  or  im- 
pulse. This  fact  we  liave  exhibited  before  our  eyes 
continually:  and  though  it  may  never  have  been  stated 
in  terms,  it  is  continually  acted  on  in  mechanical  opera- 
tions. If  an  arm  is  bent,  or  drawn  toward  the  body,  it 
is  by  means  of  contracting  the  muscles  of  the  fore-side 

*  That  which  is  called  rtind,  is  a  compound  of  power  and  spirit, 


40  THE  ALPHABET 

of  the  arm ;  if  it  is  stretched  out,  it  is  hy  contracting  the 
antagonist  muscles.  If  a  great  force  is  to  !»e  exerted,  it 
is  to  be  by  concentrating  the  force,  or  contracting  the 
muscles,  perhaps  of  the  whole  body.  In  all  machinery, 
the  principle  of  motion  is  tlie  same,  and  is  recogn  ized  in 
the  construction ;  the  force  produced  is  by  means  of  a 
contraction,  somewhere ;  it  is  either  by  gravitation,  as  the 
falling  of  water,  or  the  preponderance  of  a  weight ;  or  it  is 
produced  by  animal  power,  the  operation  of  which  al- 
ways originates  in  contraction. 

Contraction  then,  is  the  mode,  or  manner  in  which 
power  operates  ;  it  follows,  that  this  operation  is  not  the 
effect  of  volition,  not  even  of  divine  volition  ;  it  is  the  ne- 
cessary operation  of  power.  But  contraction,  or  gravi- 
tation, is  the  mode  or  manner  in  which  matter  operates ; 
it  is  the  universal  law  of  matter,  as  well  as  of  power.  It 
follows,  that  material  substance  and  power,  are  one  and 
the  same. 

But  it  is  the  general  belief,  that  Mind,  or  Spirit,  is  the 
xiltimate  cause  of  gravitation,  and  of  every  modification 
of  force,  or  impulse.  Notwithstanding  this,  it  will  be 
readily  granted,  that  power  is  necessary  to  the  produc- 
tion of  impulse ;  that  when  mind  impels,  or  originates 
motion,  it  is  by  means  of  poMcr ;  aud  that,  without 
power,  mind  is  incapable  of  producing  impulse.  Power 
then  is  necessary  to  the  production  of  impulse ;  and  it 
appears  too,  that  it  is  able  to  produce  impulse,  and  the 
only  thing  that  is  able  to  produce  this  phenomenon,  for 
mind  without  power,  is  not  able  to  impel.  But  that 
which  is  necessary  to  a  specific  operation,  and  is  able  to 
jn-oduce  that  operation,  is  the  efficient  cause  of  that 
operation. 

Still  it  will  be  contended,  that  power  is  an  attribute  of 
Mind,  and  net  an  independent  efficient  cause,  that  Mind 


OF  THOUGHT.  4j' 

or  Spirit  is  the  ultimate  efficient  cause  of  all  tilings.  The 
principle,  that  Power  is  an  attribute^  shall  be  inquired 
into  again  5  at  present  we  will  consider  whether  or  not 
the  mind,  or  spiritual  substance,  is  the  efficient  cause  of 
gravitation  and  repulsion.  If  mind,  or  the  spiritual 
substance,  be  the  f  fficient  cause  of  gravitation  and  repul- 
sion, it  must  produce  these  phenomena  eitiier  immediate- 
ly, or  mediately.  If  mind  is  the  immediate  cause  of 
gravitation  and  repulsion,  then  it  is  mind  which  gravi- 
tates and  repels,  or  mind  is  solid  and  ponderous.  But 
this  is  absurd;  it  is  confounding  things  which  are  essen- 
tially different;  for  gravity  ami  solidity,  or  gravitation 
and  repulsion,  are  the  characteristics  of  matter,  and  dis- 
tinguish matter  from  mind.  But  if  mind  produce  gravi- 
tation and  repulsion  mediately,  or  by  a  previous  opera- 
tion produced  upon  matter  from  without,  that  previous 
Operation  must  be  some  modification  of  motion  or  im- 
pulse; it  must  be  an  operation  of  the  same  kind  with 
that  to  be  produced  by  it;  for  neither  perception  nor  vo 
lition  have  any  tendency  to  produce,  either  primarily,  or 
secondarily,  the  appropriate  operation  of  power;  to  sup- 
pose that  they  could  do  so,  would  be  utterly  to  confound, 
all  our  ideas  of  cause  and  effect.  But  that  previous  im- 
pulse must  be,  either  the  immediate  operation  of  mind — > 
which  involves  the  same  absurdity  we  just  exploded — or 
it  must  be  the  effect  of  another  previous  impulse — and 
that  of  another,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  But  this  is 
equally  absurd  with  the  former  alternative.  So  it  ap- 
pears, that  on  whatever  principle  Spirit  is  supposed  to 
be  the  efficient  cause  of  impulse,  it  implies  an  absur^ 
dity. 

Since  the  spiritual  substance  is  not  the  efficient  cause 
of  gravitation,  it  follows,  that  Power  is  the  sole  cause 
«f  this  phenomenon ;  there  is  no  other  cause  concerned 


48  THE  ALPHABET 

iu  its  production.  li'  power  is  the  efficient  aausc  of 
gravitation,  then  material  substance  is  the  efficient  cause 
of  gravitation;  or  material  substance  is  the  power  to 
contract,  or  to  j^ravitate.  Tlie  efliciency  of  material 
substance  is  tacitly  admitted  in  all  our  rcasonini^s  re- 
specting bodies,  and  in  the  uses  we  apply  them  to. .  J3o 
not  the  walls  of  our  houses  repel  the  slorni?  Does  not 
the  floor  sustain  our  weight?  Perhaps  it  will  be  said, 
that  matter  is  an  instrument  employed  by  presiding 
Deity  for  this  and  other  purposes,  and  that  it  is  nothing 
more.  Be  it  so.  But  must  not  a  thing  possess  some 
power,  or  efficiency,  to  fit  it  for  Ijelng  an  instiiimcnt? 
Must  not  that  which  is  employed  to  repd,  possess  the 
power  to  repel?  If  it  do  not,  it  can  have  no  instriunen- 
talify  in  producing  the  effect.  And  if  matter  has  no  real 
instrumentality,  no  real  efficiency,  it  is  absurd  to  sup- 
pose it  employed  as  an  instrument.  And  in  this  case, 
why  should  it  be  supposed  to  exist?  The  phenomena 
w  ould  be  just  the  same  without  it.  Tiie  repulsion  of 
the  storm,  the  reflection  of  light;  the  suspension  of  our 
I)odles  some  thousand  of  miles  above  the  cenfer  of  gra- 
vity, (if  bodies  we.  certainly  have:)  these  phenomena 
are  the  real  operations  of  power,  and  if  material  sub- 
stance is  not  that  power,  if  it  do  not  really  produce  and 
sustain  these  phenomena,  what  office  does  it  perform? 
What  part  does  it  sustain?  * 

There  is  nothing  really  substantial  excepting  efficient 
causes.  That  matter  is  the  real  efficient  cause  of  its 
phenomena— that  is,  of  gravitaiion  and  repulsion;  its  es- 
sential phenomena  is  implied  in  the  language,  both  of 
the  learned  and  the  unlearned.  We  may  confidently 
appeal  to  the  common  sense  of  mankind,  are  the  pheno- 
mena, gravitation  and  repulsion,  exhibited  to  the  senses 
by  matter,  or  are  they  exhibited  by  mind  ?    By  matter 


OF  THOUGHT.  49 

certainly,  it  will  be  replied,  and  not  by  mind.  Is  mat- 
ter necessary  to  tlieir  exhibition,  or  are  they  sometimes 
exliibited  by  something  else,  independently  of  matter? 
Undoubtedly  matter  is  necessary  to  their  exhibition; 
there  is  nothing  but  matter  that  gravitates  and  repels ; 
and  whatever  gravitates  and  repels,  is  matter.  Can 
matter  exist  without  exhibiting  these  phenomena,  or 
without  solidity  and  gravity?  No,  it  cannot;  it  gravi- 
tates contihually  and  necessarily;  that  whicii  does  not 
gravitate,  is  not  matter.  Then  matter  is  necessary  to 
the  production  of  these  phenomena,  and  it  is  adequate  to 
their  production,  for  it  cannot  exist  without  pioducing 
them;  in  other  words,  matter  is  the  efficient  cause  of 
gravitation  and  repulsion. 

But  there  are  still  objections  to  this  doctrine,  which  it 
is  necessary  to  investigate.  It  is  coniideutly  asserted, 
that  Power  is  an  attribute  of  mind;  and  it  is  consider- 
ed a  self-evident  truth,  that  Power  cannot  be  without  a 
subject.  These  assertions  have  an  imposing  aspect; 
the  first  is  in  the  form  of  a  definition;  and  the  last,  of 
an  axiom,  or  an  intuitive  truth.  That  Power  cannot 
be  without  a  subject,  is  one  of  those  principles,  which, 
before  tlie  time  of  Mr.  Locke,  were  called  innate  ideas; 
and  which  at  the  present  time  are  believed  to  be  per- 
ceived intuitively,  or  which  Professor  Stewart  terms 
^^fundamental  laws  of  belief.''  But  truths  are  not  per- 
ceived in  this  way,  as  will  be  shewn  hereafter.  To  be 
convinced  that  the  above  axiom,  Power  cannot  be  with- 
out a  subject,  is  not  perceived  intuitively,,  but  is  a  deduc- 
tion of  reason,  we  need  only  observe  its  relation  to  the 
definition,  viz.  Power  is  an  attribute  of  mind.  The 
process  in  which  the  mind  arrives  at  the  axiom,  is  as 
follows.  If  power  is  an  attribute,  it  follows  of  necessi- 
ty, that  power  canuot  be  without  a  subject.    Here  the 


50  THE  ALPHABET 

major  proposition,  that  is,  an  attribute  cannot  be  without 
ft  subject,  is  taken  for  granted  without  being  expressly 
stated,  as  is  frequently  the  case  in  metaphysical  reason- 
ing. The  above  reasoning  is  plausible,  indeed  the  in- 
duction is  quite  correct:  but  it  proceeds  on  a  false  prin" 
ciple,  consequently  the  conclusion  is  false,  although  it  is 
fairly  deduced  from  the  premises.  The  process  would 
be  stated  more  methodically  thus,  An  attribute  cannot  he 
without  a  suhject;  but  Power  is  an  attribute,  therefore, 
Power  cannot  he  without  a  suhject.  The  conclusion  so 
plainly  and  necessarily  folloAvs  from  the  premises,  that 
we  are  apt,  in  reconsidering  or  applying  the  principle 
which  forms  the  conclusion,  to  overlook  both  the  major 
and  the  minor  proposition,  and  the  whole  process  by 
which  we  arrive  at  that  principle,  and  to  imagine  that 
we  perceive  it  intuitively,  or  without  any  exercise  of  rea- 
son. Yet  it  must  be  obvious  to  any  one  who  considers 
the  subject,  that  the  truth  of  the  principle,  Power  can- 
not be  without  a  subject,  depends  entirely  on  the  cor- 
rectness  of  the  premises  which  have  been  stated,  and 
more  particularly  on  the  minor  proposition,  that  Power 
is  an  attribute.  It  is  assumed^  that  Power  is  an  attri- 
bute; but  this  is  a  false  definition  of  power;  consequent- 
ly, the  conclusion,  that  Power  cannot  be  without  a  sub- 
ject, is  false. 

If  the  term  attribute  have  the  same  signification  with 
the  ward  quality,  then  it  cannoi  be  a  true  definition  of 
power  to  say,  it  is  an  attribute.  When  a  thing  is  to  be 
defined,  or  when  we  are  about  to  point  out  the  genus  to 
which  any  thing  belongs,  it  is  necessary,  not  only  that 
the  character  of  that  tiling  be  clearly  ascertained;  but 
also,  that  the  characteristic  of  the  genus  to  which  that 
thing  is  to  be  referred,  be  well  understood;  otherwise 
the  definition  may  be  false,  and  may  lead  to  false  con- 


OF  THOUGHT.  51 

elusions,  even  when  we  have  a  just  conception  of  the 
thing  to  be  defined.  That  Power  has  been  eiToneous- 
ly  defined,  was  owing,  not  so  mucli  to  tlie  want  of  a 
correct  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  power,  as  to  the 
vagueness  of  the  generical  term  attribute.  When  it  is 
said  that  Power  is  an  attribute,  a  precise  meaning  should 
be  annexed  to  the  word  attribute ;  we  should  not  only 
have  inquired— What  is  Power?  but  we  should  have 
ascertained  with  precision — What  is  an  attribute?  The 
word  attribute  is  generally  used  as  synonymous  with 
the  word  quality^  but  it  is  sometimes  applied  in  a  different 
sense.  It  frequently  signifies  that  which  belongs  to,  or 
is  possessed  by,  some  being  or  thing ;  as  when  we  say, 
Man  possesses  mind,  or  intelligence.  Tliis  is  attribut- 
ing mind  to  man,  or  it  represents  mind  as  an  attribute  of 
man.  In  this  sense  of  the  word,  an  attribute  may  be 
either  a  substance  or  a  quality,  for  mind  is  a  substance, 
and  an  attribute  of  man;  and  power  may  be  an  attribute 
and  at  the  same  time  a  substance,  a  thing  which  subsists 
of  itself,  or  without  a  subject.  Eut  in  the  more  strict 
and  proper  sense  of  the  word,  an  attribute  is  some  action, 
or  operation,  or  some  species  of  action,  or  operation,  as 
that  gravitation  is  an  attribute  of  matter;  thought,  or 
perception  is  an  attribute  of  mind.  This  agrees  with  the 
signification  of  the  word  qualily  /  gravitation,  or  gravi- 
ty, is  a  quality  of  matter ;  but  it  does  not  agree  with  the 
cliaracter  of  Power.  Power  is  not  an  action,  nor  an 
operation  of  any  kind  ;  Power  is  the  subject  of  an  attri- 
bute ;  contraction  is  the  attribute,  or  the  quality  of 
power.  Yet  the  principle,  that  Potver  is  an  attribute — 
in  the  latter  sense  of  the  word  attribute,  or  that  power 
is  a  quality,  is  the  foundation  of  the  axiom,  Power  can- 
yiot  be  laithout  a  subject.  Definitions  do  neither  good  nor 
harm,  except  ^Yhen  they  are  made  principles  of  science. 


52  THE  ALPHABET 

It  may  be  proper,  and  it  may  tend  lo  illustrate  the 
foregoing  paragraph,  to  inquire  a  little  further  into  the 
general  character  of  qualities.  A  correct  definition, 
either  expressed  or  understood,  of  the  term  quality, 
■would  seem  to  be  a  necessary  preliminary  to  the  deter- 
mination, respecting  any  particular  object,  whether  or 
not  it  be  a  quality.  Quality  is  a  term  which  has  ac- 
quired a  considerable  latitude;  to  discover  what  is  its 
radical  signification,  we  should  proceed  by  an  investiga. 
tion  of  particulars.  Gravity  and  solidity  will  be  allow- 
ed on  all  hands  to  be  qualities,  in  the  strictest  sense  of 
the  word.  What  is  gravity?  and  what  is  solidity? 
Gravity  has  been  defined,  a  tendency  to  gravitate ;  or  a 
•power  to  gravitate.  But  this  latter  has  been  exjdoded; 
modern  philosophers  affirm,  that  matter  possesses  no 
jJower  to  gravitate.  We  have,  in  fact,  no  knowledge  of 
a  power  to  gravitate,  diff'erent  from  the  substance,  or  that 
which  actually  gravitates.  Power  is  not  an  attribute. 
Material  substance  is  itself  the  power  to  gravitate^  or  the 
power  to  contract  /  the  efficient  cause  of  gravitation,  is 
the  only  power  to  gravitate.  There  is  no  such  thing  as 
a  quiescent  tendency,  or  power,  to  gravitate ;  the  actual 
operation,  and  the  efficient  cause  of  the  operation,  which 
cannot  cease  to  operate,  are  the  only  real  objects  of 
knowledge ;  gravitation,  and  that  which  gravitates,  are 
all  that  we  know  of,  or  belonging  to,  material  substance. 
Whatever  has  a  real  existence  belongs  to  the  one  or  the 
other  of  these  two  genera  ;  it  is  either  an  efficient  cause, 
or  the  operation  of  an  efficient  cause.  Perhaps  it  is  not 
strictly  proper  lo  say,  that  an  operation  exists;  but  ope- 
rations are  certainly  real,  and  tliey  are  necessary  too. — 
The  idea  which  is  really  annexed  to  the  term  gravity, 
is  that  ^{gravitation,  or  of  the  actual  force,  or  deflection 
of  one  body  tov/ard  another;.     Gravity  apd  solidity  ar.c 


OF  THOUGHT.  S6 

the  same  willi  gravitation  and  repulsion;  the  one  and 
the  other  are  called  sensible  qualities;  or  quaUties  per- 
ceived by  tlie  senses;  but  the  organs  of  sense  perceive 
only  operations ;  they  do  not  perceive  latent  tendencies 
or  powers.  This  is  the  true  philosophical  import  of  the 
word  quality ;  a  quality  is  a  phenomenon,  or  an  opcra-^ 
tion  addressed  to  the  senses,  or  to  the  mind. 

Tf  tliis  be  the  true  import  of  the  word  quality,  then 
^ower  is  not  a  quality,  it  is  not  a  phenomenon.     Power 
is  not  an  attribute  of  mind.     That  mind  exerts  an  ac- 
tive power,  is  an  un(lenial)le  fact;  but  it  does  not  follow, 
that  Power  is  a  quality  of  the  mind,  any  more  than  it 
would  follow  from  the  operation  of  Spirit,  that  Spirit  is 
a  quality  of  the  mind.     To  explain  this  matter  more  ful- 
ly, the  subject  will  be  resumed;  but  we  have  not  done 
with  the  qualities  of  matter.     Of  the  secondary  qualities 
of  matter  we  shall  speak  again ;  but  there  are  several  ac- 
cidents which  are  considered  to  be  essential  and  distin- 
guishing qualities  of  matter,  which  have  no  title  to  be  so 
denominated.     Diuisihility  is  certainly  not  a  phenome- 
non, or  an  operation,  it  is  therefore  not  a  quality  of  mat- 
ter, nor  of  any  thing  else.     Neither  is  extension  a  phe- 
nomenon, or  an  operation,  or  a  quality  of  matter.    It  ha§ 
been  generally  set  dov/n  as  an  undeniable  fact,  that  ex 
tension  and  divisibility  belong  exclusively  to  matter,  and 
that  they  distinguish  matter  from  mind,  or  from  spirit. 
But  this  is  an  assumption  without  proof;  no  one  pre- 
tends to  have  discovered  by  experiment  and  observa- 
tion, or  by  any  mode  of  investigation,  that  spirit  or  mind, 
is  unextended ;  but  it  is  one  of  those  principles,  which 
get  possession  of  the  mind  by  means  of  that  native  love 
of  mystery  which  attaches  to  our  natures.     Matter  and 
Spirit  are  dislingtiished  from  each  other,  only  by  tiicir 
phenomena :  Spirit  is  an  extended  being,  as  will  be  seen 


54  THE  ALPHABET 

when  the  subject  comes  to  be  investigated.  Extention 
is  a  word  of  nearly  the  same  import  with  space.  Space 
is  length,  breadth,  and  depth  abstracted  from  body,  or 
substance;  extention  is  length,  breadth,  and  depth  attri- 
buted to  body  or  substance.  Extention,  signifies  the 
space  which  a  substance  occupies;  space,  is  extention 
unoccupied. 

Vis  inerfice  has  also  been  considered  a  characteristic 
of  matter.  But  the  terms  contain  a  solecism.  The 
power  of  inertness,  is  the  power  to  be  powerless.  That 
which  is  obviously  alluded  to  in  this  expression,  is  the 
power  of  gravitation,  or  the  power  to  resist  being  mov- 
ed in  any  direction,  but  that  in  which  matter  uniformly 
tends,  toward  a  center  of  gravity.  Resistance  is  an 
operation  of  power;  it  is  a  phenomenon  of  the  same  kind 
with  impulse,  and  requires  the  same  species  of  efficient 
cause.  This  resistance  is  called  inertness,  because  it  is 
not  a  voluntary  action,  nor  to  be  overcome  by  simple 
volition;  it  is  only  by  organization,  or  by  combining 
spirit  with  matter,  that  the  latter  becomes  obedient  to  the 
will.  Matter  is  morally  and  intellectually,  but  not  phy- 
sically, inert.  The  power  of  inertness  is  the  power  of 
gravitation  and  repulsion ;  and  this  power  is  not  a  qua- 
lity,  but  a  substance. 

This  substance,  or  power  to  gravitate,  is  not  perceiv- 
ed by  the  senses ;  but  it  is  perceived  by  reason ;  it  is 
discovered  in  a  metaphysical  analysis  of  the  nature  of 
the  phenomena.  This  analysis  is  a  spontaneous  opera- 
tion of  the  mind,  and  takes  place  even  in  children,  or  as 
soon  as  the  child  begins  to  observe  the  result  of  its  own 
experiments,  or  the  effects  produced  within  its  organs  of 
sense  by  contact  with  external  objects.  In  pretty  early 
childhood  we  discover,  that  certain  events,  or  operations, 
are  uniformly  succeeded  by  certain  other  events.     We 


OF  THOUGHT.  55 

find  by  experiment,  that  by  a  single  stroke  we  can  send 
an  apple  or  a  ball  rolling  across  the  carpet.  In  this  way 
we  acquire  the  conception  of  a  cause,  and  of  the  relation 
of  cause  and  effect.  The  child,  indeed,  will  not  com- 
prehend your  meaning,  when  you  talk  to  him  of  a  cause: 
for  he  has  not  learnt  the  meaning  of  the  term  ;  but  he 
will  tell  you  that  he  can  make  the  apple  roll,  which 
plainly  expresses  his  idea  of  a  cause.  But  they  are 
only  physical,  or  secondary  causes  that  he  first  becomes 
acquainted  with.  In  making  farther  experiments  and 
observations,  he  discovers  another  kind  of  cause.  When 
he  holds  a  lump  of  clay  or  a  ball  of  metal  in  his  hand, 
he  perceives  that  it  forcibly  presses  downward,  or  to- 
ward the  earth ;  and  as  often  as  he  repeats  the  experi- 
ment, he  observes  the  same  phenomenon.  He  observes 
also  a  powerful  repulsion  in  the  ball,  which  prevents  his 
hand  from  closing.  He  knows  that  he  was  himself  the 
cause  of  the  rolling  of  the  ball,  or  that  the  rolling  was 
produced  by  the  impulse  which  he  had  originated;  but 
he  discovers  no  external,  or  secondary  cause  of  the  lat- 
ter phenomena,  of  the  gravitation  and  repulsion  of  the 
ball.  But  he  has  learned  from  his  observations  on  se- 
condary  causes,  that  every  effect  has  a  corresponding 
cause;  the  gravitation  and  repulsion  of  the  ball,  must 
have  a  cause  suited  to  their  production,  and  that  cause 
must  be  within  the  thing  whence  the  phenomena  pro- 
ceed.  That  thing  must  of  itself  produce  the  phenomena, 
or  it  must  be  the  efficient  cause  of  the  phenomena.  And 
that  efficient  cause  must  have  a  substantial  or  permanent 
existence,  for  it  never  ceases  to  maintain  the  phenomena 
or  sensible  appearance.  This  is  the  metaphysical  pro- 
cess in  which,  while  children,  we  discover  the  existence 
of  material  substance,  or  the  efiicient  cause  of  gravitation 
and  repulsion.     Every  mind  discovers  for  itself  the 


65  THL  ALPHABET 

relation  of  cause  and  effect,  and  the  existence  of  efficient 
causes;  no  words,  or  artijlcial  signs  can  inspire  the 
mind  with  a  knowledge  of  this  relation,  or  wUh  ilie  idea 
of  an  invisible  efficient  cause;  we  pcirceive  efficient 
causes  only  through  their  natural  signs,  thcii'  upcra^ 
tions. 

But  when  the  child  hecomes  a  youth,  he  leanis  from 
books,  or  from  his  preceptor,  that  liis  reason  plays  him 
false  in  this  matter;  that  she  is  not  a  proper  guide  in 
philosophy;  that  there  are  certain  principles,  no  matter 
whence  derived,  to  which  reason  must  succumb;  that  the 
world  is  made  of  nothing,  and  that  matter  is  not  the  ef 
ficient  cause  of  the  phenomena:  and  that  the  substance 
which  he  perceives  has  no  necessary  connexion  v/ith  the 
phenomena. — This  appears  mere  jargon  to  his  unsoplils- 
cated  mind;  for  he  is  unconscious  of  perceiving  any 
thing  in,  or  belonging  to  matter,  excepting  the  plieno- 
mena,  and  the  efficient  cause  of  the  phenomena.  He 
cannot  conceive  how  the  substance  can  appear  to  be  any 
thing  beside  what  it  really  is,  for  he  knows  that  it  does 
Qot  appear  at  all  to  the  senses,  it  discloses  itself  only  to 
reason,  through  the  evidence  of  the  phenomena.  It  is 
in  vain  that  he  asks  for  the  rationale  of  the  theory  pre- 
sented to  him,  the  ultimate  appeal  is,  not  to  reason,  but 
to  the  principle— The  world  is  made  of  nothing;  and  he 
is  exhorted  to  believe,  on  pain  of  being  pronounced  a 
dunce  and  infidel.  And  after  an  inward  struggle  be- 
tvr'cen  reason  and  prescription,  he  adopts  the  dogma,  and 
enters  a  lal)yrinth  where  the  farther  he  advances^  the 
more  he  is  entangled. 

Wc  come  now  to  consider  the  secondary  qualities  of 
matter:  It  is  an  obvious  fact,  that  there  is  an  infinite 
variety  of  phenomena  attending  matter,  which  yet  are 
not  essential  to  it,  or  necessarily  connected  with  it;  and 


OF  THOUGHT.  57 

are  therefore  called  secondary  qualitiea.     The  pheno- 
mena which  meet  the  senses,  are  not,  all  of  them,  the 
real  operations  of  matter;  t!iat  is,  simple  material  sub- 
stance, or  power,  is  not  the  efficient  cause  of  all  the 
phenomena  with  which  it  is  connected.     Some  bodies 
exhibit  phenomena,  which  all  bodies  do  not,  and  which, 
therefore,  do  not  necessarily  belong  to  body.     Matter  is 
not  the  real  efficient  cause  of  all  the  phenomena  which 
attend  it;  and  from  this  it  has  been  too  hastily  conclud- 
ed, that  matter  is  not  the  real  efficient  cause  of  any  of  its 
phenomena ;  or  that  •vavitatioii  and  repulsion  are  not  its 
real  qualities,  nor  necessarily  connected  with  it,  any 
more  than  the  secondary  qualities.     If  tliere  arc  certain 
phenomena  exhibited  by  some  bodies  which  are  not  ex- 
hibited  hy  all,  we  may  rationally  conclude  that  these 
phenomena  are  not  essential  to  body ;  or  that  simple  ma- 
terial substance  does  not  produce,  by  its  own  efficiency, 
those  phenomena  which  it  does  not  exhibit  uniformly ; 
hut  we  are  not  entitled  to  infer^  that  matter  does  not  pro- 
duce any  operation  by  its  own  power.     There  are  phe- 
nomena attending  bodies,  which  mechanical  power  does 
not,  and  which  it  cannot  produce;  hut  the  legitimate  in- 
ference is,  that  tliere  are  other  causes  present;  that  there 
are  otlier,  ov  immaterial  substances  in  combination  with 
matter;  substances  which  do  not  contract  and  repel,  but 
which,  by  producing  other  modes  of  operation  on  the  or- 
gans of  sense,  excite  other  sensations  than  those  excited 
by  contraction  and  repulsion.     And  if  we  shall  actually 
find  other   substances — substances,  the    phenomena  of 
which  are  essentially  different  from  gravitation  and  re- 
pulsion; if  we  should  find  such  substances  in  chemical 
combination   with  matter — if  we  should  find  spiritual 
substance  concerned  in  producing  some  of  the  phenome- 
na which  apparently  belong  to  matter — we  ought  not  to 
8 


58  THE  ALPHa-DET 

recoil  from  tlie  truth,  although  it  may  shock  our  preju- 
dices. Some  one  has  well  said,  that  "We  should  pur- 
sue truth  whithersoever  she  lead,  heedless  of  conse- 
quences." 

But  we  shall  be  told,  that  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  mat- 
ter and  spirit  to  be  chemically  combined.  Most  people 
are  ready  to  pronounce  absurd  any  doctrine  or  principle, 
which  contradicts  opinions  which  have  long  held  posses- 
sion of  the  mind,  whether  these  opinions  are  founded  in 
reason  and  in  fact,  or  are  not.  To  be  absurd,  is  to  be 
incompatible  with  acme  known  truth,  or  established  ge- 
neral fact.  If  any  established  truth  or  fact,  can  be 
pointed  out,  with  which  the  allegation  that  material  and 
immaterial  substances  are  chemically  combinffd,  is  in- 
compatible, then  that  allegation  is  absurd  and  inadmis- 
sible; but  if  no  such  truth,  or  fact  can  be  adduced,  you 
are  not  entitled  to  pronounce  the  allegation  absurd. 

Perhaps  this  challenge  will  be  met,  if  not  by  an  esta- 
blished fact,  at  least  by  a  theory  which  has  long  usurped 
the  authority  of  truth.  It  will  be  asserted  that  the  spirit 
or  mind  is  an  unextended  thing,  occupying  a  point  some- 
where in  the  brain;  that  it  is  therefore  incapable  of  com- 
ing in  contact,  and  consequently  incapable  of  combining 
chemically  with  matter,  which  is  extended.  But  ou 
what  does  this  theory  rest?  It  is  not  a  known  fact,  esta- 
blished in  experiment  and  observation,  that  spirit  is  un- 
extended; nor  is  it  a  fair  deduction  from  any  known 
fact.  We  will  not  suppose  that  any  enlightened  mind 
will  pertinaciously  adhere  to  this  theory.  There  is  a 
substance  well  known  to  chemists,  which  does  not  gravi- 
tate; it  exhibits  no  phenomenon  that  belongs  essentially 
and  properly  to  matter;  therefore  it  is  not  a  material, 
but  an  immaterial  substance.  Yet  it  enters  into  chemi- 
cal combination  with  all  substances;  it  is  caloric,  or 


OF  THOUGHT.  59 

lieat;  its  modus  operandi  is  e.vpansiony  the  reverse  of 
contraction. — It  will  be  demonstrated  in  the  next  chapr 
tcr,  that  the  substance  of  heat  or  fire,  is  neither  more  nor 
less  than  the  elementary  spiritual  substance.  There  is 
another  immaterial  substance,  the  phenomena  of  whicli 
we  shall  find  blended  with  those  of  matter. 

But  it  will  l)e  thought  inconceivable,  that  the  opera- 
tions of  immaterial  substances  should  affect  the  senses; 
that  they  should  be  seen,  or  felt,  or  tasted.     But  if  the 
operations  of  immaterial  substances  are  not  the  excitins; 
causes  of  some  of  our  sensations,  then  all  the  variety  of 
ideas  and  sensations  which  \Te  experience,  are  produced 
simply  by  the  operations  upon  our  organs,  of  contraction 
and  repulsion.     But  this  is  much  harder  to  conceive, 
than  that  the  operations  of  immaterial  substances  should 
be  seen  with  the  eyes,  or  tasted  with  the  palate.     And 
we  would  ask,  Why  may  it  not  be  true,  that  immaterial 
substances  affect  the  senses  ?    What  is  matter,  that  it 
should  have  more  elBciency  than  spirit  in  affecting  the 
organs  of  sense  ?    Or  are  the  organs  of  sense  adapted 
only  to  contraction  and  repulsion  ?    There  are  several 
facts  to  be  ascertained,  before  it  can  be  asserted  on  good 
ground,  that  the  senses  are  incapable  of  discerning  the 
operations  of  immaterial  substances;  or  that  these  sub- 
stances have,  and  can  have,  no  share  in  producing  the 
phenomena  of  nature.  There  can  be  but  one  simple  mate- 
rial substance,  or  one  simple  basis  of  contraction  and  re- 
pulsion; and  it  would  be  absurd  in  the  extreme  to  sup- 
pose, that  this  one  simple  principle  can  be  the  basis  of 
all  the  endless  variety  of  phenomena  which  meet  the 
senses;  or  that  it  can  produce  at  the  same  time  contrac- 
tioiif  expansion,  bitter,  sweet,  red,  blue  and  yellow. 

There  are  a  variety  of  minute  operations  produced  on 
the  organs  of  sight  and  of  iaste,  which  have  not  been 


6a  THE  ALPHABET 

ascertained  to  consist  of  contraction  and  repulsion :  wc 
know  tlirtt  the  senses  lake  cognizance  of  oilier  modes  of 
operation  exhi')iled  on  a  I)road  scale,  such  as  the  ascen- 
sion of  vapour,  the  expansion  of  bodies  by  heat,  the 
harmony  of  sound ;  and  when  these  operations  arc  mi- 
nute,  and  are  produced  in  contact  with  the  organs  of 
sense,  may  tliey  not  produce  that  variety  of  sensation 
which  v.e  experience ?  It  is  unphilosophical,  and  con- 
trary to  common  sense,  to  suppose  that  all  our  different 
sensations  have  only  one  exciting  cause ;  which  must  be 
the  case,  if  the  senses  perceive  only  the  phenomena  of 
matter. 

There  is  a  two-fold  classiiicalion  of  phenomena, 
"which  arises  out  of  the  nature  of  things,  but  which  ren- 
ders this  subject  much  more  complex  and  entangled  ap- 
parently, than  it  is  really.  The  classification  we  allude 
to,  is  not  a  scientific,  or  artificial  one;  it  is  to  be  collect- 
ed from  the  common  language  of  mankind;  it  is  founded 
in  common  sense,  and  common  observation,  and  in  the 
obvious  dijferencps  and  analogies,  of  the  phenomena  of 
nature,  and  of  the  organs  of  sense. 

And  first,  the  phenomena  are  classed  according  to  the 
different  organs  affected.  There  are  colors,  or  objects 
of  sight;  sounds,  or  objects  of  hearing;  tastes  and 
odours,  or  objects  of  taste  and  smell ;  and  all  the  differ- 
ent degrees  and  modes  of  repulsion,  as  hardness,  rough- 
ness, §;*c.  the  objects  o(  feeling.  But  each  organ  of 
sense  perceives  different  phenomena,  or  different  modes 
of  operation.  A.nd  it  is  a  fact  worthy  of  observation, 
that  several  of  the  organs  of  sense,  perhaps  all  of  them, 
excepting  that  of  feeling,  distinguish  three  simple  modes 
of  operation,  or  experience  three  distinct  kinds  of  sen- 
sation. Of  the  objects  belonging  to  the  organ  of  vision, 
■we,  have  the  three  primary  colours,  red,  blue  and  yel- 


OF  THOUGHT.  61 

loic;^'  corresponding,  numerically,  and  essentially  too, 
as  will  appear — to  the  simple  elementary  plienomena, 
motion,  perception  and  harmony — and  to  the  simple  ef- 
.ficient  causes.  Power.  Spirit  and  Truth.  The  organ  of 
hearing  distinguishes  three  distinct  operations;  first, 
simple  50 M??c?;  secondly,  harmony  of  sound,  a  phenome- 
non distinct  from  simple  sound;  and  thirdly,  the  j7a/Aos 
of  sound,  distinct  frour  either  of  the  former.  Everv 
sound  that  differs  at  all  from  simple  sound,  partakes  of 
one.  or  both  of  the  two  latter  modifications  of  sound. — 
The  organ  of  taste  also  distinguishes  three  simple  phe- 
nomena, the  sweety  the  pungent^  and  the  astringentf  or 
acid. 

But  again,  the  common  sense,  and  common  language 
of  mankind,  recognize  an  analogy  between  the  sensa- 
tions of  the  different  organs,  or  rather  between  the  phe- 
iiomena  addressed  to  the  different  organs;  which  pheno- 
mena are  the  objects  and  exciting  causes  of  our  sensa- 
tions.  Thus  we  have  siceet  sounds,  and  sweet  colours, 
as  well  as  sweet  tastes  and  sweet  odours.  Theu  we 
have  lively  and  dull  colours,  lively  and  dull  sounds, 
lively  and  dull,  or  insipid  tastes,  &c.  This  analogy,  or 
sirail^^ty,  which  is  so  plainly  recognized  in  the  pheno- 
mena, is  obviously  inferred  from  the  analogy,  or  simi- 
larity of  the  sensations  excited  in  the  different  organs 
by  the  phenomena.  It  is  obviously  taken  for  granted, 
that  the  sensation  excited  in  one  organ  by  any  mode  of 
operation,  is  analogous  to  the  sensation  excited  in  any 
of  the  other  organs,  by  the  same  mode  of  operation. 
The  same  simple  mode  of  operation,  that  is  harmony,  is 
beauty  to  the  eye,  melody  to  the  ear,  and  sweetness  to 

•  The  remaining  four  of  the  colours  somellmes  numbered  with  the 
demcntary,  arc  evj«JemIy  compounds. 


62  THE  ALPHABET 

the  taste  and  smell.  A  harmonious  vibration  produced 
in  the  organ  of  sight,  or  in  that  of  taste,  similar,  or  cor- 
responding to  the  vibrations  produced  in  the  organ  of 
hearing  by  musical  sounds,  Avill  of  course  produce  in 
those  organs  sensations,  analogous  to  that  excited  by 
music;  for  a  sensafiov  is  nothing  else  than  a  perception 
of  the  vibration  or  change,  produced  within  the  organ 
of  sense,  l)y  the  operation  of  the  external  object  upon 
that  organ. 

The  eye  has  the  advantage  of  perceiving  harmony  in 
a  variety  of  different  situations  and  relations,  from  v/hich 
circumstantial  differences  the  same  phenomenon  takes 
different  names.  There  is  harmony  or  proportion  of 
form  or  figure,  otherwise  called  beauty;  harmony  of 
movements,  called  grace;  and  one  of  the  primary  co- 
lours will  of  course  consist  of  a  harmonious  vibration 
produced  upon,  and  within  the  organ  of  vision. 

"So  the  glad  impulse  of  congenial  powers, 
"Or  of  sweet  sound,  or  f\iir  proportion'd  form, 
"The  grace  of  motion,  or  the  bloom  of  light, 
"Thrills  through  imagination's  tender  frame, 
"From  nerve  to  nerve." 

Which  of  the  primary  colours  it  is  that  consis^  of  a 
harmonious  vibration,  whether  it  is  the  red,  the  blue,  or 
the  yellow,  it  would  be  hazardous,  perhaps,  to  decide ; 
but  there  is  reason  to  conjecture  that  it  is  the  red.  This 
conjecture  is  founded,  partly  on  fact,  and  partly  on  the 
analogy  of  our  sensations.  It  will  probably  be  granted, 
that  the  sensation  excited  in  the  organ  of  sight  by  the  co- 
lour of  yAloic,  is  not  analogous  to  that  excited  in  the  or, 
gan  of  hearing  by  harmony  of  sound-  Oiir  appeal  in 
this  case,  is  to  the  consciousness,  and  the  discriminating 
taste  of  the  reader.  But  there  is  external  evidence  in 
support  of  the  conjecture,  that  hliie  is  not  the  colour  of 


OF  THOUGHT.  63 

htiimoay.  It  is  a  known  fact,  that  blue  is  the  most  re- 
fraiii;ible  of  the  elementary  colours;  but  refraction  is  a 
particular  case  of  2;ravitation,  it  is  the  approach  of  the 
parts;  and  gravitation  or  contraction  is  a  phenomenon 
distinct  from  harmony,  aud  excites  a  sensation  peculiar 
to  itself,  whicli  will  l)e  noticed  just  now.  That  the  co- 
lours are  all  refrangible  in  some  degree,  is  evidence  that 
no  one  of  them  is  quite  pure,  or  unmixed,  excepting  tlie 
blue,  or  that  they  all  contain  a  portion  of  the  gravitating 
substance. 

Again,  the  same  simple  mods  of  operation,  that  is, 
contraction,  is  acidity,  or  astrivgency  to  the  taste;  sim- 
ple sound  to  the  ear ,.  and  to  the  eye  the  colour  blue. 
When  the  Material  substance  in  its  pure  elementary 
state,  enters  the  organ  of  sight,  as  light  in  general  enters 
and  passes  through  any  other  chrystaline  body,  it  pro- 
duces its  own  mode  of  operation,  a  contraction  in  the' 
nerve.  This  contraction  is,  in  the  first  place,  the  opera- 
tion of  the  substance  wiiich  enters  the  organ ;  this  ojjera- 
tion  is  the  colour  blue ;  w  hen  it  has  entered  tlie  organ, 
it  excites  a  like  operation,  a  contraction  in  the  organ  it- 
self, or  the  nerve;  this  is  called  the  idpa  of  the  colour 
blue.  The  idea,  is  the  colour  itself,  or  it  is  contraction 
produced  wilhiii  the  organ.  Further,  the  feeling  or  per- 
ception of  the  idea,  or  the  perception  of  the  contraction 
within  the  organ,  is  that  which  is  called  the  sensation 
of  the  colour  blue.  The  organ  does  not  perceive  what 
is  the  mode  of  operation  by  which  it  is  affected,  but  it 
perceives  that  a  peculiar  idea  or  change,  is  produced 
within  it ;  it  perceives  the  differences  of  the  colours,  or 
of  the  ideas  produced  within  it,  but  it  does  not  perceive 
in  Avhat  these  differences  consist. 

There  is  a  third  simple  mode  of  operation  which,  with 
those  before  mentioned,  complete  the  circle  of  the  phe- 


04  THE  ALPHABET 

nomcnji,  or  of  llie  objects  of  our  sensations.  IX  contrac- 
tion constitutes  the  colour  of  blue  and  harmony,  the  red, 
the  only  remaining  simple  mode  of  operation,  tliat  is,  ex- 
pansion, will  form  the  colour  yelloiv.  It  will  be  shewn 
in  the  next  chapter,  that  expansion  is  the  modus  opeTun- 
di  of  spiritual  substance ;  or  that  it  is  the  manner  in 
which  spirit  operates  upon,  and  inlluences  matter.  It  is 
probably  this  mode  of  operation  or  expansion,  that  ex- 
cites the  idea  and  sensation  of  warmth  or  pungency  in 
the  organ  of  taste,  and  the  same  >\  hich  pi-oduces  or  con- 
stitutes, the  pathos  of  sound.  Pathetic,  or  penetrating 
sounds,  issue  from  a  relaxation  of  the  muscles  produc- 
ing sound,  or  producing  the  human  voice,  and  operate 
by  sympathy  upon  the  hearer.  This  relaxation  in  the 
voice,  arises  from  internal  distress,  or  is  imitated  where 
there  is  no  real  distress,  eitlier  by  the  iiuman  voice,  or 
by  a  musical  instrument. 

Thus  expansion,  the  modus  operandi  of  Spirit,  is 
patiios  to  the  ear,  pungency  to  the  taste,  and  to  the  eye 
the  colour  yelloiv ;  wliile  harmony,  the  modus  operandi 
of  Truth,  is  music  to  the  ear,  sweetness  to  the  taste,  and 
beauty,  or  the  colour  red  to  the  eye ;  and  contraction, 
the  modus  operandi  of  Power,  is  astringency  to  the  taste, 
simple  sound  to  the  ear,  and  sublimity,  or  the  colour 
blue  to  the  eye.  The  phenomena  of  Power  constitute 
the  sublime ;  those  of  Truth,  the  beautiful ;  and  those 
of  Spirit,  the  pathetic. 

This  is  an  outline  of  a  theory  which  cannot  be  fully 
developed,  except  in  a  detailed  investigation  of  the  nature 
of  the  human  mind.  It  is  merely  intended  as  an  illus 
tration  of  the  position,  that  there  is  a  natural  and  ne- 
cessary relation  between  our  sensations  and  perceptions, 
and  the  antecedent  impressions  produced  on  our  organs 
of  sense  by  external  objects ;,  and  that  the  qualities  of 


OF  THOUGHT.  65 

bodies,  or  the  phenomena,  which  are  the  immediate  ob- 
jects of  our  sensations,  are  logical  evidences  of  the  ex- 
istence, and  Df  the  various  natures  of  the  substances 
with  which  they  arc  connected. 

The  most  formidable  obstacle  in  the'way  of  conceiv- 
ing and  establisliing  the  true  dcfmitiou  of  matter,  or  of 
power,  viz.  Power  is  the  substance  and  efficient  cause 
of  Ihe  phenomena  of  matter,  is  the  prejudice  that  lin- 
gers in  the  mind  respecting  the  nature  cf  Mind.  It  is 
an  undeniable  fact,  that  Mind  exerts  an  active  power, 
that  it  originates  motion,  or  gives  the  first  impulse  to 
muscular  action.  Hence  it  is  inferred,  that  power  is  aa 
attribute  or  quality  of  mind.  Yet  it  is  not  from  this 
simple  fact — Mind  originates  motion,  taken  by  itself, 
that  the  inference  is  deduced;  for  a  much  plainer  and 
more  natural  conclusion  would  be,  that  Power  is  com- 
bined with  spirit  in  constituting  the  substance  of  the 
mind.  P»ut  it  is  tacitly  assumed,  that  Jlind  is  a  sim- 
pie  substance ;  and  it  is  on  this  principle,  taken  in  con- 
junction with  the  fact  just  mentioned,  that  it  is  so  bold- 
ly asserted,  that  Power  is  an  attribute  of  mind.  If 
mind  were  a  simple  substance,  it  would  seem  that  either 
the  power  to  impel,  or  the,  j^ower  to  perceive^  must  be  a 
quality,  or  that  both  might  be  qualities;  for  if  they  are 
both  substances,  and  both  belong  to  mind,  then  mind  is 
a  compound.  But  admitting  mind  to  be  a  simple  es- 
sence, and  considering  that  the  phenomena  of  spirit  are 
they  which  distinguish  mind  from  matter,  it  follows  that 
the  simple  spirit  is  that  essence,  or  constitutes  the  sub- 
stance of  the  mind ;  and  that  power  is  an  attribute  or 
quality  of  spirit. 

That  mind  originates  motion,  is  a  known  fact.     Mo- 
iion  then  is  an  attribute  of  mind,  or  it  is  an  operation  of 
Blind.     But  power  certainly  is  not  an  operation.    Power 
Q 


66  THE  ALPHABET 

is  not  the  operation  of  a  cause,  but  the  efficient  cause  of 
an  operation.  Motion  is  the  operation  of  power,  not  of 
spirit.  Mind  must  possess  power,  that  is,  mechanical 
power,  or  the  power  to  impel,  otherwise  it  could  not 
originate  motion;  the  spirit  or  power  to  perceive,  is  not 
the  power  to  impel.  The  energy  of  the  mind  is  in 
proportion  to  its  mechanical  power,  and  not  to  its  in- 
tellectual, as  distinguished  from  its  mechanical  power; 
it  is  in  proportion  to  the  tension  of  the  nerve,  not  to  the 
intensity  of  feeling,  nor  to  the  acuteness  of  perception. 
Strength  of  mind  does  not  consist  in  sensaiiveness ;  it 
consists  even  less  in  the  clearness  and  quickness  of 
perception,  than  in  the  power  to  repel  thoughts  that  ar« 
painful,  or  troublesome,  and  to  confine  the  attention  to 
a  subject  which  requires  labor.  The  labor  of  the  mind 
is  a  mechanical  operation,  as  really  as  the  labor  of 
the  body ;  the  first  consists  of  a  continued  effort  to  pro- 
duce those  trains  of  ideas,  or  successive  configurations 
in  the  brain,  which  are  the  signs,  or  evidences  of  the 
things  which  the  mind  is  investigating.  The  only  lo- 
gical inference  that  can  be  deduced  from  the  fact,  that 
Mind  exerts  an  active  power,  is,  that  Power  is  a  consti- 
tuent element  of  the  substance  of  the  mind. 

We  have  the  same  kind  of  evidence  for  the  existence 
of  j)oiverj  in  the  mind,  that  we  have  for  the  existence 
of  spirit  in  the  mind ;  each  exhibits  its  peculiar  pheno- 
menon; Spirit  perceives,  and  Power  impels.  From 
the  phenomenon,  we  infer  the  existence  of  the  sub- 
stance; and  from  the  species,  or  kind  of  phenomenon^ 
we  infer  the  species,  or  kind  of  substance ;  that  is, 
from  perception,  we  infer  the  existence  of  spirit;  and 
from  motion,  power.  Power  and  spirit,  or  matter  and 
spirit,  are  in  the  same  predicament  as  to  their  generic 
characters ;  they  are  both  substances ;  or  they  are  both 


OF  THOUGHT.  67 

invisible  efficient  causes,  of  visible,  or  perceived  opera- 
tions. 

Mind  contains  a  principle  of  action,  or  of  impulse, 
as  well  as  a  principle  of  perception;  but  it  is  just  as 
rational  to  suppose,  that  the  principle  of  action,  me- 
chanical power,  is  the  agent,  or  efficient  cause,  of  per. 
cejjfion,  as  that  the  principle  of  perception,  or  the  power 
to  perceive,  is  the  agent,  or  efficient  cause,  of  impulsion. 
It  is  just  as  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  material 
substance,  or  that  power,  perceives,  as  that  the  spiritual 
substance  impels.  Whenever  motion,  or  impulse,  18 
exhibited  to  the  senses,  the  thing  which  impels  is, 
without  hesitation,  called  body,  or  matter;  but  when 
the  operation  is  hidden  from  the  senses,  and  we  ar« 
left  to  infer  it  from  the  more  remote  effects,  that  is, 
where  the  impulse  perceived  by  the  senses  has  been 
communicated,  or  produced  by  a  previous  impulse — for 
instance,  where  the  action  of  the  muscles  is  produced 
by  an  impulse  originating  in  tlie  mind,  in  this  case,  the 
primary  cause,  or  thing  which  moves,  is  called  power. 
When  the  senses  perceive  the  primary,  or  immediate 
operation  of  power,  as  in  gravitation  and  repulsion,  we 
pronounce  the  operator  to  be  matter;  but  when  the 
senses  perceive  only  the  secondary  effect,  we  pronounce 
the  originating  cause  to  be  power.  If  we  could  see 
with  our  eyes,  or  feel  with  our  hands  the  operation  of 
mind  in  originating  muscular  motion,  we  should  have 
no  hesitation  in  determining  that  mind  is  in  part  mate- 
rial. But  we  can  only  infer  the  operation  of  the  mind 
in  this  transaction  from  what  follows,  from  the  action 
of  the  muscles ;  and  this  is  in  fact  the  only  evidence 
we  have,  that  there  is  an  action,  or  impelling  operation, 
in  the  mind  as  distinguished  from  tlie  rest  of  the  sys- 
tem; for  we  are  not  covtscious  of  au  exertion  of  power 


6»  THE  ALPHABET 

any  where  except  in  the  muscles.  And  if  from  the 
action  of  the  muscles  we  infer  that  an  impulse  is  given 
by  the  mind,  it  is  in  plain  terms  applying  the  law^s  of 
matter  and  motion,  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  th© 
miii<l  and  tlie  muscular  system.  It  is  an  axiom  of  the 
Kewtonian  philosophy,  that  the  momentum  communi- 
cated, is  in  direct  proportion  to  the  momcntmn  of  tiiat 
by,  or  from,  which  it  is  communicated;  or,  that  "The 
^^elocity,  mulliplied  into  the  qujintity  of  matter,  of  the 
'Mjody  impelled ;  is  in  proportion  to  the  velocity  mul- 
'^tiplied  into  the  quantity  of  matter  of  the  body  which 
'^impels." 

It  is  common  to  contrast  the  mind,  with  solid  body, 
tlie  ethereal  spirit,  with  the  clod  of  the  valley;  and 
doubtless  there  is  an  essential  diiference  between  mat- 
ter and  spirit ;  and  there  is  a  contrast  between  the 
clod  under  our  feet,  and  the  air  which  surrounds  us. 
Yet  the  air  contains  material  substance,  and  so  does  the 
mind,  which  is  not  serial;  and  matter  is  not  necessarily 
a  clod;  it  exists  in  the  atmosphere  in  n  gaseous  state; 
for  the  lightest  gas  that  gravitates, — and  they  all  gravi- 
tate— is  in  part  material,  or  contains  the  gravitating 
principle.  That  which  the  apostle  Paul  calls  a  spiritual 
body,  IS  probably  an  serial  substance,  composed  of  power 
and  spirit,  or  matter  and  spirit.  It  must  be  in  part  ma- 
terial, or  it  would  not  be  body,  and  it  diff'ers  from  the 
natural  body,  probably  by  having  a  greater  proportion 
of  the  spiritual  principle,  and  in  being  far  less  dense. 

IVlatiM'ial  substance,  in  its  primitive  state,  is  not  a 
clod.  VVlien  the  earth  was  without  form,  that  is,  "in 
^  iie  beginning."  when  creation  was  about  to  commence; 
it  is  proba!)le  that  the  bodies  which  now  exist  in  a  sen- 
sible form,  were,  either  in  an  serial  state,  like  our  atmos- 
phere, where  several  elementary  substances  enter  into 


OF  TIIOITGHT.  69 

tiic  ft)imation  of  a  gas,  or  perhaps  it  was  without  any 
cliemical  attraction,  when  it  would  form  a  move  com- 
plete chaos;  the  elements  rain^lhig.  or  existing  together 
in  space,  without  at  all  affecting,  or  being  affected,  by 
each  other.     The  lightest  gaa  has  some  degree  of  gra- 
vity, and  gravity  is  the  distinguishing  characteristic  ()f 
matter;  t!ie  lightest  ;§•«»  then  is,  in  part,  material,  and 
in  some  part  tiie  same,  essentially,  with  the  heaviest 
hodies  in  the  internal  parts  of  the  earth.     Every  elastic 
fluid,  or  every  gas,  contains  necessarily  a  contracting, 
and  an  expanding  principle;  the  opposing  tendencies  of 
tliese  two  principles  constitute  elasticity.     Were  it  not 
fur  the  operation  of  (he  contracting  principle,  the  sub- 
stance of  the.  gas  would  be  dissipated ;  and  but  for  the 
operation  of  the   expanding  principle,  the  contracting 
substance  would  form  itself  into  a  solid  mass.     There 
can  be  little  doubt  but  that  our  atmosphere  contains  the 
elements  of  all  the  substances  which  compose  our  earth 
and  its  inhabitants ;  and  it  is  highly  probable  that  the 
earth  is  contiiuially  growing,  or  acquiring  new  acces- 
sions from  the  atmusphere,  and  that  it  has  been  alto 
gether  formed  in  this  way,  or  from  the  atmosphere — 
under  the  controul  and  direction  of  infinite  Wisdom  and 
Power.     But  the  atmosphere  is  in  no  danger  of  being 
exhausted,  for,  in  any  rational  hypothesis,  it  must  be 
supposed  interminable;  the  air  must  extend  through  in- 
finite space,  for  it  would  be  absurd  to  suppose,  that  an 
elastic  fluid  should  be  terminated  by  a  vacuum. 

Before  the  formation  of  the  heavens  and  the  earth, 
the  substances  which  compose  all  tilings  were  probably 
distrii)uted,  by  their  own  equal  attractions  and  expan- 
sions, throughout  infinite  gpace;  and  it  would  of  course, 
require  all  the  power  in  the  universe,  or  if  this  phrase  is 
improper,  of  infinite  poAVcr,  to  break  the  equilibrium, 


70  THE  ALPHABET 

and  to  compress  a  icm:tH  part  of  the  universal  matter 
into  a  solid,  or  sensible  form. — What  the  origin  is,  of 
that  plastic  cncrs^y,  called  chemicnl  attraction  :  whether 
it  is  the  result  of  the  coml)iiied  tendencies  of  the  several 
simple  substances,  or  efficient  causes,  and  is  inherent  in. 
these  causes,  or  is  entirely  dependent  on  the  will  of 
Ilim  who  presides  over  all  these  operations,  it  would 
require  deep  and  undivided  attention  and  research,  to 
discover,  and  perhaps  would  not  reward  the  toil  by  dis- 
closing itself  to  the  enquirer. 

As  knowledge  and  science  are  desirable,  only  as  thej 
are  useful  and  applicable  to  the  affairs  of  life,  we  will 
hazard  an  attempt  to  identify  the  efficient  cause  of  gra- 
▼itation,  as  it  appears  to  the  metaphysician,  with  the 
corresponding,  or  the  same  principle  or  substance,  as  it 
appears  to  the  naturalist  and  the  chemist.  This  attempt 
"will,  perhaps,  be  scouted,  as  was  Galileo's  theory  of 
the  earth ;  but  we  firmly  believe  in  the  correctness  of 
our  theory ;  yet  if  we  should  hereafter  be  convicted  of 
error,  it  will  not  require  a  holif  inquisition  to  make  us 
recant. 

The  simple  substance  which,  in  chemistry,  is  called 
hjdrogeve,  is  probably  the  same  with  the  contracting 
principle,  or  material  substance.  This  conjecture  is 
founded,  principally,  on  two  known  facts.  First,  Hy^ 
drogene  forms  the  solid  parts  of  woody,  or  vegetable 
substances ;  but  solidity,  or  rejpuhion,  belongs  to  mat- 
ter only,  and  material  suf)stance  is  the  same  one  prin- 
ciple in  all  bodies ;  therefore  hrjdrog^ne  is  the  haais  of 
all  solid,  or  material  substances.  Secondly.  The 
forcible  condensation,  or  contraction  of  hydrogens  gas, 
whenever  the  equilibrium  of  tlie  chemical  attractions  of 
its  constituents  is  disturbed,  as  in  the  formation  of  wa- 
tpr,  is  the  other  fact  m  which  we  ground  the  hypothesis, 


OF  THOUGHT,  .      ^ 

that  hydrogene  is  the  contracting  principle,  or  material 
substance.  There  are  other  facts  known  in  chemistry 
which  uill  tend  to  throw  light  on  this  subject;  it  rests 
with  chemists  to  refute,  or  confirm  the  hypothesis. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


OF  SPIRITUAL  SUBSTANCE. 

The  existence  of  a  spiritual  substance  is  a  principle 
which  is  almost  universally  recognized.  It  has  indeed, 
been  denied  by  a  few  speculative  philosophers,  some  ot* 
whom  have  declared  their  conviction,  that  we  have  no 
knowledge  of  any  thing  beyond  our  own  ideas.  But 
this  doctrine  has  always  been  predicated  on  the  princi- 
ple, that  All  things  are  made  of  nothing.  The  exist- 
ence of  matter  has  been  denied  on  the  same  principle. 
Some  have  admitted  the  existence  of  matter,  while  they 
denied  that  of  spirit;  for,  say  they,  if  all  things  are 
made  of  nolhing,  it  follows,  that  neither  matter  nor 
spirit  are  the  efficient  causes  of  the  phenomena;  that, 
eonsequeutly,  the  phenomena  have  no  necessary  con- 
nection with  the  8ul)stances ;  and  that  it  is  then  obvious, 
that  for  aught  we  know  matter  may  both  gravitate  and 
perceive;  all  the  phenomena  in  nature  may  belong  to 
one  and  the  same  substance,  and  that  substance  may  bei 
matter.  If  all  things  are  made  of  nothing,  matter  is 
iot  the  real  agent  in  gravitation,  any  more  than  in 


72  THE  ALPHABET 

tliouglit  aad  perce[)tioa;  and  there  is  no  principle  on 
wliicii  it  can  be  either  affirmed  or  denied,  that  spirit  ig 
essentially  different  from  matter. 

The  annals  of  philosophy  do  not  record  any  regular 
attempt  to  investigate  the  evidence  of  the  existence  of 
spiritual  substance;  or  to  analyse  the  procedure  of  the 
mind  in  the  discovery  of  this  substance.  Hence  we 
have  no  regular  science,  or  no  principles  established  in 
a  regular  way,  respecting  the  existence  and  nature  of 
spiritual  beings. — No  doubt  it  would  be  deemed  absurd, 
if  v/e  should  talk  of  investigating  the  nature  of  spirit,  by 
eocperiment  and  ohservation;  yet  all  the  knowledge  we 
possess  of  spiritual  sulistance  is  derived  from  experi- 
ence. But  as  this  method  has  not  been  adopted  regu- 
larly,  in  the  philosophy  of  spirit,  it  has  not  been  pursu- 
ed with  advantage.  That  spirit  exists,  is  taken  for 
granted,  but  it  is  contended,  very  unphilosophically, 
that  we  neither  know,  nor  can  discover  what  is  the  es- 
sence of  the  mind  or  of  spirit.  We  hope  to  nmke  it 
appear,  that  the  essence  of  the  mind  is  known  in  fact, 
not  to  philosophers  only,  but  that  it  is  recognized  by  the 
common  sense  of  mankind. 

In  the  philosophy  of  mind  it  has  been  customary  to 
assume,  as  a  first  principle  and  an  undeniable  fact,  that 
the  mind  is  a  simjtle  essence;  or,  that  the  simple  spiri- 
tual substance  constitutes  the  whole  of  the  mind,  and  is 
the  efficient  agent,  not  in  perception  only,  but  also  in 
motion;  that  it  originates  the  actions  of  the  muscles, 
and  performs  all  the  complex  operations  of  the  mind. 
It  is  believed  that  the  essence  of  the  mind  is  some  mys- 
terious unknown  thing — something  beside  the  'power  to 
perceive  and  the  power  to  move  or  impel:  it  is  believed 
that  ihesQ  powers  are,  not  the  ultimate  efficient  causes  of 
the  phenoraetia,  perception  and  impulsef  but  that  they 


OF  THOUGHT.  7S 

are  qualities  or  attributes  belonging  to  something  else, 
which  is  called  the  essence  oi'  the  mind,  the  knowledge 
of  which,  it  is  said,  is  beyond  the  reach  of  the  human 
intellect.  It  is  not  pretended  that  there  is  any  logical 
evidence  of  the  existence  of  a  nubstratum  of  these  pow- 
ers; it  is  not  alledged  that  a  simple  essencBy  to  which 
Ihey  necessarily  belong  as  qualities,  is  actually  perceiv- 
ed; the  power  to  impel,  and  the  poicer  to  perceive  are 
Dot  operations,  from  which  we  would  be  bound  in  rea- 
son to  infer  the  existence  of  an  agent  or  cause.  Yet  it 
is  on  the  ground  that  these  powers,  the  power  to  per- 
ceive and  the  power  to  move,  are  attributes,  or  qualities, 
that  they  are  supposed  to  belong  necessarily  to  a  sub- 
stratum, or  to  something  which  is  called  the  essence  of 
mind.  Now  the  essence  of  any  thing,  is  that  which 
makes  that  thing  to  be  tvhat  it  is.  But  what  is  it  that 
makes  the  mind  to  be  what  it  is,  or  to  be  mind?  It  is 
the  power  to  perceive,  and  the  power  to  impel  that  makes 
mind  to  be  mind.  Therefore,  the  power  to  perceive, 
and  the  pow  er  to  impel,  constitute  the  essence  of  the 
mind.  It  is  also  received  as  an  incontrovertable  princi- 
ple, that  Mind,  or  Spirit  is  unextended  and  indivisible. 
It  is  not  intended  to  enter  into  an  inquiry  here,  re- 
specting the  nature  of  the  human  mind.  Mind,  or  that 
being  which  both  tliinks  and  acts, — which  both  per- 
ceives and  impels,  is  a  compound  substance,  consisting 
of  power  and  spirit,  or  matter  and  spirit.  The  simple 
spiritual  substance  perceives  ;  its  operation  is  uniformly 
perception ;  therefore  it  does  not  impel.  Like  causes 
produce  like  efi'ects.  Besides,  it  has  already  been  prov- 
ed, that  the  power  to  impel  is  not  a  quality,  but  a  sub- 
stance, and  as  power,  as  well  as  spirit,  is  essential  to 
the  constitution  of  miud,  it  follows  that  mind  is  a  com- 
poimd  substance. 
10 


74  THE  ALPHABET 

The  nature  of  t\ie  spiritual  substance  is  the  subject 
of  tbe  present  inquiry,  and  it  is  proposed  to  establish 
the  position,  that  Spirit,  in  its  elementary  state,  is  a 
self-existent  independent  being,  and  the  efficient  cause 
of  perception ;  that  previous  to  its  entering  into  the 
constitution  of  the  mind,  it  exists  in  an  elementary 
state;  and  that  it  extends  throughout  all  space,  and 
pervades  all  bodies,  animate  and  inanimate. 

The  simple  fact,  that  Spirit  perceives,  is  a  funda- 
mental principle  in  the  philosophy  of  Spirit,  or  of  Mind, 
as  distinguished  from  matter ;  it  is  a  general  fact  pre- 
cisely analogous  to  that  of  the  gravitation  of  matter. 
These  simple  ultimate  facts  present  themselves  to  every 
mind  capable  of  observation  and  reflection;  and  it  is 
perhaps  on  account  of  its  being  so  familiar  to  the  mind, 
and  on  account  of  its  simplicity,  that  the  former  princi- 
ple— spirit  perceives — is  almost  overlooked  in  the  phi- 
losophy of  mind.  To  deny  either  of  tliese  simple  ge- 
neral facts,  would  be  to  confound  truth  and  falsehood, 
and  to  undermine  every  principle  of  philosophy.  Yet 
it  is,  in  effect,  to  deny  these  principles,  to  affirm,  that 
Spirit  impels,  or  originates  motion,  or  is  tlie  efficient 
cause  of  gravitation.  Like  causes  produce  like  effects. 
But  this  principle  is  inapplicable  to  a  substance  that  is 
made  of  nothing;  and  that  is  not  the  real  cause  of  any 
effect.  If  spirit  is  made  of  nothing,  it  does  not  really 
perceive;  it  is  incapable  of  any  operation  in  its  own 
capacity;  and  on  any  principle,  it  is  just  as  rational  to 
suppose  that  matter  perceives,  as  that  spirit  impels,  or 
originates  motion. 

W'hen  natural  reason  lifts  her  voice,  she  finds  a  ready 
accordance  in  every  unprejudiced  mind.  It  will  be  readily 
granted,  that  spint  perceives,  and  that  it  is  the  only 
species,  or  kiud  of  bcmg,  capable  of  perceiving;  in  a 


OF  THOUGHT.  T^ 

word,  that  whatever  perceives  is  spirit;  and  tliat  what 
does  not  perceive,  is  not  spirit.  AV^henever  we  observe 
a  specific  phenomenon,  we  infer  the  existence  of  a  spe- 
cific  efficient  cause,  or  substance  ;  whenever  wc  observe 
perception,  or  feeling,  we  infer  the  existence  and  pre- 
sence of  spirit;  and  this  amounts  to,  or  includes  all  that 
we  know  of  spirit ;  every  genuine  principle  of  the  phi- 
losophy of  spirit,  is  implied  in  this  one,  that  spirit  per- 
ceives. If  spirit  is  that  which  perceives,  and  is  the  only 
thinj;  wliicli  perceives,  it  is  the  efficient  cause  of  percep- 
tion: it  is  that,  and  that  only  whicli  is  able  to  perceive. 
But  like  causes  produce  like  effects;  therefore,  spirit 
does  not  impel,  or  produce  any  phenomenon  different 
from  perception. 

The  power  to  perceive,  is  the  essence  of  Spirit. 
There  is  not  the  least  ground  to  suppose  the  existence 
of  any  other  essence  of  spirit,  or  of  a  being  to  which  the 
power  to  perceive  is  an  attribute.  The  power  to  per- 
ceive is  not  a  quality,  requiring  a  subject,  or  substratum; 
it  is  not  an  operation,  from  which  reason  is  bound  to  in- 
fer the  existence  of  an  agent.  Perception  is  an  attri- 
bute of  spirit;  the  power  to  perceive  is  spirit  itself;  or  it 
is  that  which  perceives ;  there  is  no  power  to  jJerceivCf 
excepting  the  efficient  cause  of  perception,  or  that  which 
actually  perceives. 

If  Spjrit  is  the  efficient  cause  of  perception,  it  must 
be  a  self-existent  independent  being,  in  its  elementary, 
or  primitive  state,  for  that  which  depends  on  some  other 
being  for  its  existence,  can  have  no  efficiency  of  its  own ; 
it  cannot  of  itself  produce  any  operation;  it  is  not  an 
efficient  cause.  Yet  every  individual  spirit,  although 
in  itself  an  efficient  cause  of  perception,  is  indebted,  for 
its  individuality,  and  for  its  situation  relatively  to  sur- 
rounding objects,  to  the  Creator,  who  separates  it  from 


re  THE  ALPHABET 

the  rommon  clement,  and  unites  it  to  an  organized  body, 
throu;;li  ^vllich  it  acquires  all  its  knowledge,  and  all  its 
enjoyments. 

In  opposition  to  this  it  will  be  alledged,  that  the  Su- 
preme Being  h.is  power  to  create,  and  actually  does 
cvea'e,  from  notliing.  all  the  spirits,  or  souls  of  men. 
But  beside  that  this  is  bare  asserti(»n  without  the  sha- 
dow of  proof,  it  is  absiird,  for  the  reasons  already  men- 
tioncil.  to  suppose  the  possibility  of  an  efficient  cause 
being  -^veated  from  nothing.  This  will  be  met  with  the 
argument,  that  infinite  power  can  do  all  things :  that 
there  is  nothing  too  hard  for  infinite  power.  It  is  true, 
that  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  terms,  there  is  nothing 
too  liard-,  or  dijicidt  for  infinite  power;  yet  it  will  not 
be  denied  that  there  are  some  things  impossible  even  to 
infinite  power.  Infinite  powxr  cannot  make  two,  equal 
to  four,  or  a  non-erditi/,  equal  to  an  eflRcient  cause. 
There  is  indeed  one  sense  of  the  words,  in  which  it  is 
true,  that  substances  are  made  of  nothing.  When  we 
look  around  in  space,  we  say,  that  we  see  nothing,  that 
the  space  is  empty;  yet  this  may  be  occupied  by  air,  or 
by  light ;  siihstnnces  which  enter  into  the  composition  of 
bodies,  but  which,  in  their  elementary  state  were  consi- 
dered to  be  nothing.  The  world  and  all  that  it  contains 
"was  once  in  that  state ;  "the  earth  was  without  form. 
^%nd  void,"  yet  it  icas ;  substances  existed,  but  without 
a  stn^\h\e  form  ;  their  operations  could  not  have  been 
perceived  by  organs  of  sense  such  as  ours. 

When  it  is  asserted  that  infinite  power  creates  sub- 
stances from  nothing,  it  should  in  reason  be  shewn, 
cither  that  it  is  within  the  compass  of  infinite  power  to 
do  this  thing,  or  that  in  fact  it  has  been  done.  But 
neither  of  these  can  be  shewn,  on  the  contrary,  the  ab- 
surdity of  the  supposition   is   palpable.     Can   infinity 


OF  THOUGHT.  77 

'power  think,  or  perceive?  We  speak  of  meclumical 
power,  or  the  power  to  impel.  No,  certainly:  power 
does  no<,  cannot  perceive;  it  is  spirit  only  that  per- 
ceives, or  that  can  perceive.  If  infinite  power  cannot 
produce  the  phenomenon,  is  it  not  absurd  to  suppose, 
t^iat  it  can  create,  from  nothing,  the  efficient  cause  of  the 
pheuomenon  ?  The  sole  operation  of  power^  is  motion^ 
or  impulse,  which  never  can  amount  to,  or  create,  its 
own  efficient  cause.  It  would  he  equally  absurd  to 
su|)posc  that  Spirit  can  create  other  spirits  from  nothing. 
Spirit,  then,  is  a  self-existent,  inflependent  being,  and  is 
t)ic  efficient  cause  of  perception. 

The  spiritual  substance  exists  in  an  elementary  state, 
previous  to  its  entering  into  the  constitution  of  the  hu- 
man mind.  The  pro«f  of  this  proposition  will  be 
drawn  from  known  facts,  and  from  the  attestation  of 
sacred  writ. 

It  is  a  well  known  fact,  that  the  substance  of  the 
body  is  continually  wasting,  and  continually  renewed 
by  the  food  we  take.  Rut  who  shall  dare  to  conjecture, 
in  the  face  of  the  prevailing  theories  respecting  mind, 
or  spirit,  that  this  too  is  constantly  expending  itself,  and 
constantly  repaired  by  the  element  from  which  it  first 
originated.  Yet  there  is  hardly  room  for  conjecture,  it 
is  a  fact,  which  is  obvious  to  the  attentive  observer,  that 
the  principle  of  life  is  thus  wasted,  and  supplied; 
though  the  element  from  which  it  is  supplied,  is  dif- 
ferent from  that  which  replenishes  the  bodily  substance, 
and  is  received  through  a  diir.Tent  organ. 

The  vital  air  which  we  inhale  by  the  lung*!,  is  the 
food  of  the  principle  of  life.  Every  exercise  of  animal 
power  exhausts,  or  lessens  the  principle  of  lliV.  or  the 
sensorial  power :  and  is  followed  by  an  increase  of 
breathing,  to  obtain  a  fresh  supply,  and  an  atci'lerated 


78  THE  ALPHABET 

circulation  of  the  blood,  to  distrihiite  that  supply 
throu£;hout  the  system.  There  is  no  fact  more  clear- 
ly ascertained,  than  that  lije  results  from  the  air  we 
breathe,  and  death  from  the  exclusion  of  air.  So  long 
as  we  breathe,  we  live ;  but  the  most  perfectly  orga- 
nized body,  is  dead  until  it  breathes.  *'God  made  man 
"of  the  dust  of  the  s;round,  and  breathed  into  his  nos- 
"trils  the  breath  of  life,  and  man  became  a  living  soul.^' 
JBut  vfhat  is  the  principle  of  life  ?  That  which  is  called 
life,  consists  of  actions,  or  motions  excited  by  stimulus  ; 
and  stimulus  is  something  jierceived,  or  felt.  The 
principle  of  life  then,  is  that  substance  which  is  capa- 
ble of  being  stimulated,  or  of  feeling,  or  perceiving  the 
action  of  stimulus.  But  that  which  perceives,  or  feels j 
is  Spirit.  Wherever  there  is  perception,  there  is  spirit;^ 
from  the  lowest  or  dullest  feeling  of  sense,  to  the  highest 
exercise  of  reason,  the  same  species  of  phenomenon, 
requires  the  same  species  of  efficient  cause.  And  by 
whatever  name  we  call  that  phenomenon,  whether  we 
term  it  feeling,  sense,  or  perception,  it  is  essentially  the 
same;  it  is  the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  spiritual 
substance ;  and  it  is  the  prominent  feature  in  all  the 
complex  phenomena  of  reason  and  of  sense.  It  is  then 
an  obvious  fact,  that  the  air  we  breathe  contains,  and 
constantly  supplies  the  aliment  of  that  substance,  which 
is  the  principle  both  of  life,  and  of  intelligence. 

That  spirit  exists  in  an  elementary  state,  is  attested 
by  the  word  of  the  august  Being,  who,  by  His  creative 
power  united  our  bodies  and  spirits,  and  who  is  most 
intimately  acquainted  with  the  constitution  of  man. 
The  sacred  historian,  by  divine  inspiration  informs  us, 
that  ''God  made  man  of  the  dust  of  the  ground,  and 
'^breathed  into  his  nostrils  the  breath  of  life,  and  man 
<*became  a  living  soul."    In  consequence  of  the  breath 


OF  THOUGHT.  79 

of  life,  or  the  air,  being  breathed  into  his  nostrils,  he 
became  a  living  soul.  The  dust  of  the  gronnd,  and  the 
breath  ofhfe,  are  the  elements  from  which  is  formed  the 
living  man,  or  the  living  soul." 

We  are  told  by  the  learned,  that  the  word  which  is 
translated  wind,  and  breath,  is  the  same  throughout  the 
sacred  scri^)tures,  with  t'lat  which  is  rendered  spirit ; 
tlie  same  word  in  the  original,  signifies  spirit,  iciud, 
breath.  This  would  seem  plainly  to  imply,  that  the 
wind,  or  the  air,  is  spirit,  or  that  it  contains  the  ele- 
mentary spiritual  substance.  There  is  no  part  of  sacred 
wri(  that  forbids  this  implication ;  but  the  metaphysical 
theories  of  the  ^earnc  d  forbid  it.  However  it  is  sr^ne- 
rally  true,  that  the  most  learned  are  also  the  most  libe- 
ral, and  most  ready  to  encourage  research;  and  with 
these  encouraging  reflections  ve  proceed  to  lay  before 
the  reader  the  following  considerations. 

In  the  first  chapter  of  Genesis  it  is  said,  "The  earth 
'^was  without  form,  and  void,  and  darkness  was  upon 
'^•the  face  of  the  deep,  and  the  Spirit  of  God  moved  upon 
"the  face  of  the  waters.''  It  appears  to  be  assumed  by 
divines,  that  the  Holy  Spirit  is  spoken  of  in  this  passage. 
But  surely — with  deference  to  these  respected  authori- 
ties,— it  is  attril)uting  to  that  divine  person,  an  office  by 
no  means  appropriate,  and  far  l)eneath  the  dignity  of  his 
character.  It  is  not  warranted  by  other  parts  of  sacred 
writ,  for  wherever  the  Holy  Spirit  is  expressly  mention- 
ed, he  is  employed  in  revealing,  either  the  character  of 
God,  the  history  of  ffillen  man.  or  the  mysteries  of  re- 
demption. The  Holy  Spirit  U  the  proper  subject  of  the 
moral  attributes  of  God;  or  is  the  agent  in  producing 
holiness,  and  in  inspiring  the  mind  of  man  with  the 
knowledge  and  love  of  truth;  but  is  nowhere  represent- 
ed Qs  the  agent  in  physical  operations,  such  as  movivg 


80  THE  ALPHABET 

on  the  face  of  the  waters.  The  wind,  or  Spirit  of  Gorl 
spoken  of  in  the  passage  under  consideration,  would  ap- 
pear to  a  plain  mind  to  be  that  elementary  spirit,  or 
breath,  or  vital  air,  which  to  this  day  moves  upon  thk 
face  of  the  icaters,  being  the  fluid  element  next  in  weight 
to  water.  It  Avas  that  elementary  substance,  Avhich 
doubtless  then  was,  and  which  still  is  one  of  the  consti- 
tuents of  atmospheric  air ;  and  which  supplied  the  first 
progenitors  of  our  race,  and  which  still  supplies  their 
descendants  with  the  principle  of  life,  or  the  spiritual 
part  of  their  constitutions.  And  it  was  called  the  S2)irit 
of  Gody  because  it  was  that  elementary  substance  which 
was  yet  retained  absolutely  in  His  hands,  or  which 
had  not  yet  been  appropriated  to  the  formation  of  indi- 
vidual beings. 

There  arc  many  passages  of  scripture  in  which  the 
Spirit  of  the  Lord  is  mentioned,  where  it  is  evidently 
not  the  Holy  Spirit  that  is  intended.  Such  are  the  fol- 
lowing. ^^x-X-nd  the  Spirit  of  the  Lord  came  mightily 
^•'upon  him,"  [Sampson]  ^^and  he  rent  him''  [the  lion] 
'''as  he  would  liave  rent  a  kid,  and  he  had  nothing  in 
'^his  hand."* — ••And  when  he  came  to  Lehi  the  Philis- 
^^tines  shouted  against  him ;  and  the  Sp)irlt  of  the  Lord 
<^came  mightily  upon  him ;  and  the  cords  that  were  on 
"his  arm  became  as  flax  that  was  burnt  with  the  fire, 
*and  his  bands  loosed  from  off  his  hands.'-'f  No  one 
can  seriously  believe,  that  the  Spirit  of  the  Lord,  in 
these  passages,  means  the  Holy  Spirit;  it  appears 
plainly  to  be  the  principle  of  life,  or  the  principle  of  ani- 
mal strength  that  is  alluded  to.  The  following  passage 
has  the  same  pur[)ort.  "As  the  beast  goetli  down  into 
"the  valley,  tlie  Sjjirit  of  the  Lord  causeth  him  to  rest."^: 

♦JiMiges  xiv.  16.     f  sv,  14.     ^^^  Isaiah  Ixiii.  li. 


OF  THOUGHT,  U 

These  passages  shew  pretty  plainly,  that  the  words 
Sjmit'  of  the  Lord,  in  the  holy  scriptures,  do  not  al- 
ways allude  to  the  Holy  Spirit. — In  the  following  ex- 
tracts, the  words  spirit,  and  Spirit  of  God,  evidently 
mean  the  elementary  principle  of  animal  life.  '*A11  the 
"while  the  breath  is  in  me,  and  the  Spirit  of  God  is  ia 
"my  nostrils,  my  tongue  shall  not  utter  deceit."* — "And 
"the  Sj)irit  of  God  came  upon  Saul  when  he  heard 
^^these  tidings,  and  his  anger  was  kindled  greatly."f 
'•'Cease  ye  from  man,  whose  breath"  [spirit]  "is  in  his 
"nostrils,  for  wherein  is  he  to  be  accounted  of."J — It  is 
impossible  to  inculcate  in  a  plainer  manner,  the  princi- 
ple, that  the  elementary  principle,  or  spirit  of  life,  is  de- 
rived from  the  air  we  breathe. 

That  the  spiritual  substance  has  exteiision,  scarcely 
needs  any  farther  proof  than  what  the  foregoing  argu- 
ments afford ;  yet  as  there  is  direct  testimony  from  sa- 
cred writ,  as  well  as  the  clearest  evidence  from  fact  to 
establish  this  point,  it  is  proper  to  say  a  few  words  on 
the  subject,  especially  as  it  will  tend  to  confirm  the  posi- 
tion before  insisted  on,  if  it  be  thought  to  need  any  far- 
ther confirmation, — that  spirit  exists  in  an  elementary 
stale. 

And  first,  of  the  testimony  from  sacred  writ.  "The 
"eyes  of  the  Lord  are  in  every  place,  beholding  the 
"evil  and  the  good."||  This  text,  with  many  others, 
pi*ove  the  omnipresence  of  the  Spirit  of  God.  But  it  is 
idle  to  go  about  to  prove  the  omnipresence;  no  one 
will  deny  it.  And  it  is  probable  that  no  one  will  ven- 
ture to  alledge,  that  omnipresence,  and  extension,  are 
two  different  modes  of  existence, — or,  that  the  first  does 
not  imply  the  last.     But  if  the  Spirit  of  the  Lord  is 

♦Jobxxvli.  3.     t  ^  Sftnaucl  la.  #.     *  Isaiah  ii.  22.    0  Proverbs  xv.  3. 
11 


St  THE  ALPHABET 

omnipresent,  or  is  extended  throughout  all  space,  then 
extension  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  nature  of  cspiiit ; 
if  thQ  Spirit  of  the  Lord  is  not  distinguished  from  mat- 
ter by  being  uncxtended,  is  it  necessary  that  the  spirits 
of  men  should  be  distinguished  from  matter  by  the  want 
of  extension  ?  If  the  Spirit  of  the  Lord  is  extended 
through  infinite  space,  does  not  this  afford  strong  pre- 
sumptive evidence,  that  all  spirits  have  their  degree  of 
extension. 

But  we  have  more  direct  evidence  from  fact,  in  sup- 
port of  the  principle  that  spirits  are  extended  beings. 
Whatever  facts  we  possess  in  relation  to  this  subject, 
and  as  they  respect  the  human  spirit,  or  mind,  are  of 
course  derived  from  the  testimony  of  consciousness. 
And  may  we  not  confidently  appeal  to  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  reader ;  do  we  not  feel,  or  perceive  with  our 
eyes,  our  ears,  palate,  at  the  ends  of  our  fingers,  and 
with  almost  every  part  of  the  body  ?  Are  we  not  con- 
scious of  all  this  ?  Does  not  the  experience  of  every 
moment  confirm  it  ?  Make  a  farther  experiment  when 
you  will ;  put  your  finger  in  the  blaze  of  the  candle, 
and  you  will  instantly  perceive  that  something  is  going 
forward  in  the  finger.  Whatever  swift  little  messenger 
conveyed  the  notice  of  this  to  the  central  reflecting  or- 
gan, the  brain,  it  must  first  have  perceived  it  itself, 
at  the  point  where  the  action  originated.  There  is  a 
perception,  or  sensation  in  the  finger ;  and  the  sensa- 
tive  substance  must  have  extended  to  the  finger.  It  is 
to  no  purpose  to  say,  that  the  sensation  is  in  the  mind ; 
and  that  the  mind  is  confined  to  the  brain,  or  to  a  single 
peint  in  the  brain ;  it  might  as  well  be  said  that  the 
mind  is  in  the  moon;  if  it  is  not  present  in  the  pait 
where  we  are  conscious,  we  know  not  where  it  is ; 
consciousness  is  then  no  guide;  its  testimony  is  false. 


OF  THOUGHT.  83 

But,  to  return:  we  are  conscious  that  there  is  a  sensa- 
tion in  the  finger,  and  this  consciousness  is  the  only 
evidence  we  have,  on  the  subject  of  the  locality  of  the 
sensative  substance.  It  is  a  fact  that  the  finger  feels, 
or  is  conscious  of  the  violent  cliange  produced  within 
it,  by  the  action  of  the  fire;  no  sophistry  can  disprove 
this  fact.  The  sensation  is  without  doubt  in  the  mind  ; 
this  cannot  be  denied ;  wherever  there  is  sensation, 
tliere  is  mind  ;  but  must  we,  in  spite  of  fact,  conclude 
from  this,  that  the  sensation  is  in  the  brain,  and  confin- 
ed to  a  sin,«;le  point  there ;  or  should  we  not  rather 
conclude  that  the  mind  extends  to  the  finger,  and  to 
every  point  where  sensation  is  felt.  There  is  no  fact 
that  forbids  this  conclusion ;  it  is  not  inconsistent  with 
any  principle  established  in  reason.  If,  where  there  is 
sensation  there  is  necessarily  mind — and  if  it  is  a  fact 
that  there  is  sensation  in  the  finger,  tlien  the  mind  ex- 
tends to  the  finger;  the  mind  has  nearly  the  same  ex* 
tension  with  the  body. 

But  in  defiance  of  the  testimony  of  consciousness,  it 
will,  perliaps,  be  insisted  on,  that  sentient  beings  are 
unextended;  we  shall  be  told  that  the  pain  produced 
by  the  heat  of  the  candle,  is  not  really  in  the  finger,  but 
in  the  mind  which  occupies  a  point  somewhere  in  the 
brain.  But  this  is  borrovviug  the  question;  when  it  is 
proved  that  the  mind  is  unextended,  then  we  shall  be 
compelled  to  admit  that  our  sensations  are  confined  to  a 
point;  but  the  only  evidence  calculated  to  prove  that  the 
mind  is  unextended,  would  be  the  fact,  that  our  sensa- 
tions are  confined  to  a  point.  Now  this  fact  can  be 
ascertained  only  by  experiment  and  by  the  testimony  of 
consciousness ;  but  consciousness  does  not  testify  the 
fact :  on  the  contrary,  consciousness  testifies  that  sensa- 
tion takes  place  in  the  external  organs, — hence  it  is  that 


84  THE  ALPHABET 

they  are  called  the  organs  of  sense,  or  of  sensation;— 
if  M'e  are  to  rely  on  the  testimony  of  consciousness,  a 
single  sensation  extends  itself  over  a  considerable  sur- 
face, or  throughout  the  whole  extent  of  an  organ. 
There  is  no  evidence  to  be  drawn  from  consciousness, 
that  the  pain  wliich  is  apparently  in  the  finger,  is  really 
in  the  head. 

We  are  not  conscious  that  our  sensations  are  alto- 
gether in  the  brain  ;  we  are  not  conscious  at  all  of  sensa- 
tion in  the  brain,  excepting  when  it  is  disordered.  It 
is  not  to  the  brain  that  we  refer  our  pains  and  our  plea- 
sures ;  they  originate  apparently  in  the  bodily  organs ; 
our  joys  and  our  sorrows  we  refer  to  our  bosoms — love, 
hatred,  auger,  benevolence  we  attribute  to  the  heart,  by 
which  is  meant,  not  the  muscular  organ  so  called,  but 
the  spirit,  residing  in  the  bosom  as  well  as  in  the  head. 
The  head  is  no  doubt  the  principal  seat  of  intelligence, 
it  is  there  all  the  organs  meet ;  it  is  to  this  common  re- 
ceptacle is  brought  all  the  notices  of  external  objects  ; 
it  is  there  these  notices,  or  impressions  are  analysed, 
and  our  inferences  drawn  as  to  the  existence,  nature, 
and  positions  of  external  objects,  and  our  connexions 
with  tliem.  But  it  is  in  the  bosom  we  experience  the 
feelings,  the  sentiments,  and  the  perturbations  excited 
by  those  objects ;  it  is  in  the  bosom,  in  conjunction  with 
the  brain,  that  we  approve,  or  disapprove.  We  per- 
ceive right  and  wrong  in  the  brain,  but  we  feel  good  and 
evil  in  the  lieart,  that  is,  throughout  the  whole  of  the 
nervous  system,  including  the  brain.  To  siira  up  all  in 
one  word,  wherever  there  is  blood,  and  nerve,  and  vital 
air,  there  is  sensation. 

There  can  be  no  doubt,  but  that  the  external  organs 
of  sense  communicate  with  the  brain,  and  with  it  form 
one  grand  organ  of  sensation,  or  perception,  and  that 


OF  THOUGHT.  U5 

the  spirit,  or  mind,  having  her  pnucii)al  seat  in  the 
hrain,  has  there  the  advantage  of  receiving  and  compar- 
ing all  the  impressions,  or  ideas  conveyed  through  the 
several  external  organs,  and  of  drawing  her  conclusions 
from  the  whole.  It  is  thus  we  learn  to  estimate  dis- 
tance, by  comparing  the  ideas  of  the  organ  of  sight,  with 
those  of  the  organ  of  feeling. 

But  if  the  spiritual  substance  exists  in  an  elementary 
state ;  and  if  in  the  human  system  it  is  continually  ex- 
pended, and  supplied  again  by  the  air  we  breathe,  does 
not  tbis  destroy  the  identity  of  the  mind  ? — By  no 
means.  The  identity  of  the  mind  does  not  consist  in 
its  having  retained  the  identical  parts,  or  particles  of 
spirit,  any  more  than  the  identity  of  the  body  consists 
in  its  having  retained  the  same  particles  of  matter. — 
The  sameness  of  the  spiritual  substance  cannot  consti- 
tute the  identity  of  the  mind, — first,  because  the  spirit 
does  not  constitute  the  whole  mind.  Mind  is  a  com- 
bination of  power  and  spirit,  or  matter  and  spirit.  The 
only  operation  and  characteristic  of  spirit,  is  perception  ; 
there  is  nothing  in  one  spirit,  simply  as  spirit,  to  distin- 
guish it  from  another  spirit;  every  spirit  perceives. 
Simple  spirit  is  incapable  of  acquiring  a  fixed  and  per- 
manent form,  or  a  distinct,  or  individual  character. — 
Secondly.  If  we  consider  the  mind  as  formed  of  two 
distinct  substances,  power  and  spirit^  still  there  is 
nothing  simply  in  this  combmation  of  substance  to  dis- 
tinguish one  mind  from  another;  power  and  spirit  is 
the  same  in  one  mind,  with  power  and  spirit  in  another 
mind.  One  mind  is  distinguished  from  another,  not  by 
perception,  but  by  the  objects  of  its  perceptions,  or  about 
which  it  has  been  conversant,  or  by  the  ideas  and  the 
knowledge  it  has  acquired,  and  by  its  habits  of  think- 
ing and  feeling.     The  identity  of  the  mind  consists  in 


»6  THE  ALPHABET 

the  ideutily  of  its  ideas,  associations,  and  habits  of 
thinking  and  feeling.  But  knowledge,  and  ideas,  and 
liahits  of  thinking  and  feeling,  can  he  ac<inired  only 
through  the  medium  of  organs,  adapted  at  once  to  re- 
ceive impressions  from  external  o'DJects,  and  to  feel,  or 
perceive  these  impressions ;  that  is,  organs  composed  ef 
matter  and  spirit;  matter,  to  be  acted  on  and  to  react, 
or  to  receive  impression  from  matter ;  and  spirit,  to 
perceive,  or  feel  the  impression.  Such  in  fact  are  our 
organs  of  sensation.  It  is  the  material  part  of  the  nerv- 
ous system,  or  mind,  which  receives  the  impressions 
from  external  objects,  or  which  is  the  suhjp.ct  of  the 
ideas,  or  configurations  or  modes  of  operation  communi- 
cated by  these  impressions;  but  it  is  tlie  spiritual  part, 
which  is  in  combination  with  the  material,  that  per- 
ceives these  impressions.  Every  repetition  of  an  idea 
in  the  mind,  that  is,  every  repetition  of  a  particular  ac- 
tion, or  operation,  in  the  external  organs  of  sense  and 
the  brain,  increases  the  facility,  and  the  tendency  to  re- 
peat this  same  idea,  or  operation,  and  in  all  probability 
increases  the  bulk  and  consistence,  or  solidity  of  the  or- 
gan, or  organs,  both  external  and  internal  tlnis  brought 
into  action; — just  as  the  repetition  of  a  particular  action 
in  the  muscular  organs,  increases  the  size  of  the  mnscle, 
and  the  facility  of  repeating  that  action. 

We  come  now  to  consider  more  particularly,  the  phy- 
sical and  chemical  characters  of  spiritual  substance ;  or 
to  inquire  in  what/orm  it  exists  in  the  piiysical,  or  ex- 
ternal world,  and  in  what  way  it  exhibits  itself  to  the 
senses.  It  is  a  known  fact,  that  the  spirit,  or  mind  in- 
fluences, and  is  influenced  by  bodily  substances ;  yet, 
perhaps,  the  attempt  to  investigate  this  fact,  or  to  in- 
quire into  the  manner  in  which  this  reciprocal  influence 
is  eftectcd,  will  be  pronounced  vain  and   idle.     But 


OF  THOUGHT.  87 

surely  it  is  the  office  of  philosophy  to  explore,  and  not 
to  shut  up  a  field  of  inquiry.  Therefore,  we  hope  to 
receive  the  indulgence  bestowed  on  adventure,  instead 
of  the  censure  due  to  temerity. — The  proldeni,  as  to  the 
manner  in  which  matter  and  spirit  reciprocally  afl'ect 
each  other,  is  to  be  solved  only  in  one  way, — that  is,  by 
identifying  Spirit  with  some  one  of  the  substances  fami- 
liarly known  in  what  is  called  the  physical  world,  and 
by  shewing  Miiat  is  the  niodus  operandi  of  this  sub- 
stance, or  the  manner  in  which  it  affects,  and  is  af- 
fected by  matter. 

The  manner  in  which  it  is  common  to  identify  one 
substance  with  another  in  philosophical  investigation,  is 
in  reasoning  from  analogy^  the  analogy  of  the  pheno- 
mena. It  is  on  this  species  of  evidence  that  any  two 
substances  are  pronounced  to  be  of  the  same  kind,  or 
species;  the  soul,  or  spirit  of  a  man,  and  the  soul  or 
spirit  of  a  beast  are  called  by  the  same  name,  or  per- 
ceived to  be  the  same  species  of  substance,  on  the  evi- 
dence of  analogy,  the  analogy,  or  sameness  of  their 
phenomena;  the  lightning  of  tlie  heavens,  and  the  elec- 
tric aura^  are  pronounced  the  same,  on  the  same  kind  of 
evidence;  and  aerial  substances  are  known  to  be  mate- 
rial, on  the  evidi||[ice  of  analogy,  or  because  they  gravi- 
tate and  repel.  We  propose  to  shew,  on  the  evidence 
of  analogy,  that  the  substance  which  in  metaphysics  is 
denominated  Sjjtrit,  is  the  same  with  that  which  in 
chemistry  is  called  the  matter  of  heat,  or  caloric. 

It  is  apt  to  be  imagined,  that  there  is  no  metaphysi- 
cal reasoning  at  all  attending  the  discovery  and  percep- 
tion of  material  substance;  we  seem  to  perceive  it  by 
the  senses;  it  obtrudes  itself  so  continually  on  observa- 
tion, tliat  M'ithout  reflection  and  a  laborious  abstraction, 
wc  imagine  that  we  perceive^  the  substance  immediatelj^^ 


88  THE  ALPHABET 

while  in  reality  it  is  only  the  phenomena  that  are  per- 
ceived immediately,  or  by  the  senses.  At  the  same 
time,  Spirit  is  conceived  to  be  an  invisible  mysterious 
thing,  and  that  even  its  operations  arc  necessarily  invi-, 
siblc  and  mysterious.  It  is  admitted,  indeed,  that  the 
phenomena  of  spirit  are  perceived  by  internal  sense,  or 
consciousness;  but  it  is  believed  that  they  can  in  no 
wise  affect  the  external  organs  of  sense.  But  material 
substance,  or  the  basis  of  gravitation  and  repulsion,  is 
as  completely  invisible  to  the  senses,  as  the  spiritual 
substance;  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  is  perceived 
immediately,  or  in  the  way  that  we  perceive  operations. 
The  perception  or  knowledge  of  matter,  as  well  as  the 
^knowledge  of  spirit,  is  the  result  of  a  metaphysical  in- 
vestigation of  the  phenomena. 

The  modus  ojierandi  of  spirit  is  perceived  by  the 
external  organs  of  sense  ;  and  we  have  ventured  to  term 
this,  the  physical  characteristic  of  spirit.  There  is  no 
good  reason  to  aver,  that  the  phenomena  of  spirit  may 
not  affect  the  organs  of  sense  as  well  as  the  phenomena 
of  matter ;  or  that  they  may  not  affect  the  external,  as 
well  as  the  internal  sense,  or  consciousness.  For  what 
is  internal  sense ;  or  what  is  consciousness  ?  It  is  the 
perception,  or  feeling  of  the  operatio^^,  or  phenomena 
w^hich  take  place  within  the  mind. — And  what  is  exter- 
nal sense,  or  sensation  in  the  external  organs?  It  is  con- 
sciousness too;  or  it  is  the  perception,  or  feeling  of  the 
changes,  or  operations  communicated  to  and  produced 
within  the  external  organs,  by  the  impressions  of  exter- 
nal objects.  It  appears  then,  that  sensation  in  the  ex- 
ternal organs,  and  consciousness  within  the  mind  are 
precisely  similar;  they  differ  only  in  their  localities; 
consciousness  in  the  mind,  is  the  sensation,  or  percep- 
tion of  what  takes  place  within  the  mind;  and  sensation 


OF  THOUGHT.  i>9 

in  the  external  organs,  is  the  consciousness  or  percep- 
ccptioii  of  what  takes  plicc  witliin  tlie  external  organs. 
Setise  and  consciousness  perceive  phenomena,  or  opera- 
tions, but  do  not  take  cognizance  of  substances.  If 
the  internal  organ  of  consciousness,  or  sensation  per- 
ceives the  phenomena  of  spirit,  why  may  not  the  exter- 
nal organ  of  sensation,  or  consciousness  perceive  the 
phenomena  of  spirit?  Is  spirit  less  efScient  than  mat- 
ter? Is  it  matter  only  that  has  the  pov.cr  to  awaken 
the  sentient  organ  ?  Or  has  the  sentient  principle  in  the 
the. external  organs  the  power  to  perceive  the  pheno- 
mena of  matter;  and  not  the  power  to  perceive  the  phe- 
nomena of  spirit? 

The  organ  of  feeling;  perceives  gravitation  and  re- 
pulsion; and  reason  infers  an  invisible  cause,  a  some- 
thing which  gravitates  and  repels ;  and  this  something 
is  called  matter.  The  external  organ  of  feeling  per- 
ceives heat  also;  that  is,  the  phenomenon  called  heat ; 
and  it  is  inferred,  that  there  is  a  suhstancBj  or  mat- 
ter of  heat;  we  do  not  refer  this  phenomenon  to  the 
same  cause,  or  substance  which  produces  gra\ita(ion. 
Thougli  the  sulistance  of  heat  is,  improperly,  termed 
matter  of  heat,  it  is  notorious  that  it  does  not  gravitate 
or  repel.  The  substance  of  heat  is  immaterial.  ITeat 
is  capable  of  being  accumulated  to  an  unknown  extent, 
by  means  of  its  chemical  attjj, Action  for  material  sub- 
stance; but  this  is  quite  d-lTerent  from  gravitation^ 
which  is  the  necessary  operation  of  matter,  independ- 
ently of  chemical  affinities.  Heat  radiates,  or  ex[)and.''; 
but  this  is  diflcrent  from  the  repulsion  of  matter,  for 
while  heat  radiates,  it  penetrates  solid  bodie«,  it  does 
not  repel  them.  By  means  of  its  chemical  attraclion, 
heat  imparts  to  bodies  its  own  mode  of  operation,  ex- 
j)ansion,  and  causjes  matter  to  exhibit  phenomena  essen- 
12 


^0  THE  ALPHABET 

tially  different  fi'om  contraction,  or  gravitation.  It  is  in 
consequence  of  this  tendency  to  expand,  together  with 
its  chemical  attraction  for  material  suhstance,  that  heat 
produces  solution  and  decomposition  in  unori^auized 
bodies;  and  it  is  in  consequence  of  the  same  tendencies, 
physical  and  cliemical,  that  it  i;ives  to  organized  bodies 
a  peculiarity  of  character  called  life. — It  is  a  known 
fact,  that  tlje  living  principle  is  continually  counteract- 
ing the  contracting,  or  gravitating  tendency  of  the  ma- 
terial part  of  the  animal  system.  Many  of  the  animal 
functions  are  performed  by  means  of  expansion ;  and  it 
is  this  mode  of  operation  tljat  distinguishes  the  living 
from  the  dead  body; — or  the  phenomena  of  life,  from 
simple  gravitation  and  repulsion.  It  is  by  expanding 
the  chest  that  we  breathe ;  it  is  by  alternate  contractions 
and  expansions  of  the  heart  and  arteries,  that  the  blood 
is  circulated,  &c.  It  has  been  shewn,  that  the  nwde  of 
vjperation  of  the  material  substance,  or  of  power,  is  con- 
traction; that  in  all  animal  actions,  the  primary  opera- 
tion is  contraction.  But  when  a  muscle  has  contracted, 
the  material  part  has  nat  any  power  nor  tendency  again 
to  expand;  consequently  its  actions  Avould  be  at  an  end, 
if  there  were  not  another  species  of  energy,  or  power,  to 
expand  the  contracted  muscle.  The  contractions  of 
matter  cannot  l)e  counteracted  but  by  direct  expansion. 
But  what  is  it  that  is  1^  pwn  to  counteract  and  controui 
the  contracting  tendency  pf  matter  in  the  animal  con- 
stitution ?  It  is  the  spirit,  ^r  the  principle  of  life. 

Expansion  then  is  the  mode,  or  manner  in  which 
spirit  operates  upon,  and  controuls  matter. — But  expan- 
sion is  the  mode  or  manner  in  which  heat,  arjlre  ope- 
rates upon  and  controuls  matter;  therefore,  heat  and 
sjnritj  are  t£e  same  substance. — It  is  probable  that  heat 
causes  bodies  to  expand,  not  hy  force,  whicli  is  the  kind 


OF  THOUGHT.  &1 

of  energy  exhibited  by  power,  or  matter,  but  by  its  owu 
tendeacy  to  expand,  united  with  its  chemical  attraction 
for  material  substance.  The  force  exhibited  by  ex- 
panding  bodies,  is  the  energy  of  power;  but  the  direc- 
tion of  that  force,  that  is,  from  a  center,  is  the  operation 
of  spirit,  and  the  material  substance  is  carried  along 
with  tlie  spiritual  by  chemical  attraction. 

There  are  certain  mclaphors  in  the  language  of  cul- 
tivated nations,  wliicli  plainly  indicate  a  common  senti- 
ment, or  apprelicnsion  among  mankind,  that  external 
fire,  and  the  internal  spirit,  arc  analogous,  or  that  they 
are  essentially  tlic  same.  When  the  mind  exhibits 
mudi  excitement  it  is  said  to  be  heated,  or  fired.  The 
mind  isjired  with  a  thirst  of  glory;  Jired  with  a  thirst  of 
revenge,  &c.  Then  there  is  the^re  of  genius;  thej^re 
of  anger;  the  fire  of  ambrik)n;  the^rc  of  devotion. — 
Prometheus  stole ^'re  from  heaven,  to  animate  his  man 
of  clay. — ''Wiien  I  mused,  the  fire  burned,''  said  the 
royal  poet.  The  following,  from  the  same  pen,  is  an 
expression  without  any  metaphor  of  the  sameness  of 
spirit  and  tire.  ^*^Wlio  maketli  sjririts  his  angels, — a 
^"'flame  o^  fire  his  ministers." — Passion  is  said  to  be  a 
combustion,  in  wSiicli  the  body  is  consumed  by  internal 
fires.  Animal  life  is  a  slow  combustion,  in  which  the 
body  is  exhaled  by  the  operations  of  the  spirit,  and  if 
not  constantly  replenished,  would  cease  to  furnish  fuel 
for  tlie  vital  tlame. 

But  metaphor,  it  may  he  said,  is  not  a  proper  vehicle 
of  philos(»phical  truth.  Yet  metaphor  is  founded  in 
analo2;y,  and  analogy  certainly  is  one  species  of  philo- 
phical  evidence.  Anah)gy  consists  in  the  samencsn  of 
the  mode  of  operation,  or  of  some  circumstance  attend- 
hig  some  two  things.  There  is  a  loose  analogy,  where 
the  circumstances  which  correspond  in  the  two  things 


92  THE  ALPHABET 

winch  ai-c  analogous,  are  remotely  connected  with  ihn^o 
thin<;s,  or  are  the  remote  eJfectSj  and  not  the  immediate 
necessary  operations  of  those  things.  The  following 
melaplior  presents  an  instance  of  this  loose  analogy. 
"If  any  man  seem  to  be  religious,  and  bridlcth  not  his 
tongue,"  &c.  This  metaphor  is  founded  in  the  analogy 
between  a  bridle  and  a  moral  precept^  or  truth,  Thft 
point  of  analogy  is  the  restraint  imposed  by  the  bridle, 
and  by  tbc  precept;  but  the  G^ect  is  remote  from  either 
cause:  and  the  mode  of  operaiion  of  the  one  cause  is 
different  from  that  of  the  other.  A  bridle  restrains  by 
force,  and  by  tlie  pain  it  inflicts ;  but  a  moral  precept, 
or  truth  restrains  by  its  beauty,  and  by  the  pleasing  sen- 
sation it  excites  in  the  mind. — It  would  be  improper  to 
rest  the  proof  of  a  principle  in  philosophy  on  this  vague 
analogy.  But  there  is  a  strict  and  philosophical  ana- 
logy, which  consists  in  the  sameness  of  the  immediate 
effects,  or  of  the  modes  of  operation  of  the  analogous 
causes,  and  which  indicates  the  sameness  of  the  causes 
themselves.  This  strict  analogy  subsists  between  spi- 
ritual substance,  and  the  substance  of  heat;  the  mode  of 
operation  of  the  one,  and  of  the  other,  is  the  same;  it  is 
expansion ;  and  this  is  the  point  of  analogy  between 
them. 

Spirit,  or  the  substance  of  bP*t,  pervades  all  bodies 
animate,  and  inanimate.  ^"^Whjther  shall  I  go  from  thy 
^'Spirit?  or  whither  shall  I  flee  from  thy  presence." 
The  S[)hit  of  God  is  every  where,  it  extends  through- 
out all  space,  through  that  which  is  occupied  by  body, 
as  well  as  that  which  is  not.  So  it  is  with  the  substance 
of  heat.  From  its  inherent  tendency  to  expand,  it  dis- 
seminates itself  universally  ;  it  cannot  be  excluded  from 
any  part  of  space,  nor  totally  abstracted  from  body. 
Bnt   the   phenomena   of  spiritual   substance,    that   is, 


OP  THOUGHT.  '.V5 

josrceptiott  and  sensation,  as  they  appear  to  our  internal 
consciousness,  and  as  they  exhibit  themselves  through 
ilic  external  sigus  of  feeling,  and  of  enlargement  of 
mind,  are  mucJi  more  o1>vious,  or  discoverable  in  th« 
animal  and  rational  worlds,  tlian  in  the  vegetable  and 
mineral.  Hence  the  common  opinions  taken  up  with- 
out investigation,  that  the  spiritual  substance  belongs 
exclusively  to  those  liii^her  parts  of  creation.  Eut  if 
spirit  operate  by  expansion,  if  it  expand  in  perceiving, 
and  if  it  is  l)y  this  mode  of  operation  that  it  influences 
and  coutrouls  matter,  tiieu  wherever  we  observe  this 
phenomenon,  ex[jansion,  we  are  bound  in  reason  to  in- 
fer the  presL'nce  and  agency  of  spirit. 

But  when  we  seek  the  phenomena  of  spirit  in  othei* 
beings  beside  (mrselvcs,  we  look  not  for  expansion;  for 
we  are  not  conscious  of  this  mode  of  operaiion  in  per- 
ceiving ;  and  if  we  were,  we  could  not  see  the  cx})an- 
sion  of  other  minds,  which  arc  invisible;  in  ail  orga- 
nized bodies,  tlie  sensative  part  of  the  system  is  furnish- 
ed with  a  covering,  at  all  points  sufficient  to  conceal  and 
protect  the  immediate  suliject  of  sensation,  though  not 
to  exclude  all  impressions  from  without.  But  where 
we  expect  to  discover  tlie  sensative  substance,  we  look 
for  its  secondary  effects  in  tlie  actions  of  the  beings  or 
things  wherein  we  expect  it  to  reside  ;  we  look  for  the 
external  signs,  of  perce[)(iou,  or  feeling,  and  of  choice 
or  volition,  in  the  actions  of  other  beings,  and  wlien  wc 
perceive  a  train  of  actions  wliich  manifestly  tend  to  a 
desirable  end,  and  which  are  too  complex  to  be  the  eflect 
of  accident,  we  always  infer,  tiiat  they  spring  frcur  ;!e- 
«ign,  or  volition,  and  that  the  spiritual  substance  is  pre- 
sent. That  is,  where  these  external  signs  are  exhibited 
by  animal  beings,  we  fail  not  to  recognize  llie  spiritual 
substance  through  them.      And  if  we   can  trace   the 


§4  THE  ALPHABET 

same  external  signs  in  the  vegetable  and  mineral  king- 
clums,  will  it  not  be  a  fair  induction  to  refer  them  to  the 
same  invisible  causes,  or  to  infer  that  tliey  originate  in 
sensation  and  volition,  the  operations  of  sjn ritual  sub- 
stance. It  is  not  necessary  that  sjiirit  exhibit  the  high- 
est attribute  of  mind,  in  onler  to  manifest  its  existence. 
Heasoning  implies,  not  only  perception,  the  simple  o{)c- 
ration  of  spirit,  it  implies  also  the  presence  of  ideas^  or 
of  a  subject  on  which  reason  is  exercised,  aiid  ideas  re- 
quire bodily  organs;  reasoning  also  implies  some  know- 
ledge of  truth,  or  of  the  necessary  relations  of  things. 

Let  us  tlien  endeavour  to  trace  those  external  signs  of 
sensation  and  vcdition,  in  the  gradation  from  a  man,  to 
a  mineral,  and  see  whether  there  is  a  point  at  which 
these  signs  entirely  disa[jpear,  and  at  which  spirit  ceasesr 
to  exhibit  her  influence.  In  man  these  signs  of  percep- 
tion and  volition  shine  forth  with  superior  lustre,  for 
they  are  blended  with  the  signs  of  reason,  and  of  high 
resolve. — Take  away  reason  from  man,  or  take  away 
that  internal  organ  of  thought  and  perception,  in  which 
all  the  external  organs  meet,  and  which,  being  enlarged 
and  extended  as  the  mind  acquires  new  ideas,  has  the 
power  to  reflect,  or  repeat  the  ideas  at  pleasure,  and,  by 
comparing  and  analysing,  to  discover  the  relations  of 
things, — take  away  this  organ,  and  fliere  remains  a 
mere  animal,  a  sensitive  system,  but  without  the  apjju- 
ratus  f«r  reasoning.  The  sim{de  spirit,  or  power  to 
perceive,  is  tlie  same  in  tliis  as  in  the  former,  the  same 
in  the  mere  animal  that  it  is  in  the  rational  being;  but 
the  organ  of  comparison,  the  store  house  of  assorted 
ideas  is  gone.  Still  the  organs  of  sense  remain,  and 
the  principle  of  sensation  and  volition. — Take  a^vay 
then  the  external  organs  of  seeing,  hearing,  tasting  and 
smelling,  and  take  away  the  muscles  of  locomotion,  and 


OF  THOUGHT.  fys 

we  shall  no  longer  have  an  animal,  hut  we  shall  have  a 
ves;e.tal)le ;  the  system  that  remains  may  still  vegetate. 
Does  the  perceiving  substance,  or  principle  of  sensation 
and  volition  (lc})enfl  on  the  animal  ors;  •  n i zation ?  and  is 
it  gone  with  the  organs  of  sense — so  called?  No,  there 
is  an  organic  system  of  vegptaUe.  life,  resemhltng  that 
of  animal  life.  The  veii;etahle  has  its  secretory  organs, 
it  has  its  circulatory,  respiratory  and  nutritive  systems, 
as  well  as  the  animal.  Secretion  implies  seUvtion,  or 
choice,  or  volition;  and  this  implies  perception.  Tlic 
spirit,  or  perceiving  substance  still  attends  us;  the  vege- 
table exhibits  the  external  signs  of  internal  feeling  and 
Selection,  or  choice;  circulation,  respiration  and  nutri- 
tion, cannot  be  accounted  for  from  the  laws  of  matter; 
they  cannot  be  resolved  into  contraction  and  repulsion. 
Now  destroy  the  organic  system  of  vegetable  life,  and 
the  vegetable  dies;  there  remains  no  organized  part  t© 
supply  the  want  created  by  the  continual  exhalation 
from  all  bodies  that  vegetate.  After  death  the  exhala- 
tion, or  decomposition  goes  on,  for  a  sliort  time,  just  as 
it  had  done  before;  presently  it  becomes  more  rapid, 
and  at  last  the  earth  returns  to  the  earth  aft  it  n'ns,  and 
the  spirit,  or  principle  of  vegetable  life,  ascent'is  to  its 
native  element  in  air;  for  it  is  notorious,  that  after  the 
abstraction  of  reason,  of  animal  organization,  and  of 
vegetable  organization,  that  which  remains  is  not  all 
matter;  it  does  not  all  gravitate  and  return  to  dust; 
a  part  ascends  by  its  own  elevating,  or  expanding 
power, — carrying  with  it  a  portion  of  the  gravitating 
subs<ance.  The  expanding  principle  must,  therefore, 
be  an  immaterial  efficiency,  existing  independently  of 
any  organization.  This  principle  appears  to  be  inca- 
pable, at  least  in  the  [)resent  state  of  the  chemical  affini- 
ties, of  disengaging  itself  altogether  from  matter;  a  fact 


ii]  THE  ALPHABET 

which  seems  to  he  signified  in  ancient  mythology,  hy 
Vulcan  having  fastened  an  anvil  to  the  feet  of  JuiiOf 
to  prevent  her  escape  from  the  earth,  or  from  the  at- 
mosphere. 

But  to  return,  wherever  the  external  signs  of  sensa- 
tion and  volition  are  observed,  there  reason  perceives 
spirit.  It  is  not  necessary  that  spirit  sliould  reason, 
to  give  evidence  of  its  existence;  the  fiicnlty  of  reason- 
ing is  not  necessary  to  constitute  a  voiuntiry  agent,  for 
the  lower  animals  act  voluntarilv,  thou2;l»  thev  do  not 
reason.  It  will  be  granted  that  spirit,  or  the  perceiv- 
ing substance  is  the  principle  of  animal  life;  that  this 
principle  may  be  traced  from  man  to  the  elephant,  and 
from  the  elephant  to  the  oyster.  There  are  but  a  few 
s'eps  from  the  oyster  to  the  sensitive  jilant,  and  at  each 
step  the  external  signs  of  sensation  and  volition  attend 
us.  Yet  though  the  external  signs  are  obvious,  we 
shall  not  be  allowed  to  draw  the  same  inference  from 
them  here,  as  when  they  are  exhibited  by  animals.  It 
will  be  denied  that  the  actions  of  this  plant  are  really 
the  signs  of  sensation  and  volition.  It  is  easy  to  af- 
firm, or  deny,  much  easier  than  to  analyse.  But  how 
ehall  the  objector  convince  me  that  his  own  actions  are 
voluntary?  Fiis  telling  me  so  is  not  proof;  but  my  own 
observations  convince  me.  I  see  him  take  food  and 
drink,  avoid  danger  and  seek  good.  !8o  does  this  i)lant; 
it  secretes,  or  selects  the  juices  proper  for  its  aourish- 
mcnt ;  and  it  shrinks  from  danger.  The  inferiority  of 
its  powers  to  obtain  these  ends,  is  not  proof  of  the  ab- 
sence of  volition,  or  of  sensation;  that  inferiority  con- 
sists, not  in  the  want  of  feeling  and  desire,  but  in  the. 
want  of  more  perfect  bodily  organs ;  if  the  phenomena 
are  of  the  same  kind,  thoui^h  not  the  same  in  degree^ 


OF  THOUGHT.  gr 

with  those  of  animal  life^  they  require  the  same  kind 
of  efficient  cause. 

Perhaps  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  w<  rd  volition^  the 
actions  of  the  plant,  or  indeed  of  the  lower  animals, 
cannot  be  said  to  be  voUmtary.  If  volition  be  consi- 
dered as  implying  design  and  forethought,  or  an  ex- 
pectancy of  what  is  to  be  the  effect  of  the  action,  or 
if  it  imply  a  conception  of  the  manner  of  the  action  it- 
self, it  would  be  absurd  to  attribute  all  this  to  the  plant. 
Nor  is  it  necessary  to  insist  that  the  plant  acts  volunta- 
rily in  this  sense  of  the  word;  if  it  exhibit  signs  of  sen- 
satioTij  this  is  sufficient  for  our  purpose;  sensation  be- 
longs to  the  spirit  only.  But,  it  may  be  said,  though  the 
plant  is  apparently,  it  is  not  really  sensitive.  But  how 
can  this  be  determined,  unless  we  admit  the  phenomena 
as  evidence  of  the  fact  ?  We  cannot  ^'reason  but  from 
**what  we  know."  The  plant  exhibits  the  external 
signs  of  sensation :  on  what  established  principle  is  the 
reality  of  the  fact  denied?  And  after  all,  how  far  is  the 
oyster  elevated  in  dignity  above  the  sensitive  plant,  that 
we  must  allow  the  former  to  have  a  spirit,  while  we 
deny  it  to  tlie  latter?  It  will  not  be  denied  that  the  oys- 
ter is  sensitive  really;  then  why  not  the  plant? — In 
truth  there  is  the  same  kind  of  evidence  to  prove  the 
sensitiveness  of  the  plant,  that  there  is  to  prove  the  sen- 
sitiveness of  animals. 

There  are  certain  actions,  or  operations  in  the  animal 
economy  which  are  called  involuntary,  and  which  are 
so  with  respect  to  the  mind,  or  to  the  organs  of  sense 
and  of  reason;  but  if  actions  may  be  termed  voluntary 
on  account  of  their  being  prompted  by  sensation,  then 
every  action  which  is  not  resolvable  into  gravitation  and 
repulsion,  is  voluntary.  If  the  oyster  acts  voluntarily, 
so  do  the  ors;ans  of  animal  life.  The  circulatory, 
13 


98  THE  ALPHABET 

respiratory,  and  nutritive  syslems  have  tlieir  nerves. 
anil  tlieir  sensations,  or  they  are  capable  of  being  sti- 
mulated, as  well  as  the  external  organs  of  sense 
tlu'ough  which  we  acquire  the  knowledge  of  external 
objects;  and  their  peculiar  actions  arise  as  really  from 
the  influence  of  the  spiritual,  or  sensitive  substance,  as 
do  the  actions  which  result  from  hearing,  smelling  and 
tasting,  or  even  from  reason.  Those  organs  of  animal 
life  do  not,  indeed,  communicate  their  sensations  in  a 
very  sensible  manner  to  the  mind ;  nor  do  their  actions 
originate  thence;  each  system  has  its  own  distinct  sen- 
sations and  actions ;  hence  these  actions  are  involuntary 
relatively  to  the  mind ;  but  they  are  not  so  absolutely. 
Simple  perception,  or  sensation  is  absolutely  iuvolun- 
iai-y,  and  so  are  gravitation  and  repulsion  ;  but  every 
action,  or  motion  that  is  not  resolvable  into  gravitation 
or  repulsion,  is  the  result  of  perception. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  sensitive  jjlant  perceives,  or 
feels  the  contact  of  other  bodies;  its  actions  exhibit  the 
signs,  or  evidences  of  sensation;  and  why  should  the 
plant  be  deemed  incapable  of  sensation  when  the  oys- 
ter is  deemed  capable  ?  Though  the  organization  of  the 
animal  may  be  more  complex,  and  more  perfect  than 
that  of  the  vegetable,  the  sensitive  substance,  or  power 
to  feel,  is  not  an  effect  of  organization.  The  more  per- 
fect, or  the  more  complex  the  organization,  the  more 
extended  is  the  splicre  of  observation ;  but  perception 
is  not  the  more  real.  The  meanest  vegetable  exhibits 
evi<lence  of  f ensation ;  it  has  a  circulatory,  a  nutritive, 
and  it  is  said, 'a  respiratory  system;  it  absorbs  particles 
of  air  and  of  light.  Its  intcnial  organs  carry  on  cer- 
tain chemical  processes,  in  which  li(juids  are  secreted 
for  the  nourishment  of  the  plant.  This  is  not  the  ope- 
ration of  material  substance;  matter  does  not  exhibit 


OF  THOUGHT.  99 

the  phenomena  of  life ;  it  is  incapable  of  being  stimulat- 
ed; wherever  there  is  excitement  there  must  be  some, 
thiiig  to  be  excited,  or  to  perceive  the  stimulus. 

Spirit  then  is  a  constituent  part  of  vegetables.  But 
the  gradation  does  not  stop  here;  minerals  also  are 
formed  by  a  gradual  increase,  or  growth;  they  exhibit 
phenomena  which  do  not  belong  properly  or  essentially 
to  matter.  We  say  a  vegetable  has  life,  because  it  is 
acted  on — not  mechanically,  but  according  to  the  laws 
of  life — by  the  soil,  the  air,  and  the  light  around  it ; 
and  in  its  turn  acts  upon  these  things,  producing  chemi- 
cal changes  and  assimilating  them  to  its  own  substance. 
Minerals  also  arc  acted  on,  not  mechanically — and  act 
upon  light,  heat,  air,  and  other  substances  in  contact 
with  them,  producing  chemical  changes. — In  the  pheno- 
mena of  chemical  combination  and  decomposition  there 
is  something  essentially  different  from  the  phenomena  of 
sim[)le  matter;  there  is  some  principle,  or  substance  that 
feels  and  selects,  that  deserts  one  combination  of  sub- 
stances and  enters  into  another.  This  is  not  a  mechani- 
cal operation ;  it  has  no  connexion  with  gravitation,  or 
repulsion. — ]5ut  a  mineral  does  not  crawl,  like  a  worm, 
therefore  it  does  not  feel.  Is  this  a  philosophical  con- 
(lusion?  The  mineral  has  not  the  organization  which 
enables  the  worm  to  crawl ;  but  it  has  motions  which 
are  not  resolvable  into  simple  gravitation  and  repulsion. 
Why  should  oxygena  desert  one  combination  and  enter 
into  another  matter?  has  no  likings  or  antipathies.  The 
perceiving,  selecting  substance  is  probal)ly  the  stirring 
agent  in  all  the  phenomena  of  the  laboratory;  perliaps 
these  phenomena  might  all  be  resolved  into  the  contrac- 
tions and  expansions  of  the  material  and  spiritual  sub- 
stances. 


leo  THE  ALPHABET 

Methinks  I  hear  some  one  exclaim,  Wliat!  the  mind, 
the  immortal  spirit  reside  in  fire,  in  air,  in  vegetables  ? 
Does  the  carrot  feel  pain  in  being  prepared  for  the 
boiler?  Ts  the  oak  sensible  of  injury  when  the  feller  is 
at  work? — What  agonies  he  must  feel  if  this  were 
true ;  what  cruelty  to  pluck  a  rose,  or  even  to  pull  a 
noxious  weed.  Can  the  beneficent  author  of  nature 
have  ordered  things  so?  Can  divine  goodness  have 
created  a  universe  of  sensitive  beings,  every  one  the 
sport  of  accident,  and  subject  every  moment  to  suffer- 
ing? A  universe  in  agonies  and  convulsions! — Softly, 
gentle  reader.  All  this  is  not  implied  in  our  doctrine; 
when  we  give  free  exercise  to  sentiment,  the  imagina- 
tion is  apt  to  carry  us  far  beyond  the  limit  of  philosophi- 
cal  truth.  Some  of  those  alledged  consequences  do 
follow  from  our  theory;  but  they  are  also  undeniablei 
facts;  they  are  observed  in  nature,  and  therefore,  in- 
stead of  forming  an  objection  to  our  theory^  they  tend  to 
establish  it.  Independently  of  inanimate  nature,  there, 
is  a  universe,  or  at  least  a  world  of  sensitive  beings,  the 
sport  of  accident  and  the  subjects  of  pain — no  disparage- 
ment to  divine  goodness; — and  there  are  aciiml  co72vul- 
sions  of  nature,  which  are  not  surely  the  throes  of  inert 
matter.  But  though  spiritual  substance  is  a  component 
part  of  the  oak  and  of  the  carrot,  though  the  vegetative 
process  is  proiluced  by  the  action  of  stimulus,  and 
though  to  be  stimulated,  implies  feeling,  or  perception, 
yei  it  does  not  imply  that  the  oak  or  the  carrot  is  sensi- 
ble o*'  -ain.  Pain  is  more  than  simple  perception;  pain 
is  the  perception  of  evil.  Though  the  tree  perceive,  or 
feel  certain  things,  it  may  not  perceive  this  particular 
object,  that  is,  evil;  it  will  of  course,  not  perceive  all 
that  a  more  perfectly  organized  being  will  perceive; 
and  though  it  should  perceive  the  stroke  of  the  axe,— 


OF  THOUGHT.  lOi 

which  however  has  not  heen  affirmed, — yet  it»may  not 
perceive  any  evil  in  that  stroke,  it  may  not  experience 
any  jjain.  A  vegetable  may  be  calculated  to  feel  the 
stimulating  qualities  of  the  soil  about  its  roots,  without 
being  capable  of  perceiving  injury  in  its  own  destruc- 
tion. But  were  it  admitted  that  these  thiugs  feel  pain 
under  the  knife  or  the  axe,  should  this  shock  our  reason 
more  than  that  the  lobster  should  exercise  the  perceptive 
faculty,  or  should  it  do  more  violence  to  our  feelings 
than  the  death  of  an  ox?  Would  it,  even  in  that  case, 
be  more  cruel  to  pluck  a  rose,  than  to  draw  a  fish  from 
the  water? 

Spiritual  substance  is  in  its  own  nature  immortal; 
but  individual  spirits,  boiugs,  parts  separated  from  the 
common  element,  and  joined  to  a  portion  of  material 
substance,  or  power,  are  of  course  subject  in  themselves 
to  decomposition,  or  dissolution.  Their  immortality  is 
a  gift.  Spirits  are  immortal  from  no  other  cause,  or 
necessity,  than  their  being  self-existent.  No  being  can 
exist  independently,  in  an  absolute  sense,  unless  it  is 
self-existent;  God  himself  cannot  make  a  being  inde- 
pendent of  Himself. 

Spiritual  substance  is  the  principle  of  animal  and  of 
vegetable  life,  and  it  is  concerned  in  the  production  of 
all  those  phenomena  of  inanimate  nature  which  cannot 
be  resolved  into  gravitation  or  repulsion.  That  the 
Supreme  Deity  is  the  immediate  efficient  agent  in  all  the 
phenomena  of  vegetable  growth,  and  decomposition,  as 
well  as  in  all  the  combinations  and  decompositions  oT 
mineral  substances,  is  a  doctrine  that  is  both  impious 
and  absurd  ;  it  attributes  all  the  deformities,  all  the 
abortions,  and  all  the  decompositions  and  disgusting 
changes  and  appearances  to  the  immediate  agency  of — 
we  dare  not  finish  the  sentence. 


CHAPTER  Y. 

OF  THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH, 

Pilate  asl^ed.  What  is  truth? — and  it  is  still  made  a 
question,  what  is  the  correct  definition  of  truth.  Some 
have  professed  to  believe  that  there  is  really  no  such 
thing  as  truth.  To  this  day  it  is  believed  and  taught 
that  there  are  no  necessary  trutjis  in  natural  philosophy; 
but  this  belief  arises  out  of  the  principle,  that  snbsfances 
are  made  of  nothing,  and  have  no  necessary  relations; 
for  to  affirm  a  truth,  is  to  affirm  some  relation  of  things. 
It  is  even  now  set  down  as  undeniable,  that  truth  is  not 
a  real,  substantial  thing,  that  it  has  no  efficiency  in  it- 
self, and  performs  no  part  in  nature.  It  is  thence  that 
it  is  believed  to  have  no  infallible  criterion^  and  to  be 
iftcapable  of  being  logically  defined. 

Yet  though  we  should  not  be  allowed  to  call  truth  by 
the  general  name  of  substance,  it  will  readily  be  allow- 
ed to  be  self-existent,  or  necessary,  and  eternal ;  we  shall 
hardly  be  permitted  to  say  that  truth  is  an  efficient 
cause,  and  the  basis  of  a  specific  phenomenon;  yet  M'c 
think  it  will  be  granted,  that  there  is  a  certain  state  of 
things  which  cannot  exist  without  the  influence,  or  ope- 
ration of  tmth,  that  it  is  necessary  to  order,  harmony, 
beauty. — It  is  implied  in  our  systems  of  religion,  that 
truth  is  the  conservator  of  the  soul ;  and  in  our  ethics, 
that  it  is  the  bond  of  society,  and  the  source  of  all  that 
is  fair,  and  lovely,  and  honorable,  and  of  good  report. — 
Yet  this  theory,  correct  in  itself,  and  founded  in  reason 
afl.d  fact,  as  well  as  in  revelation,  is  accompanied  wdlh  a 


OF  THOUGHT.  105 

va£;ue  belief,  or  tlicoretical  assumption  that  the  conser- 
vative and  heaulifviiig  qualities  of  truth  belong  to  it  only 
by  appointment,  and  depend  on  the  arbitrary  will  of  the 
Creator.  In  the  modern  schools  of  philosophy  and  me- 
taphysics, instead  of  its  being  believed  and  taught  that 
Truth  makes  the  Creator  to  be  wliat  He  is,  holy,  and 
upright,  and  just,  it  is  believed  and  inculcated  that  the 
Creator  makes  truth  to  be  what  it  is,  to  be  the  light  of 
all  who  possess  it. 

The  scholastic  theory  of  tr;uh  is  precisely  similar  to 
that  of  material  substance, — that  its  phenomena  are  not 
produced  by  its  own  necessary  tendency,  or  by  its  own 
efficiency,  and  that  they  are  connected  with  the  su!)stance 
only  incideulcilly,  or  by  divine  appointment; — or,  that 
the  Creator  makes  imivev  to  be  what  it  is,  instead  of 
power  being  an  essential  part  of  his  Being.  This  coin- 
cidence in  the  theories  respecting  truth,  and  material 
substance,  migiit  have  suggested  the  thought,  and  have 
led  to  the  inquiry  whether  truth  may  not  be  a  substance, 
whether  it  may  not  have  the  same  geucrical  characteris- 
tic with  matter.  But  it  seems  to  be  considered  an  in- 
dubitable fact,  that  truth  has  no  qualitij^  or  jpheiiommonf 
no  sensible  appearcmcp,  ovform  by  which  to  distinguish 
it  from  other  realities  ;  nor  any  characteristic  in  common 
with  any  other  objects  of  knowledge,  by  which  it  may 
be  referred  to  a  class,  or  genus.  Hence  it  is  that  truth 
is  deemed  incapa!)le  of  being  defined,  for  a  logical  defi- 
nition points  out  the  genus,  and  the  specijic  difference 
of  the  thing  defined.  If  truth  belongs  to  no  genus,  or 
if  it  possess  no  characteristic  in  common  witli  some 
other  tilings  ;  and  if  it  exhibit  no  phenomenon  by  which 
it  can  be  distinguished  from  other  objects,  and  by  which 
at  the  same  time  it  manifests  its■ov^■n  existence  or  reality, 
then  of  necessity  it  is  undefinable.     But  if  this  were  ita 


104  THE  ALPHABET 

character,  or  its  uo  character — it  would  be  uncliscover- 
able  too,  it  would  be  impossible  to  know,  or  perceive  it ; 
for  truth  is  not  perceived  immediately  or  in  a  direct  man- 
ner, as  phenomena,  or  operations  are ;  truth  is  an  invi- 
sible thing. 

To  arrive  at  a  correct  knowledge  and  right  defittition 
ol*  truth,  the  best,  and  perhaps  the  only  successful  me- 
thod, is  that  recommended  by  Sir  Francis  Bacon,  that 
is,  the  investigation  of  facts.  We  must  analyse  the 
manner  in  which  truth  is  actually  perceived  ;  and  we 
must  inquire  what  is,  in  fact,  the  object  of  the  mind  in 
the  perception  of  truth — or  Avhat  is  the  precise  thing  to 
which  we  give  the  general  appellation  of  truth.  It 
should  be  inquired  whether  truth  has  a  resemblance,  in 
any  one  point,  to  any  other  object,  and  whether  it  is  ne- 
cessarily or  uniformly  attended  with  a  specific  phenome- 
non. 

If  it  be  suggested  that  truth  cannot  be  a  substance, — 
w^e  would  ask.  Why?  Is  it  because  truth  does  not  gra- 
vitate and  repel,  that  we  must  not  refer  it  to  this  genus '^ 
Is  it  because  it  is  not  tangible  ?  Gravitation  and  repul- 
sion characterize  the  species,  not  the  genus ;  they  are 
peculiar  to  matter,  and  distinguish  it  fiom  spirit  and 
from  truth — Spirit  docs  not  gravitate,  and  yet  it  is  a  sub- 
stance; it  is  a  substance,  because  it  is  the  cJUcient  cause 
of  a  phenomenon ;  it  is  spiritual  substance,  because  its 
phenomenon  is  perception.  If  truth  exhibit  any  species 
of  phenomenon,  if  any  effect  is  proper  to  truth  only,  then 
truth  is  the  ejficient  cause  of  that  phenomenon,  or  aScctf 
and  is  a  substantial,  or  indestructible  being. 

The  definitions  heretofore  offered  of  truth  have  gene- 
rally given  a  partial  view  of  that  object.  Writers  paint 
that  aspect  of  truth  with  which  they  happen  to  be  most 
familiar ;  or  they  describe  the  peculiarities  of  the  clasn 


OF  THOUGHT.  105 

of  truths  which  their  particular  pursuits  have  led  them 
to  investigate.  But  a  regular  defiuitiou  should  point 
out  the  characteristic  which  is  common  to  all  classes 
of  truth,  and  which  at  the  same  time  distinguishes  truth 
from  every  other  species  of  the  same  genus,  that  is, 
from  every  other  substance,  this  is  to  point  out  the  "spe- 
^^cific  difference;"  and  it  should  point  out  the  genus,  or 
the  characteristic  which  it  has  in  common  with  some 
other  ohjects  of  knowledge — that  is,  with  other  sab- 
stances. 

^•Truth,"  says  Mr.  Wollaston,  ""is  the  conformity  of 
"''those  words  or  signs  by  which  things  are  expressed, 
''to  the  things  themselves." 

''Truth/"  says  Dr.  Tathara,  "is  of  the  nature  and 
"essence  of  God;  like  Him  incomprehensible  in  the 
"whole,  and  iiicffable  in  its  sublimer  parts.  For  these 
"and  other  reasons  it  cannot  admit  of  an  adequate  dcfi- 
"?ii7/on.— God  is  Mind,"  continues  the  Doctor,  "and 
"truth  is  consequently  an  attribute  of  mind." 

"I  accouiit  that  to  be  truth,''  says  Dr.  Beattie,  '•which 
'•the  constitution  of  our  nature  determines  us  to  believe; 
"nnil  tliat  to  he,  falsehood  which  the  constitution  of  our 
'•nature  determines  us  to  disbelieve." 

Jnouc  of  these  definitions  are  logically  regular;  it  is 
probalde  the  authors  did  not  intend  them  for  such.  We 
sl'.ould  indeed  except  that  by  Dr.  Tatham,  for  though 
he  professes  to  believe  that  truth  "cannot  admit  of  an 
"adequate  definition,"  yet  the  latter  part  of  the  above 
extract: — "Truth  is  an  attribute  of  mind,"  is  a  defini- 
tion in  the  very  form  prescribed  by  the  father  of  dia- 
lectic. "Attribute"  is  the  genus;  "of  mind,"  the  spe- 
ciGc  difference.  But  though  this  definition  is  logically 
regular,  it  is  not  philosophical ;  it  does  not  distinguish 
truth f  from  power,  for  this  sect  of  philosophers  define 


106  THE  ALPHABET 

power  in  the  same  words,  Power  is  an  attribute  o^ 
mind.  Now  truth,  and  poiver  are  essentially  different 
from  each  other,  and  they  cannot  both  be  properly  de- 
fined by  saying  they  are  attributes  of  mind.  But  if  the 
word  attribute  mean  a  phenomenon,  or  operation,  then 
neither  truth  nor  power  are  attributes,  they  are  not  phe- 
iiomena.  Truth  has  no  necessary  relation  to  mind ;  if 
it  had,  the  brutes  would  possess  it,  there  would  be  no 
irrational  minds,  none  incapable  of  moral  perception. 
But  the  knowledge  of  truth  involves  the  exercise  of  rea- 
son; hence,  mind  may  exist  without  truth,  and  truth 
certainly  exists  independently  of  mind. 

Truth  is  the  efficient  cause  of  harmony.  Truth  is  a 
substance,  a  self-existent,  indestructible  being;  and  like 
other  substances  it  is  distinguished  by,  and  perceived 
through  a  specific  phenomenon. 

Dr.  Wollaston  took  his  idea  of  truth  from  one  class 
of  truths,  the  truth  of  words,  or  historical  truth;  and 
his^  definition  is  formed  on  this  particular  view,  or  on 
the  connexion  between  truth  as  it  is  in  itself,  and  the 
words  by  which  it  is  expressed.  "Truth,''  says  he, 
^*is  the  conformity  of  words  or  signs  to  the  things  ex- 
^^pressed."  This  is  truth  as  opposed  to  falsehood ; 
nothing  but  words,  or  artificial  signs  can  be  falsified. 
But  truth  exists  independently  of  words,  and  is  to  be 
distinguished  from  other  things,  as  well  as  from  false- 
hood ;  and  we  shall  find,  that  the  characteristic  by 
which  truth  is  distinguished  from  other  species  of  the 
same  genus,  that  is,  from  other  substances,  is  also  the 
only  infallible  criterion  by  which  to  distinguish  truth 
from  falsehood  and  error.  Harmony  is  the  characteris- 
tic of  truth,  and  constitutes  demonstrative  evidence. 

But  this  class  of  truths,  the  truth  of  "words,''  would 
be  more  accurately  defined  by  saying,  that  it  is  the 


OF  THOUGHT.  107 

confoi'mity  of  propositions  to  the  relations  of  things  as 
they  really  exist.  Single  words  express  "things,"  but 
single  words  do  not  express  truths.  The  word  jwwer 
expresses  a  certain  oI>ject  of  knowledge,  but  it  expres- 
ses neither  truth  nor  falsehood.  It  is  only  when  words 
aflfirm,  or  deny  some  relation  of  things,  that  they  are 
either  true  or  false.  Every  proposition  affirms  some 
relation  of  things;  and  a  proposition  is  true,  when  it 
expresses  the  real,  and.  none  but  the  real  relations  of 
things,  the  relations  as  to  time,  place,  action,  cause,  ef- 
fect, &c.  "When  we  say  power  produces  motion^  we 
affirm  a  specific  relation,  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect, 
between  power  and  motion.  The  truth  affirmed,  or 
^^ expressed*^  in  this  proposition^  is  that  relation  of 
cause  and  effect,  between  power  and  motion ;  but  the 
truth  of  the  proposition,  is  its  relation  of  conformity  to 
that  relation  of  cause  and  efiect  as  it  really  is.  The 
truth  of  the  proposition,  and  the  truth  expressed  by  the 
proposition,  are  different  truths;  the  last,  viz.  that  power 
produces  motion,  is  a  necessary  eternal  truth;  but  the 
first,  the  conformity  of  the  proposition  to  the  eternal 
relation,  is  an  incidental  truth;  as  words  are  only  the 
conventional  and  arbitrary  signs  of  things,  they  can 
have  no  natural  or  necessary  conformity  to  the  things 
they  express.  Hence  words,  and  even  propositions 
may  have  a  "conformity''  to  things,  and  yet  be  false ; 
if  this  were  not  so,  there  could  be  no  such  thing  as 
falsehood.  I  may  say,  matter  perceives.  The  words 
of  this  proposition  have  a  conformity  to  the  things 
they  express,  and  to  the  relation  also  which  they  ex^ 
press ;  they  affirm  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  or  of 
agent  and  operation,  between  matter  and  perception. 
But  though  matter,  and  perception  are  both  real  objects, 
no  such  relation  subsists  between  them,  therefore  the 


108  THE  ALPHABET 

proposition  is  false.  Words  have  always  a  conformity. 
an  artificial  conformity,  to  the  things  they  express  ; 
otherwise  they  would  not  be  the  signs  of  those  things; 
but  they  sometimes  affirm  relations  Avhich  do  not  exist, 
or  which  do  not  belons;  to  the  thinsrs  of  which  thev  arc 
aflBrraed  ;  and  it  is  then  they  are  false. 

Dr.  Beattie's  remarks  apply,  almost  exclusively,  to 
general  and  necessary  truths;  for  it  is  only  this  class 
of  tmths  of  which  it  may  in  some  sense  be  said,  that 
'^the  constitution  of  our  nature  determines  us  to  believe'* 
them  ;  that  is,  when  the  evidence  of  a  truth  is  presented 
to  a  mind  unbiassed,  and  capable  of  appreciating,  or  of 
perceiving  the  nature  of  evidence,  that  mind  necessarily 
believes,  or  perceives  the  truth.  But  the  mind  in  its 
best  state,  is  not  determined  by  its  oonstitution  alone, 
and  independently  of  evidence,  to  the  belief,  or  percep- 
tion of  any  specific  truth ;  if  it  were,  it  should  have  that 
perception,  or  a  knowledge  of  that  truth,  from  the  ear- 
liest moment  of  its  existence.  As  soon  as  mind  exists, 
li  jpercpives ;  ^'the  constitution  of  its  nature"  absolutely 
determines  it  to  perception,  but  not  to  the  perception 
of  truth,  or  of  any  particular  object.  The  perception 
of  a  particular  object  depends  on  external  circumstances, 
as  well  as  on  the  constitution  of  the  mind.  Every  truth 
is  a  relation  of  some  two  things;  and  when  the  mind 
has  a  knowledge  of  those  things,  and  perceives  some 
necessary  relation  arising  from  the  nature  of  the  things, 
then  it  perceives  a  necessary  truth. 

But  the  Doctor^s  remarks  are  not  universally  true 
even  of  general  or  necessary  truths.  The  ^^constitution 
of  our  nature"  is  not  so  infallible,  as  uniformly,  or 
necessarily  to  exclude  the  belief  of  falsehood;  hence, 
lelief  is  not  the  criterion  of  truth,  nor  disbelief,  of  false- 
hood.    The  Doctor's  definition  of  truth  seems  to  imply, 


OF  THOUGHT.  109 

tbaf,  (he  constitution  of  the  mind  is  such,  that  it  will 
necessarily  believe  truth,  and  reject  falsehood.  But  if 
<lii.s  were  true,  the  circumstance  \yould  characicrize,  not 
t!ic  truth.  l)ut  the  mind  :  it  would  characterize  the  mind, 
vvhich  perceives,  not  the  object  perceived.  Perception 
is  the  operation  of  mind,  and  the  perception  of  truth 
characterizes  the  rational  mind  ;  but  to  he  perceived 
does  not  characterize  any  thin^,  does  not  distinguish 
one  thing  from  another.  Besides,  it  is  a  notorious  fact 
that  we  arc  often  deceived,  that  we  often  mistake  false- 
liood  for  self-evident  necessary  truth.  This  arises,  not 
from  the  want  of  an  infallible  criterion  of  truth,  but  from 
the  rallil)llity  of  the  human  miud. — Considering  the  dif- 
ficulty which  arises  in  many  cases,  in  ascertaining  the 
truth,  the  single  circumstance,  that  we  believe  a  propo- 
sition, is  not  a  sufficient  test  of  its  truth. 

The  perception,  or  belief  of  truth,  is  characteristic  of 
the  mind,  rather  than  of  truth :  that  is,  it  distinguishes 
the  rational  mind  fi(»m  the  irrational.  Although  the 
perception  of  truth  do  not  arise  from  the  constitution  of 
the  mind  necessarily,  nor  even  from  that  of  the  rational 
mind,  independently  of  evidence,  yet  the  perception  of 
truth  constitutes  rationality;  when  the  two  causes  meet, 
when  evidence^  the  existing  cause,  is  presented  to  the 
rational  mind,  the  efficient  cause,  the  effect,  the  percep. 
Hon  of  truth  necessarily  follows.  And  though  there  arc 
other  invisible  objects  beside  truth,  the  knowledge  of 
which  are  acquired  through  the  medium  of  evidence,  the 
perception  of  any  object  through  the  medium  of  evi- 
dence, involves  the  perception  of  truth,  or  of  some  ne- 
cessary  relation.  Every  logical  deduction,  implies  the 
perception  of  a  necessary  relation  between  the  concla* 
eion  and  the  premises. 


110  THE  ALPHABET 

It  is  a  singular  anomaly  in  philosophy,  to  represent 
the  perception  of  truth  as  characterizing  truth,  and  at 
the  same  time  as  arising  necessarily  from  the  *^constitu- 
tion  of  our  nature ;"  or  from  the  constitution  of  the 
mind.  Dr.  Bcattie  is  not  singular  in  this.  The  per- 
ception of  truth  is  a  complex  phenomenon,  it  does  not 
arise,  singly,  either  from  the  constitution  of  the  mind, 
nor  from  the  nature  of  truth ;  and  therefore  is  not  the 
distinguishing  characteristic  of  either.  Perception  is 
the  characteristic  of  Mind,  or  of  Spirit, — harmony  is 
that  of  Truth. — Truth  exists  independently  of  the 
mind,  and  of  being  perceived;  therefore,  the  perception 
of  truth  does  not  characterize  truth;  and  the  human 
mind  exists  long  before  it  is  capable  of  perceiving  the 
nature  of  truth  and  evidence,  therefore  the  perception  of 
truth  does  aot  arise  necessarily  from  the  constitution  of 
the  mind.  Before  the  mind  can  perceive  necessary 
truth,  it  must  be  capable  of  appreciating  evidence. 

That  belief  does  not  characterize  truth  is  demonstrate 
ed  by  the  fact,  that  there  are  other  invisible  objects  of 
knowledge,  which  are  essentially  different  from  truth, 
but  which  produce  in  the  mind  as  firm  a  conviction  of 
their  reality  as  truth  can  do.  Hence  truth  is  to  be  dis- 
tinguished, and  it  is  in  fact  distinguished,  not  from  false- 
hood only,  which  should  be  disbelieved,  but  also  from 
other  real  objects  of  belief  Power,  or  material  sub- 
stance presents  itself  to  the  mind  by  an  evidence,  or  a 
criterion  as  infallible  as  that  of  truth,  and  obtains  as  firm 
a  belief  in  its  reality ;  yet  that  belief  does  not  charac- 
terize power,  because  there  are  other  objects,  different 
from  power,  which  produce  belief.  The  distinguishing 
characteristic  of  power,  is  motion,  its  own  peculiar  phe- 
nomenon; motion  is  the  immediate  effect,  or  the  opei*a- 
tion,  of  power;  belief  is  the  remote  effect,  produced  in 


QF  THOUGHT.  Ill 

the  mind  by  the  operation  upon  the  external  organs  of 
sense.  Belief  therefore  is  an  incidental,  and  not  a  ne- 
cessary effect  of  the  existence  of  power. — And  the  dis- 
tinguishing characteristic  of  truth  is  its  own  peculiar 
phenomenon,  that  is,  harmony  ;  the  belief,  or  perception 
of  truth  is  the  remote  effect,  of  which,  harmony  is  the 
exciting,  or  secondary  cause.  Mind  is  the  efficient 
cause  of  perception,  but  Truth  is  the  efficient  cause  of 
harmony. 

Dr.  Tatham  seems  to  have  had  in  his  mind's  eye, 
truth  as  it  is  distinguished  from  other  real  beings,  or 
substances.  He  says,  "Truth  is  of  the  Essence  of 
"God ;"  that  is  to  say,  truth  is  of  the  Substance,  or  Be- 
ing of  God.  He  seems  to  have  had  a  vision  of  truth  in 
her  genuine  form ;  but  he  has  had  also  some  theoretical 
notions,  which  threw  an  obscurity  over  the  object  of  his 
contemplation,  and  infused  themselves  into  his  definition. 
Tlie  truth  seems  to  have  forced  itself  upon  his  mind,  in 
despite  of  a  theory  which  he  held  in  opposition  to  it ; 
for  he  tells  us  that  "Truth  is  of  the  Essence  of  God ;" 
but  again  he  says,  "Truth  is  an  attribute.^'  He  re- 
fers truth  first  to  the  genus  substance,  or  essence;  and 
again  be  refers  it  to  the  genus  attribute,  or  quality. 
Now  an  essence,  and  an  attribute  are  distinct  things ; 
substance,  and  quality  are  different  genera.  Although 
truth  belongs  essentially  to  God,  it  is  certainly  incorrect 
language  to  say  that  truth  is  an  attribute  of  God. 
Truth  is  the  basis  of  certain  attributes  of  God,  of  justice, 
holiness,  beauty;  these  are  attributes  of  God;  but  they 
arc  attributes  of  a  God  of  truth ;  a  God  without  truth 
would  not  be  holy,  or  just,  would  have  no  beauty  in  His 
character,  any  more  than  a  God  without  power  would 
be  sublime  and  awful,  an  object  of  admiration  and  of 
fear. 


Iil2  THE  ALPHABET 

Tnilli  is  the  efficient  cause  of  haimony — or  of  beauty. 
Vriiich  is  harmony,  or  proportion  of  form,  or  of  parts. 
Harmony  is  a  simple  i>henomenou  different  from  either 
motion,  or  perception,  and  rerjuires  a  distinct  eiTicient 
r:ause.  Truth  is  the  only  cause  which  is  adequate  to 
tlie  [iroduction  of  harmony;  neither  power,  nor  sj)ii'it, 
unconnected  with  truth,  ])roduccs  this  phenomenon.  The 
operation  of  power  is  motion  ;  tliat  of  spirit,  percep- 
tion; harmony  is  an  operation  distinct  from  eitiier,  and 
requires  a  distinct  efficient  cause.  In  fact  the  liuman 
mind,  wherever  it  is  capal)le  of  reasoning,  or  of  the 
exercise  of  common  sense,  assi2;ns  a  distinct  efficient 
cause  to  this  plienomenon.  Wherever  harmony,  or 
beauty  is  exhibited  to  the  senses,  or  to  the  mind,  it  is 
referred  to  truth  as  its  ultimate  cause,  or  that  which  is 
necessarily  at  the  foundation  of  the  phenomenon. — Har- 
mony indeed  never  exhibits  itself  to  the  senses  but  in 
connexion  with  the  phenomena  of  power;  the  writing  of 
a  proposition,  and  the  sound  of  the  words  which  convey 
a  truth,  are  operations  of  mechanical  power;  !)ut  no  one 
confounds  tlie  trutli  of  a  proposition  with  the  sound  of 
the  words,  or  with  the  written  characters.  Yet  though 
common  sense  distinguishes  practically  the  sound  from 
the  sense,  when  philoso[)iiy  comes  to  investigate  the 
distinctive  character  of  truth,  she  is  apt  to  confound 
that  character  v/ith  its  .adjuncts ;  she  invariably  brings 
along  v/ith  her  some  dogma  which  she  throws  over 
truth,  and  then  judg^.'s  of  her  character  through  this 
false  medium. — In  music,  harmony  is  connected  with 
sound,  but  the  harmony  is  a  phenomenon  distinct  from 
the  sound ;  the  efficient  cause,  or  principle  of  the  sound, 
is  mechanical  power;  but  the  principle  of  the  harmony, 
or  the  first  principles  of  music,  are  certain  immutable 
rides,  or  truths.     No  one  ever  thinks  of  ascribing  music 


OF  THOUGHT.  115 

to  power  as  its  sole,  or  as  its  efficient  cause ;  when  tlie 
foundation,  or  first  principles  of  music  is  sought  for,  it 
is  sought  among  the  truths.  We  practically  recognize 
the  necessary  relation  of  truth  and  harmomj,  both  in 
common  life,  and  in  the  sciences;  the  harmony  of  a 
truth  which  is  sought,  with  a  truth  aUeady  known,  is 
the  evidence,  or  the  test  of  the  genuineness  of  the  former. 
Truth  is  always  consistent  with  truth,  or  in  harmony 
with  truth. 

Truth  is  the  foundation  of  beauty,  or  of  harmony  of 
parts  in  form,  or  figure ;  such  as  beauty  of  architecture, 
beauty  of  person,  &:c.  Architecture  is  an  art  founded 
on  certain  principles,  or  truths,  and  never  could  be 
brought  to  any  degree  of  perfection  independently  of 
those  principles;  neither  is  personal  beauty  produced 
by  its  divine  author  at  random,  or  without  truth  and 
science.  ^'The  Lord  possessed  me  in  the  beginning  of 
•'his  way,  before  his  works  of  old.  When  he  prepared 
"the  heavens  I  was  there." — Truth  is  the  foundation  of 
moral  beauty ;  it  is  the  basis  of  honour,  integrity,  jus- 
tice, &c. 

Harmony  constitutes  demonstrative  evidence,  or  it  is 
the  criterion  of  mathematical  and  metaphysical  truth. 
Every  demonstration  in  geometry  proceeds  upon  the 
harmony,  or  agreement  of  the  iiroposition,  with  tlie  de- 
finition, or  diagram  to  which  the  proposition  relates. 
Thus,  if  it  is  to  be  demonstrated  that  the  three  angles 
of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  angles;  the  mathe- 
matician proceeds  to  analyse  the  two  angles  and  the 
three  angles,  and  when  it  is  found  that  from  their  na- 
ture tbey  necessarily  harmonise  with  what  is  affinned 
in  the  proposition,  then  the  proposition  is  demonstrated 
to  be  a  universal  truth.  The  axioms  are  establiv*hed 
©n  the  same  species  of  evidence,  their  harmony  with  the 
15 


114  THE  ALPHABET 

definitions.  Two  straight  lines  canvot  intersect  each 
other  in  more  points  than  one.  Tliis  truth  is  said  to 
be  perceived  intuitively,  or  without  reasoning  and  with- 
out evidence.  But  this  is  not  the  fact.  This  negative 
principle  may  be  resolved  into  the  positive  fact,  that 
when  two  straight  lines  intersect  each  other,  the  farther 
they  are  produced  the  farther  they  diverge.  This  ge- 
neral fact  is  immediately  founded  in  the  definition — A 
straight  line  is  the  shortest  that  can  be  draicn  between 
two  points.  Every  negative  principle,  if  genuine,  is 
founded  in  some  positive  principle,  which  is  ultimately 
founded  in  the  definition,  or  predicament  of  the  thing 
to  which  the  principle  relates.  And  it  is  the  harmony 
of  the  axiom  with  the  definition,  or  predicament  of  the 
thing  to  which  the  axiom  relates,  that  is  the  evidence 
of  the  truth  of  the  latter,  and  establishes  it  beyond  con- 
tradiction. 

It  is  the  same  in  metaphysics.  Definition.  Matter 
is  the  efficient  cause  of  gravitation.  Hence  the  axiom — 
Gravitation  is  a  universal  law  of  matter,  or,  matter 
gravitates  uniformly,  and  nothing  but  matter  gravitates. 
This  axiom  has  no  other  foundation  than  m  that  defini- 
tion, or  in  the  nature  of  material  substance  ;  and  it  evi- 
dently implies,  and  is  implied  in  that  definition,  that 
matter  is  the  efficient  cause  of  gravitation.  If  matter  is 
the  efficient  cause  of  gravitation,  and  if  like  causes  pro- 
duce like  effects,  then  gravitation  is  a  universal  law  of 
matter :  but  if  matter  is  not  the  efficient  cause  of  gravi- 
tation, and  if  it  is  not  a  universal  truth,  that  like  causes 
produce  like  ejfiects,  then  the  axiom  that  matter  gravi- 
tates uniformly,  or  at  all  times  and  all  places  and  cir- 
cumstances, is  a  groundless  assumption.  But  the  defi- 
nition is  in  fact  recognized  in  the  axiom;  and  it  is 
the  perfect  harmony  of  the  axioms  with  the  definition, 


OF  THOUGHT.  115 

or  with  the  known  and  tacitly  recognized  predicament 
of  matter,  that  demonstrates  the  genuineness  of  the 
axiom.  In  any  syllogism,  it  is  the  harmony  of  the  con- 
clusion, with  the  premises,  that  constitutes  the  emdencc, 
or  proves  the  truth  of  the  conclusion.  Every  invisible 
object  of  knowledge  manifests  itself  to  the  mind  through 
the  evidence  of  some  phenomenon,  or  of  an  operation 
which  is  immediately  perceived ;  gravitation  is  the  evi- 
dence of  the  existence  of  matter,  or  of  power ;  percep- 
tion is  the  evidence  of  the  existence  of  spirit;  and  har- 
mony is  the  evidence  of  the  reality  of  truth. 

But  it  may  be  asked.  If  harmony  is  the  infallible  cri- 
terion of  truth,  and  is  generally  recognized  as  such,  how 
do  we  ever  come  to  be  deceived?  If  harmony  is  neces- 
sarily connected  with  truth,  and  if  it  uniformly  excite 
the  belief,  or  perception  of  truth,  what  is  it  that  excites 
llie  belief  of  that  which  is  false?  How  is  it  that  we 
sometimes  imagine  that  we  perceive  a  trutli,  when  no 
truth,  but  a  falsehood  is  presented  to  the  mind? — ■ 
This  anomaly  does  not  arise  from  the  nature  of  truth, 
nor  from  the  nature  of  demonstrative  evidence ;  but 
from  the  imperfection  of  human  knowledge;  it  does  not 
arise  from  the  want  of  an  infallible  criterion  of  truth, 
but  from  the  fallibility  of  the  human  mind.  Without 
entering  into  any  elaborate  discussion  of  the  causes  and 
consequences  of  this  imperfection,  we  will  simply  slate 
a  few  facts.  Although  harmony  uniformly  attends 
truth,  and  uniformly  produces  the  perception  of  trutli  in 
the  reasoning  mind,  yet  the  mind,  as  well  as  the  ear,  is 
sometimes  deceived  by  an  imperfect  harmony; — or, 
though  truth  must  harmonize  with  truth,  so  falsehood 
may  harmonize  with  falsehood,  while  from  the  limited- 
ness  of  our  knowledge,  we  may  not  be  possessed  of  the 
fundamental  truths  with  which  those  falsehoods  do  not 


116  THE  ALPHABET 

harmonize,  aiitl  ^vhicb  wouhl  prove  their  fallacy.  Heuce, 
a  superficial  knowUulsie  of  a  subject,  sometimes  leads  to 
greater  absurdities  than  perfect  ignorance ;  and  hence 
the  necessity  for  ascending  to  first  principles  when  any 
difficulty  is  to  be  solved. 

Every  real  truth  will  be  found  in  harmony,  and  false- 
hood will  be  discordant,  with  the  true  definition  of  the 
thing  to  which  they  relate,  or  of  which  they  are  affirm- 
ed. An  instance  of  tliis  has  been  given  in  the  chapter 
on  material  substance.  That  ^'Pow^er  cannot  be  with- 
out a  subject,"  is  a  principle  very  similar  to  the  axiom, 
two  straight  lines  cannot  intersect  each  other  in  more 
points  than  one.  That  is,  these  principles  are  similar 
in  a  logical  point  of  view,  or  considered  as  principles  of 
reasoning;  they  difl'er  in  the  subjects  they  relate  to,  the 
one  relating  to  the  nature  of  power,  the  other  to  the  na- 
ture of  a  straight  line.  They  are  both  axioms;  and 
they  are  both  negatives;  and  each  is  resolvable  into  the 
definition  of  the  thing  to  which  it  relates.  They  both 
appear  intuitively  certain,  or  they  appear  certain  from 
their  harmony  with  the  definitions  to  wlilch  they  respec- 
tively relate.  Harmony  is  intuitive  evidence.  That 
two  straight  lines  cannot  intersect  each  other  in  more 
points  than  one,  is  a  genuine  truth,  because  it  is  found- 
ed in,  or  harmonizes  with  the  true  definition  of  a 
straight  line.  But  the  metaphysical  axiom  is  false, 
because  it  is  founded  in  a  false  definition  of  power. 
The  axiom,  power  cannot  be  without  a  subject,  takes 
for  granted  that  power  is  an  attribute,  a  quality,  or  the 
ojjeration  of  a  cause.  It  supposes  that  power  is  con- 
nected with  spirit  in  the  relation  of  cause  and  eifect ;  it 
supposes  power  to  have  the  same  relation  to  spirit,  that 
perception  has  to  spirit,  or  the  same  that  motion  has 
to  power.     But  all  this  is  false  and  absurd;  power  is, 


OF  THOUGHT.  117 

not  the  operation  of  .a  cause,  but  the  efficient  cause  of  an 
operation.  So  tliat  instead  of  real  and  perfect  harmony, 
this  axiom,  power  cannot  be  without  a  subject,  has  pro- 
duced confusion  and  "harsh  discord''  in  metaphysical 
science.  But  when  it  is  brought  to  the  touchstone  of 
genuine  fact,  it  betrays  its  unsubstantiality,  it  vanishes 
like  the  shadows  of  the  night  at  the  approach  of  the 
morning. 

Thus  mathematics  and  metaphysics  proceed  upon 
the  principle  that  harmony  is  the  characteristic  of 
truth.  Prophets  and  poets  recognize  the  same  princi- 
ple. Truth  and  harmony,  or  beauty,  are  associated  in 
their  writings,  iia  a  way  that  plainly  indicates  a  convic- 
tion in  the  minds  of  the  writers,  that  those  two  things 
are  necessarily  connected. 

The  prophets  and  apostles  claim  the  first  notice. 
The  song  of  Solomon  contains  a  variety  of  rapturous 
expressions  of  the  heaiity  of  the  church  and  its  King, 
of  both  which  truth  is  the  foundation  and  distinguish- 
ing characteristic.  Many  of  those  expressions  are 
highly  figrn-ative  ;  but  some  of  them  are  jilain,  and  the 
sense  incontrovertible. — '"Thou  art  beautiful,  O  my 
'•love,  as  Tirza ;  cumehj  as  Jerusalem." — "Behold, 
"thou  art  fair,  my  love  ;  behold,  thou  art  fairJ' — 
""1  hou  art  all/azV,  my  love;  there  is  no  spot  in  thee." — 
"My  beloved  is  white  and  ruddy,  the  chief  among  ten 
"thousand, — yea,  he  is  altogether  lovely^^ — King  Da- 
vid w^ho  is  a  prophet  and  a  poet  says,  "Thou  uri  fairer 
^'than  the  children  of  men,  grace  is  poured  into  thy 
"lips."  St.  Paul  associates  trutli,  with  beauty  tlius  : 
"Whatsoever  things  are  true,  whatsoever  things  ai*e 
"honest,  just,  pure,  whatsoever  things  are  lovely,^^  or 
heautful,  and  "of  good  report." 


118  THE  ALPHABET 

The  works  of  poets  fiirnis]!  the  most  ample  testimony 
in  favor  of  the  connexion  between  Truth  and  UarmoDy. 

"Goddess  of  the  lyre, 
"Wliicli  rules  the  accents  of  the  moving'  spheres, 
"Wilt  thou,  eternal  Harmoni)  descend 
"And  join  this  festive  train  ?  for  with  thee  comes 
*'The  guide,  the  guardian  of  their  lovely  sports, 
"Majestic  Truth  ,•"• 

"Thus  was  beauty  sent  from  heaven, 
"The  lovely  ministress  of  Truth  and  good 
"In  this  dark  world ;  for  Truth  and  good  are  one. 
"And  beauti)  dwells  in  them,  and  they  in  her, 
••With  like  participation."* 

"Alas  !  how  faint, 
"How  slow  the  dawn,  of  beauty  and  of  truth 
"Breaks  the  reluctant  shades  of  gothic  night 
'•Which  yet  involve  the  nations  !"* 

"Blest  be  the  day  I  'scaped  the  wrangling  crew, 

"Of  Pliyro's  maze,  — — 

''And  held  high  converse  with  the  god-like  iew, 
"Who  to  th'  enraptur'd  heart,  and  ear,  and  eye, 
"Teach  beauty,  virtue,  truth,  and  love,  and  melody.''-^ 

In  these  stanzas  the  connexion  of  truth  with  beauty, 
or  with  harmony,  is  affirmed  in  direct  terms  :  and  there 
are  innumerable  instances  in  the  works  of  the  poets^ 
in  which  this  connection  is  implied.  AVe  will  notice  a 
few. 

"Is  there  a  lieart  which  music  cannot  melt  r 
"Alas !  how  is  that  rugged  heart  forlorn  ! 


"He  needs  not  woo  the  Muse,  he  is  her  scorn, 

"77w  sophists  rope  of  cobiueb  he  shall  ttviiie  / 

"Mope  ov'r  the  schoolman's  peevish  page,  and  mourn."t 

" Song  is  but  the  eloquence  of  Truth."l| 

♦  Akepslde.    f  Beattie's  Minstrel,    t  Minstrel.    O^ampbell. 


OF  THOUGHT.  119 

••The  only  amaranthine  flow'r  on  earth 

"Is  virtitv.*   the  only  lasting  treasure  trulh."f 

"Where  now  that gloom  which  hid 

"Fair  Truth  from  vulgar  ken. — i: 

The  epithets  fair,  loveli/,  beautiful,  and  siceet,  are 
applied  to  truth;,  but  never  to  power,  nor  to  spirit. 
Power  is  sublime;  spirit,  or  mind  is  interestiiigj  or  is 
the  object  of  benevolence;  but  truth  is  fair,  beautiful, 
or  lovely. 

Truth  is  a  substance,  a  being,  or  thing  which  has  a 
permanent  existence,  and  is  the  basis  of  a  specific  phe- 
nomenon. In  many  minds  the  general  term  substance 
is  associated  with  the  idea  of  a  particular  species;  that 
is,  with  the  idea  of  material  substance.  To  these  minds 
the  general  term  conveys  no  general  meaning;  it  con- 
veys only  the  ideas  of  gravitation  and  repulsion,  or  of 
solid  ponderous  being; — they  can  hardly  conceive  of 
substance  that  is  not  tangible.  Yet  we  have  tlie  same 
kind  of  evidence  for  the  existence  %id  substantiality  of 
truth,  that  we  have  for  the  existence  and  substantiality 
of  matter,  or  of  spirit ;  truth,  like  these  other  things,  is 
the  subject  of  a  quality,  or  the  basis  of  a  phenomenon. 
A  specific  phenomenon  is  acknowledged  both  by  the 
senses  and  by  the  mind ;  reason,  or  common  sense  as- 
signs to  this  phenomenon  a  specific  efficient  cause,  or 
invisible  basis;  and  that  basis  we  denominate  truth. 
But  as  in  the  perception  of  gravitation  and  of  matter, 
we  are  apt  to  confound  the  perception  of  the  phenome- 
non, with  the  perception  of  the  substance  ;  so  it  is  with 
respect  to  truth  and  harmony,  we  are  apt  to  confound 
tiie  perception  of  harmony,  with  the  perception  of 
truth. 

*  Virtue,  moral  becuttf,    fCowper.    *  More. 


120 


THE  ALPHABET 


But  truth  is  too  shadowy  a  thin*;  to  be  conceived 
of  as  a  suhstaucc ;  we  cannot  handle  it  with  our  hands, 
or  shape  it  into  form,  figure.  Very  right;  truth  is  a 
subborn  thing;  it  will  give  an  impression,  but  receive 
none.  Is  it  then  more  shadowy  tlian  spirit,  which  re- 
ceives, but  does  not  give  impressions?  Would  not 
power,  or  matter  appear  as  shadowy,  if  we  were  in  the 
habit  of  withdrawing  the  senses  from  the  observation  of 
its  phenomena? 

But  it  is  hard  to  conceive  of  truth  as  exercising  an 
efficiency,  as  being  an  operative  cause.  It  is  true,  we 
cannot  conceive  icky  truth  operates,  or  why  it  produces 
harmony,  but  we  do  conceive  the  fact,  we  know  that 
harmony  is  the  offspring  and  evidence  of  truth.  But 
this  does  not  satisfy  us,  our  metaphysical  predilections 
demand  something  more ;  we  are  not  content  with  the 
knowledge  of  an  efficient,  unless  we  can  also  discover 
a  final  cause,  a  reason  for  every  phenomenon.  There 
is  a  rooted  prejudi|[b  in  tlie  mind  which  supposes,  that 
every  operation,  whether  simple  or  complex,  is,  in  some 
way  or  other,  the  effect  of  volition;  that  mind,  or  spirit 
is  the  only  ultimate  efficient  cause  in  existence,  and 
power,  and  truth  are  secondary  causes,  or  attributes, 
(Equalities. J 

But  we  cannot  tell  why  truth  harmonizes,  any  more 
than  we  can  tell  why  matter  gravitates. — We  shall 
hereafter  consider  of  the  reason  why,  or  the  manner  in 
which  truth  affects  the  external  organs  of  sense;  it  will 
be  shewn,  that  truth  affects  the  senses  by  means  of  its 
harmony,  or  its  sweetness ;  but  this  is  a  different  thing 
from  giving  a  reason  why,  or  accounting  for  the  fact;, 
that  truth  produces  harmony.  We  can  give  the  causes 
of  gravitation  and  of  harmony,  but  we  can  give  no  rea- 
son why  the  one  cause  produces  gravitation,  or  why  the 


OF  THOUGHT.  121 

other  protluces  harmouy.  These  are  ultimate  facts ; 
they  cannot  be  accounted  for,  otherwise  than  by  attri- 
buting the  phenomena  to  their  respective  ultimate  causes. 
Gravitation  antl  harmony  are  not  voluntary  operations, 
considering  each  with  respect  to  its  proper  efficient 
cause ;  power  contracts,  or  matter  gravitates — necessari- 
ly, not  voluntarily;  and  truth  harmonizes,  not  voluntari- 
ly, but  necessarily.  Harmony,  or  beauty  is  the  idea, 
the  image,  or  visible  form  of  the  invisible  substance 
called  truth. 

Though  it  may  be  thought  difficult  to  comprehend,  or 
extravagant  to  aflirra  a  universal  and  necessary  relation 
between  truth,  and  harmony,  there  is  nevertheless  a 
vague  belief  of  the  fact  universal  among  mankind.  And 
it  is  not  so  much  the  fact,  as  it  is  the  ground,  or  evidence 
of  the  necessity  and  universality  of  the  fact,  that  we 
sometimes  puzzle  ourselves  about.  Some  are  of  opinion 
that  demonstration  belongs  exclusively  to  the  mathema- 
tical  sciences ;  yet  there  is  nothing  more  common  than 
to  talk  of  demonstration,  and  to  eflect  it  too,  in  mural 
and  natural  philosophy. 

But  there  is  much  greater  diversity  of  opinion  about 
what  it  is  that  constitutes  demonstrative  evidence,  or 
what  is  the  criterion  of  truth.  Ta  the  philosophy  of 
matter  and  spirit,  we  proceed  by  investigating  facts ; 
and  we  judge  of  the  nature  or  character  of  these  invisi- 
ble objects,  by  their  phenomena.  Their  phenomena 
constitute  their  character.  And  in  the  philosophy  of 
truth,  is  it  not  proper  to  proceed  in  a  similar  manner? 
This,  too,  is  confessedly  an  invisible  object  of  know- 
ledge ;  and  the  way  to  arrive  at  a  philosophical  defini- 
tion of  this  object,  is  to  investigate  the  facts  relating  to 
it,  the  manner  in  which  the  mind  acquires  a  knowledge 
of  it,  or  to  inquire  what  is  the/orw;  the  dress f  the  visible 
16 


1£2  THE  ALPHABET 

operation,  or  the  iilienomenon  through,  or  in  which  this 
invisible  object  presents  itself  to  the  mind. 

All  are  agreed  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  demon- 
strative evidence,  or  an  appropriate  medium,  a  sjjecies 
of  evidence  which  renders  the  truth  perfectly  certain. 
The  question  is,  what  is,  precisely,  that  species  of  evi- 
dence? Some  seem  to  suppose,  that  in  any  act  of  rea- 
soning, the  premises  is  the  evidence  of  the  truth  of  the 
conclusion,  or  that  one  truth  is  evidence  of  another. 
But  how  is  the  truth  of  the  premises  perceived  ?  It  is  an 
invisible  object  as  well  as  the  truth  of  the  conclusion. 
To  say  that  one  truth  is  evidence  of  another  truth,  or 
that  one  truth  causes  another  to  bo  perceived,  is  just 
about  as  correct  as  to  say,  that  one  body  causes  another 
to  move,  when  it  is  well  known,  that  it  is  not  the  one 
body  at  rest,  or  simply,  because  it  is  body,  that  causes 
the  other  to  move,  but  that  it  is  the  one  body  in  motion 
that  impels,  or  causes  the  other  to  move.  So  it  is  with 
truth;  the  one  truth  does  not  cause  the  other  to  be  per- 
ceived, or  to  manifest  itself  to  the  mind,  but  it  is  the 
phenomenon,  it  is  the  harmony  of  the  truth  of  the  con- 
clusion, with  the  truth  of  the  premises,  that  demonstrates 
the  former.  Evidence  in  its  very  nature  is  something 
perceived  immediately;  but  truth  is  not  perceived  im- 
mediately; it  is  tlierefore  not  one  truth  that  demon- 
strates  another  truth,  or  causes  it  to  be  perceived ;  any 
more  than  a  body  at  rest,  makes  an  impression  upon 
another  body,  or  causes  it  to  move ;  but  it  is  the  pheno- 
menon, the  harmony  of  truth  with  truth,  that  demon- 
strates its  reality. 

The  simple  fact,  that  harmony  is  connected  with 
truth,  is  discovered  in  the  first  place  by  observation,  or 
in  the  same  way  that  we  discover  that  gravitation  is 
connected  with  matter;  but  the  ground  of  the  univer- 


OF  THOUGHT.  123 

sality  of  that  connexion,  or  of  that  fact,  is  to  be  found 
only  in  the  nature  of  tlie  things  themselves.  In  an 
analysis  of  the  natures  of  truth,  and  harmony,  we  find 
that  the  one  is  an  effect,  of  which  the  other  is  the  ef- 
ficient cause,  or  is  that,  without  which  the  effect  cannot 
be  produced;  hence  they  are  universally  connected. 
The  unsophisticated  mind  goes  directly  to  this  result ; 
common  sense,  in  the  pursuit  of  truth,  takes  for  granted 
her  necessary  connexion  with  harmony,  and  whatever  is 
found  in  this  garb,  is  received  as  truth.  But  when  the 
philosopher  comes  to  define  truth,  he  thinks  it  necessary 
to  assign  her  some  metaphysical  character,  or  some  in- 
visible dress;  and  thus  places  her  out  of  sight  altogether, 
and  beyond  the  reach  of  inquiry. 

It  is  hard  to  conceive  of  power  as  being  the  eflficient 
cause  of  certain  phenomena  of  matter,  because  these 
phenomena  are  sometimes  associated  with  the  pheno- 
mena of  mind ;  and  because  of  the  long  cherished  belief 
that  power  is  an  attribute  of  mind,  and  that  all  the 
phenomena  of  matter  some  way  or  other  depend  on 
mind.  And  for  a  similar  reason  it  is  hard  to  conceive 
of  truth  as  being  tlie  efficient  cause  of  harmony;  it  is 
because  harmony  is  associated  with  the  phenomena  of 
both  matter  and  spirit.  Because  harmony  of  sound  is 
produced  under  the  direction  of  mind,  there  is  a  vague 
belief  that  mind,  or  spirit  is  the  ultimate  cause  of  har- 
mony in  general,  and  of  truth  also.  But  tlie  mind  that 
hath  music  in  itself  must  have  been  previously  possess- 
ed of  truth ;  it  must  have  acquired,  in  an  analysis  of 
the  phenomena,  those  mathematical  principles  of  quan- 
tity and  number,  whicii  constitute  the  first  principles  of 
music.  Even  a  child  who  performs  a  regular  tune, 
must  in  some  measure  comprehend  these  principles,  and 
must  in  some  sort  have  performed  this  analysis;  else 


I £4  THE  ALPHABET 

how  should  he  make  his  quantities  aad  uumhers  con- 
form to  the  rules  of  harmony. 

Beauty  of  architecture  consists  in  the  havmomj,  or 
right  proportion  of  parts,  and  tiiis  we  are  wont  to  ascribe 
to  the  mind  of  the  architect,  as  the  ultimate  cause  of  the 
phenomenon,  the  beauty;  and  it  is  just  to  dp  so;  but  it 
is  to  a  mind  informed,  or  possessed  of  the  first  truths,  or 
rules  of  the  art.  A  mind  uninlbrmed  of  those  first 
truths,  has  no  capacity  to  create  beauty;  as  soon  should 
we  expect  impulse  where  there  is  no  power,  as  beauty, 
or  harmony  where  there  is  no  truth.  Truth  is  essential 
to  all  the  arts,  as  much  so  to  painting,  and  to  poetry,  as 
to  music  or  to  architecture. 

Truth  is  not  an  attribute  of  mind,  nor  is  it  essential 
to  the  existence  of  mind;  yet  truth  is  undoubtedly  a 
constituent  element  of  every  reasoning  mind ;  for  reason 
is  employed  only  in  the  acquisition  of  truth,  or  in  dis- 
covering the  relations  of  things.  The  spiritual  sub- 
stance is  also  a  constituent  element  of  the  substauce  of 
the  mind ;  it  is  a  distinct  thing  from  truth,  and  exists 
without  it ;  as  truth  may,  and  does  exist  independently 
of  spirit.  It  will  not  be  denied  that  truth  is  indepen- 
dent of  mind.  That  two  and  two  are  equal  to  four,  is 
a  truth  though  it  be  not  perceived.  Truth  is  not  an  at- 
tribute, or  operation  of  the  mind  ;  it  is  not  an  operation 
at  all.  It  is  only  by  confounding  the  jjercejition  of 
truthn  with  truth  itself,  that  we  come  to  call  the  latter  an 
attribute  of  mind.  Percejttion  is  the  attribute  of  mind  ; 
truth  is  the  subject  of  the  attribute  of  harmony. 

If  truth  is  not  the  efllcient  cause  of  harmony,  there 
is  no  adequate  cause  of  this  phenomenon,  that  has  been 
discovered;  or,  contrary  to  the  habitual  proceeding  of 
reason,  she  has  not  assigned  a  specific  ultimate  cause, 
to  this  specific  phenomenon.     If  truth  were  not  that 


OF  THOUGHT.  125 

cause,  or  were  not  recognized  as  siicb,  we  should  then 
have  a  phenonieuon,  or  quality,  without  a  substance,  or 
basis, — an  operation,  without  an  adequate  cause ;  we 
shouhl  liave  truth,  a  thing  independent  in  its  nature, 
nnd  eternally  existent,  yet  producing  no  eflcct  in  nature, 
suslaiuing  no  part  in  the  universe  of  being.  We  should 
have  a  being,  or  thing  invisible  in  itself,  and  exhibiting 
no  visible  operation,  no  evidence  of  its  existence,  and 
yet  perceived  by  the  mind;  perceived  neither  mediately, 
nor  immediately,  yet  perceived.  We  should  have  a 
cause  without  an  cflect,  and  an  effect  without  a  cause; 
or  rather,  an  effect  and  its  cause  disjoined — uncon- 
nected. 

Truth  is  but  a  name,  if  it  be  not  an  efficient  cause. 
We  have  no  powers,  or  organs,  of  perception,  except- 
ing tiiose  of  sense  and  consciousness,  and  that  of  rea- 
soning. Sense  and  consciousness  perceive  effects,  ope- 
rations ;  reason  perceives  causes ;  reason  infers  the  ex- 
istence of  efficient  causes,  from  the  operations  perceived 
by  sense  and  consciousness.  If  truth  is  neither  cause 
nor  effect — substance  nor  phenomenon — it  has  no  ex- 
istence. 

Trutii  is  a  self-existent  efficient  cause,  and  its  mode 
of  operation  is  harmony.  Its  more  remote  effect  is  to 
jjlease^  and  to  govern  mind ;  the  former,  that  is  har- 
mony, is  the  effect  which  truth  produces  in  itself,  it  is 
involved  in  its  nature ;  the  latter,  that  is,  to  please  and 
to  govern,  are  the  effects  it  produces  in  other  beings,  or 
substances,  beside  itself;  the  former  is  a  necessary  ef- 
fect, the  latter  is  incidental. — Power  moves,  or  impels 
by  means  of  its  primary  operation,  contraction ;  spirit 
perceives  in  expansion  ;  and  truth  governs,  or  influences 
the  mind  by  means  of  its  harmony.  The  mi:id  govern- 
ed  by  power,  or  force,  is  a  slave;    ungoverned,  or 


126  THE  ALPHABET 

governed  by  passion,  is  a  demon ;  governed  by  truth, 
is  divine. 

In  a  treatise  on  truth  it  would  be  unpardonalile  not 
to  notice  the  doctrine  of  Professor  Stewart,  respecting 
the  nature  of  truth  and  evidence.  The  Professor's  re- 
marks are  rather  vague  and  general,  and  somewhat  de- 
sultory. The  most  condensed  and  determinate  form  in 
"wliich  liis  theory  of  truth  is  to  be  found,  is  in  the  second 
volume  of  ^'Elements  of  Philosophy,''  and  in  chapter 
first,  entitled  "Of  the  fundamental  Laws  of  human  Be- 
lief, or  primary  Elements  of  human  Reason,"  and  is 
contained  in  the  following  paragraphs. 

^'I  begin,"  says  the  Professor,  "with  a  review  of 
*^some  of  those  primary  truths,  a  conviction  of  which  is 
"necessarily  implied  in  all  our  thoughts  and  in  all  our 
^^actions ;  and  which  seem,  on  that  account,  rather  to 
^^form  constituent  and  essential  elements  of  reason,  than 
^'objects  with  which  reason  is  conversant." 

The  primary  truths  to  which  I  mean  to  confine  my 
attention  at  present  are:  1.  Mathematical  Axioms; 
S.  Truths  (or  more  properly  speaking,  Laws  of  Belief,) 
inseparably  connected  with  tke  exercise  of  conscious- 
ness, perception,  memory,  and  reasoning.* 

The  following  passage  contains  a  few  specimens  of 
the  "Laws  of  Belief*  Avith  the  author's  own  observa- 
tions concerning  them. 

From  such  propositions  as  these,  ^^i  exist;  I  am  the 
^^same  person  to-day  that  I  was  yesterday;  the  material 
^^world  has  an  existence  independent  of  my  mind  ;  the 
^'general  laws  of  nature  will  continue^  in  future,  to 
^(operate  uniformly  as  in  time  past,  no  inference  can 
"be  deduced,  any  more  than  from  the  intuitive  truths 

♦  Elements  of  Philosophy,  p.  25.  2d  Vol.  New  York  cd. 


OF  THOUGHT.  127 

^^preflxed  to  the  elements  of  Euclid.  Abstracted  from 
'^other  data,  they  are  perfectly  barren  in  themselves ; 
'^nor  can  any  possible  combination  of  them  help  the 
^^rnind  forward,  one  single  step  in  its  progress.  It  is 
^'for  this  reason,  that  instead  of  calling  them,  with 
^^other  writers,  first  principles,  I  have  distinguished 
^^thera  by  the  title  of  fundamental  laws  of  belief;  the 
"former  word  seeming  to  denote,  according  to  common 
"usage,  some  fact,  or  some  supposition,  from  which  a 
'•^series  of  consequences  may  be  deduced."* 

In  the  chapter  throughout  from  which  these  para- 
graphs are  extracted,  the  author's  design  is  to  prove, 
that  the  "laws  of  belief,'"  or  the  "primary  truths"  of 
philosophy,  are  neither  the  result  of  reasoning,  nor  a 
foundation  for  reasoning,  that  they  are  not  discovered, 
as  facts  are,  in  an  investigation  of  the  phenomena,  and 
that  unlike  facts,  they  afford  no  data  from  which  a  con- 
clusion can  be  drawn. — He  labors  to  prove  that  truths 
are  perceived  intuitively,  or  independently  of  reasoning 
and  of  evidence.  He  seems  to  consider  the  knowledge 
of  truth  as  innate  ;  for  he  says  it  "seems  rather  to  be 
"a  constituent  element  of  reason,  than  an  object  with 
"which  reason  is  conversant."  Aud  he  contends  far- 
ther, that  first  truths,  or  "elements  of  reason,"  are  not 
principles  of  reasoning,  that  "abstracted  from  other 
^'data,  they  are  perfectly  barren  in  themselves,  nor  can 
"they  help  the  mind  forward  one  single  step  in  its  pro- 
"gress." — In  the  first  section  the  author  labors  to  prove, 
that  the  principles  of  mathematical  science  "are,  not  the 
"axioms,  but  the  definitions.^^ — The  second  section  is 
intended  to  shew,  that  the  "laws  of  belief"  are  pre- 
cisely analogous  to  mathematical  axioms  in  this  respect, 
that  from  them  no  inference  can  be  deduced. 

*  Page  55. 


128  THE  ALPHABET 

If  it  be  true,  that  the  pei-ception,  or  belief  of  truth,  is 
not  the  result  of  rcasouini;,  theu  that  belief  is  not  a  ra- 
tional;  or  philosophical  belief; — and  it  is  not  then  ne- 
cessary to  be  endowed  with  reason,  to  com[)rcheiid,  or 
perceive  truth,  for  rationality  is  not  requisite  to  the  per- 
ception of  that  which  is  perceived  without  reasoning, — 
And  if  it  be  true  that  first  truths  are  not  a  fofuulation  for 
reasoning,  then  truth  has  no  efficiency,  and  no  influence 
over  mind;  it  is  not  a  guide  in  the  pursuit  of  know- 
ledge, nor  in  distinguishing  between  right  and  wrong : 
it  is  not,  either  in  science  or  in  morals,  "a  lamp  to  our 
•^'feet,  and  a  light  to  our  path.''  If  fundamental  truths 
have  so  little  character,  and  so  little  authority,  other 
truths  cannot  have  more.  But  if  indeed  first  truths  do 
not  "help  the  mind  forward  one  single  step,"'  what  is 
the  value  of  truth?  What  is  its  use?  If  truth  is  with- 
out efficiency  and  without  influence  or  operation,  it 
would  seem  to  be  about  as  useless  a  thing  as  matter 
would  be  if  made  of  nothing.  But  if  first  truths,  or 
"fundamental  laws  of  belief,*'  are  not  princi})les  of  rea- 
soning, in  Avhat  sense  are  ih^y  f and amental? 

The  Professor's  theory  of  the  ])erce]jtion  of  truth  is 
a  refinement  on  Dr.  Beattie's  definition  of  truth.  "I  ac- 
"count  that  to  be  truth,"  says  the  Doctor,  "which  the 
"constitution  of  our  nature  determines  us  to  believe.*' 
The  Professor  says,  "primary  truths — seem  rather  to  be 
"constituent  and  essential  elements  of  reason,  than  oh- 
'Ejects  with  which  reason  is  conversant." — There  are 
certain  propositions  which  the  Professor  instances  as 
"truths,  or  fundamental  laws  of  belief;"  such  as  that 
*^^the  material  world  has  an  existence  independent  of 
<^my  mind ; — I  am  the  same  to-day,  that  I  was  yester- 
"day ;"  &c.  But  it  is  sometimes  the  belief  of  one  of 
those  propositioas;,  that  he  speaks  of  as  being  a  "law  of 


OF  THOUGHT.  129 

•'belief.'^  "The  belief/'  says  he,  ^"'which  all  men  eii- 
'•[ertain  of  the  existence  of  the  material  world,  be- 
•'lougs  to  the  same  class  of  ultimate  or  elemental  laws 
•'of  thought.'"* — Thus  according  to  the  Professor,  that 
matter  exists,  is  a  "law  of  belief/'  and  that  matter  is 
perceived,  is  a  "law  of  belief;" — or  in  other  words,  the 
existence  of  matter,  is  a  "law  of  belief/'  and  the  belief 
in  the  existence  of  matter,  is  a  "law  of  belief/'  and 
"laws  of  belief"  are  '^'truths''  analogous  to  mathema- 
tical tixioms.f  In  this  Avay  the  author  has  woven  a  web, 
whieh  catches  many  a  fly.  His  idea  of  truth  has  evi- 
dently been  obscured,  by  being  blended,  in  his  mind, 
with  the  idea  of  the  perception,  or  belief  of  truth. 

The  Professor's  grand  aim  is  to  establish  a  system 
of  logic,  or  to  point  out  the  most  proper  method  of  in- 
vestigation and  reasoning  in  philosophy  and  metaphy- 
sics. To  this  end  he  is  laboring  to  shew  what  is  the 
characteristic  of  truth;  or  rather,  he  labors  to  prove 
that  truth  has  no  criterion,  no  decided  characteristic, — 
excepting  the  circumstance  that  it  is  believed.  Accord- 
ingly he  says,  that  truths  are  "more  properly"  termed 
^•laws  of  Ijelief /'  by  which  term  be  seems  to  signify, 
that  e\  ei  V  truth  is  a  law  of  the  mind,  in  the  same  sense 
that  perception  is  a  law  of  the  mind,  or  that  gravitation 
is  a  law  of  matter, — for  he  says,  '"'truths  seem  rather  to 
"be  elements  of  reason,  than  objects  with  which  reason 
"is  conversant."  In  giving  this  title — "laws  of  belief," 
to  truths,  the  author  seems  not  to  have  distinguished 
between  the  jperception,  or  belief  of  truth,  and  the 
truth  perceived,  or  to  have  confounded  truths,  with  the 
phenomena  of  mind ;  which  is  the  same  error  into  which 

•  El.  rhU.  Vol,  2.  p.  53.        t  P.  52. 

17 


130  THE  ALPHABET 

Dr.  Tatham  has  fallen,  when  he  says  ^'trulh  is  an  attri- 
bute of  mind.'^ 

To  make  good  his  theory  of  truth  and  evidence,  the 
Professor  attempts  to  establish  a  distinction,  and  a  j7a- 
rallel;  a  distinction  between  princijiles  of  reasonivg^ 
and  '^elements  of  reasoning/'  or  ^'fundamental  laws  of 
belief:''  and  a  parallel  between /acis,  as  first  principles 
of  philosophy,  and  definitions^  as  first  principles  of 
mathematical  science;  —  a  parallel  also,  between 
^^fundamental  laws  of  belief,"  and  mathematical  axioms. 
He  observes,  that  "from  such  propositions  as  these,  I 
^'exist;  the  material  world  has  an  existence  indejjen- 
''dent  of  my  mind ;  &c.  no  inference  can  be  deduced, 
"any  more  than  from  the  intuitive  truths  prclixed  to  the 
"Elements  of  Euclid." — He  observes  also,  that  "Defini- 
"tions  hold,  in  mathematics,  precisely  the  same  place 
"that  is  held  in  natural  philosophy  by  such  general  facts 
^^as  have  now  been  referred  to."*  The  general  facts 
referred  to  are  "the  gravity  and  elasticity  of  the  ai?'."j- 

It  is  astonishing  that  the  Professor  should  have  over- 
looked so  obvious  a  distinction,  as  that  between /«cf^, 
and  definitions.  They  agree,  indeed,  ia  being  both 
principles  of  reasoning,  but  they  arc  different  kinds  of 
principle ;  and  they  are  not  distinguished  from  triitki^ 
and  axioms  by  this  character,  for  these  also  are  princi- 
ples of  reasoningy  as  we  shall  see  just  now.  The  lo- 
gician must  use  different  terms  in  defining  facts,  from 
those  in  which  he  would  define  definition  ;  and  if  the 
Professor  had  defined  his  terms,  he  had,  without  doubt, 
detected  his  own  error.  The  character  of  a  definition 
is,  that  it  points  out  the  genus  of  some  (one)  thing  de- 
fined, and  the  specific  difference  by  which  that  thing  is 

♦  El.  Phil.  p.  37.        t  Page  36, 


OF  THOUGHT.  131 

(iistinguished,  8^'c.  But  the  character  of  a  fact  is,  that 
it  affirms  or  denies  some  relation  between  some  two 
things.  The  fact  of  the  gravitation  of  the  air  does 
not  resemble,  either  iu  a  lo2;ical  or  philosophical  point, 
the  definition  of  a  right  angle  or  of  a  square ;  nor  can 
any  dctininition,  either  in  mathematics  or  in  philosophy, 
have  a  reseml)lance  to  tiiat  or  to  any  other  fact.  That 
the  air  gravitates — is  a  fact;  it  affirms  a  specific  rela- 
tion— the  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  or  of  agent  and 
action — between  the  substance  of  the  air,  and  the  phe- 
nomenon, gravitation.  But  if  we  define  gravitation,  we 
say  gravitation  is  a  j^henomenon  ;  this  is  the  genus — 
and  that  it  is  produced  by  material  substance — this  is 
the  specific  difference.  In  like  manner,  in  mathematics, 
that  all  right  angles  are  equal — is  a  fact;  the  proposi- 
tion affirms  the  relation  of  equality  among  all  right  an- 
gles. But  when  we  define  the  figure,  we  point  out  the 
genus  by  saying  it  is  an  angle,  and  the  species,  or  spe- 
cific difference,  by  sayiug  it  is  a  right  angle,  or  an  an- 
gle of  ninety  degrees. 

But  the  Professor's  design  was  to  establish  the  doc- 
trine, that  truths  are  not  principles  of  reasoning. 
Hence  he  tells  us  that,  in  mathematics,  definitions  are 
principles  of  reasoning,  but  that  the  axioms  are  not ; 
that  in  philosophy,  facts  are  principles  of  reasoning,  but 
••truths,  or  laws  of  belief,"  are  not;  and  farther,  that 
general  facts  hold  the  same  place  in  philosophy,  that  de- 
finitions hold  iu  mathematics;  and  th^i  truths  hold  no 
place  in  either  science. 

Wc  shall  inquire  by  and  by  into  the  fact — what  place 
in  actually  held  in  mathematics  and  philosoi)hy,  re- 
spectively, by  definitions,  and  axioms,  facts,  and  "laws 
of  belief."  And  we  trust  it  will  appear,  that  in  phi- 
losophy, truths,  and  general  facts  iiold  the  same  place 


1S2  THE  ALPHABET 

in  pliilosopliy,  that  truths  or  axioms  held  in  mathema- 
tics. In  the  mean  time  we  shall  endeavor  to  shew  that 
ih^  facts  of  philosophy  are  analogous,  not  to  the  defini- 
tions, but  to  the  axioms  of  mathematics — in  a  word,  that 
truths,  and  axioms,  avt  general  facts,  both  in  mathe 
matics  and  in  philosophy ;  and  farther,  that  those  pro 
positions  which  the  author  terms  '^•fundamental  laws  of 
belief,"  and  which  the  author  says,  are  not  principles 
of  reasoning,  because  they  are  neither  facts  nor  defini- 
tion^, are  some  of  them  reaWy  facts ;  and  some  of  them 
express  the  universality  of  certain  facts. 

One  of  the  "laws  of  belief"  enumerated  by  the  author 
is,  that  'Hhe  material  world  has  an  existence  indejjen- 
^^dent  of  my  mind.^'  This  is  a  fact.  A  fact  or  truth 
affirms,  or  denies  somewhat.  This  one,  or  this  "law 
"of  belief"  affirms  existence  of  the  material  world,  and 
denies  its  dependence  on  ^'my  mind."  That  ^-7  am 
^*the.  same  to-day  that  I  was  yesterday, ^^  is  also  a  fact, 
it  affirms  the  relation  of  sameness^,  or  similarity,  of  that 
which  I  am  to-day,  to  that  which  I  was  yesterday. 
This  is  a  simple  fact;  the  following  '^law  of  belief"  is 
more  complex;  "T7te  general  laws  of  nature  will  con- 
••timie  to  operate  uniformly,  as  in  time  past.^'  This 
proposition  merely  affirms  universality  of  the  '^'general 
*  ^aws"  of  nature,  or  of  certain  facts  observed  in  nature. 
That  matter  gravitates,  is  one  of  these  facts ;  awd  wlien 
a  fact,  or  law  of  nature,  is  perceived  to  be  universally 
true,  and  because  that  universality  is  established  in  a 
metaphysical  investigation  of  things,  the  fact  is  termed  a 
truth;  the  Professor  terms  it  a  "law  of  belief." 

Mathematical  axioms  are,  strictly,  general  facts,  and 
are  of  the  same  nature  with  those  just  mentioned,  only 
that  they  relate  to  different  things.  When  it  is  said 
of  two  rijght  angles,   that  tliey  Tvre  eqiial^  this  is  the 


OF  THOUGHT.  133 

expression  of  an  mdividual  fact;  tliat  all  right  angles 
are  equal,  is  a  general,  or  universal  fact ;  and  because 
of  its  universality,  it  is  termed  a  truth,  or  axioin. — If  in 
the  way  of  experiment  it  is  discovered,  thtat  A  is  equal 
to  B,  and  that  C  is  equal  to  B,  and  that,  consequently, 
A  and  C  are  equal,  this  is  the  discovery  of  a  fact ;  but 
when  in  farther  conteraphating  the  subject,  it  is  perceiv- 
ed to  he  necessarily  and  universally  true,  that  things 
equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal  among  themselves, — 
this  is  termed  an  axiom,  or  truth. 

So  it  appears  tiiat  the  "laws  of  belief  are  essential- 
ly the  same  with  general  facts,  and  that  general,  or  uni- 
versal facts,  are  metapliysical  truths,  and  are  analogous 
to  mathematical  axioms.  We  will  novr  inquire  into  the 
fact,  wliat  place  is  actually  held  in  mathematics  and 
philosophy  respectively,  by  definitions,  and  axioms, 
facts,  and  "laws  of  belief.*'  It  is  certainly  true,  that, 
as  the  Professor  observes,  Xio  inference  can  be  deduced 
from  a  truth,  or  law  of  belief,  nor  from  mathematical 
axioms,  taken  singly,  or  "abstracted  from  the  data.^' 
But  the  same  is  true  of  facts,  and  tlic  same  is  true  of 
definitions,  whether  mathematical  or  metaphysical. 
From  no  one  principle,  either  axiom,  or  definition,  fact, 
or  "la\v  of  belief,*'  can  any  inductive  inference  be  de- 
duced. In  a  process  of  inductive  reasoning,  either  an 
axiom,  or  a  general  fact,  or  a  definition — any  general 
principle,  may  form  the  major  proposition;  but  we  de- 
duce no  inference  without  the  minor  also — either  ex- 
pressed, or  tacitly  recognized.  For  example,  matter 
gravitates :  what  inference  can  b«  drawn,  inductively, 
from  this  general  fact?  None  at  all.  But  add  the 
minor  proposition,  the  moon  is  a  material  substance ; 
and  directly  we  come  to  the  conclusion,  th.it  the  moon 
gravitate?.     Or  if  we  take  for  the  viajov  [uoposition. 


134  THE  ALPHABET 

the  definition — matter  is  the  e^^cient  cause  of  gravi- 
tation ^  no  inductive  infcrcucc  follows  from  this;  but 
add  the  minor,  the  moon  gravitates,  then  it  follows  that 
the  moon  is  a  material  substance.  It  is  the  same  in 
matliematics.  Definition.  A  straight  line  is  the  short- 
est that  can  be  drawn  between  two  points.  "Abstract- 
'^ed  from  other  data^*  this  is  barren  of  consequence ;  but 
add  the  individual  fact,  here  is  a  line  stretched  from  A 
to  B,  the  shortest  that  can  be  drawn  between  the  two 
points.  It  is  then  a  straight  line.  The  axioms  like- 
wise form  major  propositions.  Major.  Two  straight 
lines  cannot  inclose  a  space.  Minor.  Here  are  two 
lines  inclosing  a  space.  Inference.  They  cannot  both 
be  straight  lines.  Take  now  for  major  proposition  the 
following  -'law  of  belief.*'  ^^The  laics  of  nature  will 
continue  to  operate  uniformly,  in  future,  as  in  time 
jpast.''^  Minor.  Here  is  a  fountain  of  water  which  has 
ever  flowed  as  it  does  now.  Inference.  It  will  con- 
tinue to  flow,  in  future,  as  in  times  past. 

Thus  it  appears,  that  in  a  process  of  inductive  reason- 
ing, any  general  principle,  w  hether  axiom,  or  definition, 
may  form  the  major  proposition,  and  an  individual  fact, 
the  minor;  though  from  no  single  principle,  whether 
fact,  or  axiom,  or  definition,  docs  any  consequence  fol- 
low, inductively.  Truths,  then,  are  principles  of  rea- 
soning as  well  as  definitions ;  and  it  lias  been  seen  too, 
that  definitions  are  sound  principles,  or  real  guides  in 
the  path  of  science,  only  so  far  as  they  are  true—  or  as 
they  are  in  harmony  with  the  real  predicaments  of 
things.  Definition  is  the  polar  star,  but  truth  is  the  sun 
of  science. 

We  trust  it  has  also  already  been  proved,  or  made 
appear,  that  truths  are  not  perceived  intuitively,  or 
without  evidence  and  the  exercise  of  reason 5  but  that 


OF  THOUGHT.  135 

general  principles,  or  universal  truths,  both  in  philoso- 
phy and  in  mathematics  are  unfolded  in  a  metaphysical 
analysis  of  the  nature  of  the  subjects  of  which  the  truths 
arc  affirmed. 

Analysis  and  induction  are  apt  to  be  confounded,  the 
one  with  the  other,  in  the  attempts  of  logicians  to  de- 
scribe them,  prol)ably  because  that  analysis  is  frequent- 
ly succeeded  by  induction,  and  induction  ought  to  be 
preceded  by  analysis.  We  analyse  a  particular  fact, 
with  a  view  to  discover  its  character,  or,  to  induct  it 
into  some  general  principle;  or  we  analyse  a  phenome- 
non, with  a  view  to  bring  it  under  some  definition,  or  to 
refer  it  to  some  class.  Analysis  implies  e.vjieriment, — 
even  in  metaphysical  subjects,  it  is  impossible  to  analyse 
witliout  adducing,  or  exhibiting  to  the  mind  a  particular 
instance  of  the  thing  to  be  analysed,  and  of  the  decom- 
position, or  separation  of  its  component  parts,  and  of  its 
necessary  relations.  This  is  technically  termed  analy- 
sis, and  abstraction  :  while  the  bringing  an  individual 
subject  under  some  definition,  or  referring  a  particular 
fact  to  some  general  fact,  is  termed  induction.  Thus 
when  we  analyse  a  particular  fact,  for  instance,  the 
jiercepiion  of  matter,  we  exhibit,  or  bring  that  particu- 
lar fact  before  tlie  mind,  in  idea;  we  then  abstract  the 
phenomenon — simple  perception,  from  its  object,  or  ex- 
isting cause,  that  is,  matter,  and  view  the  former  by  it- 
self, or  in  its  own  native  character;  this  is  analysis  ;  in 
viewing  the  phenomenon  thus,  we  perceive  that  it  is  an 
operation — a  thing  which  is  produced,  and  passes  away, 
this  is  induction,  this  single  act  of  referring  the  particu*. 
lar  object  to  a  class  of  objects,  to  operations,  is  that 
which  is  termed  induction. — In  this  process  we  establish 
the  definition,  or  the  general  character  of  the  phenome- 
non perception  ;  we  discover  that  it  belongs  to  the  pre- 


136  THE  ALPHABET 

tlicameiit  of  operations.  A2;aiu,  in  further  analysing 
Ibis  particular  phenomenon,  iierce-ptiony  with  a  \iew  to 
discover  its  source,  aiid  its  necessary  relations^  wo,  ab- 
stract its  geuerical  character,  as  an  operation,  from  itn 
species,  or  particular  character,  as  perception.  In  con- 
templatiog  the  first,  its  character  as  an  operation,  it  will 
be  perceived,  that  it  has  no  stability  in  itself,  that  as 
soon  as  it  exists,  it  passes  away,  and  is  succeeded  by 
another  of  the  same,  and  that  by  another,  continually ; 
that  it  must  therefore  relate  to  some  invisible  substantial 
being  which  produces  it, — it  is  evidently  the  product  of 
some  cause  which  is  able  to  sustain  the  operation  conti- 
nually. Thus  we  discover  the  universal  truth,  that 
every  phenomenon  requires  a  cause  able  to  produce  i(, 
or  an  efficient  cause.  By  pursuing  the  analysis  of  the 
phenomenon  perception,  several  other  general  princi- 
ples would  disclose  themselves,  but  this  will  suffice  for 
the  present.  Although  it  is  performed  mentally,  this 
process  is  properly  experimental;  but  it  is  certain  that 
when  experiment  is  addressed  to  the  senses,  it  is  most 
efficacious  in  throwing  light  on  a  subject.  But  this  is 
simply  because  the  external  organs  of  sense  arei  more 
exercised  than  tlie  internal  organs,  or  faculties  of  the 
raind,  or  rather,  that  the  mind  is  more  exercised  on  sen 
sible,  than  on  metaphysical  subjects.  It  is,  pcrJiaps. 
for  this  reason,  that  the  first  principles  of  mathematical 
science,  which  relate  to  sensible  objects,  have  long  ago 
been  fixed  beyond  dispute,  while  those  of  metaphysics 
still  wander  as  a  glimmering  light  in  a  dark  and  vast 
expanse. 

It  is  by  means  of  analysis,  or  by  experiment  on  lines, 
angles,  &c.  that  the  elementary  principles,  or  first  truths 
of  matliematics  are  originally  discovered.  In  compar- 
ing two  right  angles,  it  is  discovered  that  they  arc  equal. 


OF  THOUGHT.  137 

Tljis  is  Si  fact  discovered  by  experiment.  But  in  farther 
contemplating  these  angles,  and  comparing  them  with 
others,  we  discover  that  no  one  right  angle  can  be 
greater,  or  less,  than  any  other  right  angle;  m  other 
words,  that  all  right  angles  are  equal.  This  process 
involves  and  fixes  the  definition  of  a  right  angle,  at  the 
same  time  that  it  unfolds  the  axiom ;  for  unless  the 
term  right  angle  have  a  definite  signification,  the  uni- 
versality of  the  fact  does  not  appear.  The  definition 
and  the  axiom  are  established  at  the  same  time,  in  the 
analysis  of  the  simple  ffict,  that  two  right  angles  are 
equal.  The  simple  fact  ascertained  by  observation  is 
tlie  ground^  or  that  which  leads  to  the  discovery  of  the 
definition ;  and  the  definition,  in  its  turn,  is  the  ground 
of  the  axiom f  or  of  the  universality  of  the  fact.  The 
axiom — things  equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal  to  one 
another — is  discovered  and  proved  in  the  same  way.  In 
experiment  it  is  observed,  that  A  is  equal  to  B,  and  that 
C  is  equal  to  B,  and  that  A  and  C  are  also  equal.  This 
is  a  simple  fact.  But  in  farther  considering  the  sub- 
ject, it  is  discovered,  that  whatever  is  equal  to  B,  must 
be  equal  to  A,  and  to  C,  and  that  it  cannot  be  other- 
wise. Hence  the  axiom,  things  equal  to  the  same  thing, 
are  equal  to  one  another. 

It  appears  to  be  the  general  belief  that  these  axioms 
are  perceived  intuitively  as  soon  as  they  are  announced, 
and  without  experiment  or  inquiry.  But  this  is  not  thel 
fact,  except  where  we  have  previously  made  the  experi- 
ment, or  been  conversant  about  lines  and  angles,  or 
about  the  things  to  which  the  axioms  relate.  It  is  im- 
possible for  any  one  to  comprehend  the  axiom,  unless 
he  have  a  pretty  clear  conception  of  the  things  to  which 
it  relates,  or  of  which  it  is  affirmed.  These  indeed,  are 
18 


1S8  THE  ALPHABET 

very  simple  processes,  but  they  form  the  infant  science. 
Hercules  in  his  cradle. 


We  have  now  to  consider  the  physical  character,  or 
sensible  form  of  ti-uth,  if  the  expression  is  allowable,  or 
the  manner  in  which  truth  influences  other  substances, 
and  in  which  it  presents  itself  to  the  external  organs  of 
sense.  We  have  seen  that  harmony  is  the  characteris- 
tic of  truth,  in  the  metaphysical  world  ;  or  that  it  is  the 
form  in  which  truth  presents  itself  to  the  mind.  But  Jiav- 
mony  exists  in  the  physical  or  external  world  also,  and 
is  perceived  by  the  senses.  But  like  causes  produce 
like  eifects.  Therefore  truth  is  the  efficient  cause  of 
harmony,  in  the  pliysical,  as  well  as  in  the  metaphysical 
world.  W^herever  this  phenomenon  is  perceived  to  ex- 
ist, and  whatever  are  the  avenues  through  which  it  ex- 
hibits itself  to  the  mind,  it  is  always  the  product  of  the 
same  invisible  efficient  cause  or  substance. 

Harmony  is  the  eifect  and  evidence  of  truth  in  the 
physical,  as  well  as  in  the  moral  and  metaphysical 
worlds.  But  this  simple  phenomenon  is  modified  in  a 
variety  of  ways,  by  being  associated  with  other  pheno- 
mena, from  which  circumstance  it  takes  a  variety  of 
names,  as  music,  beauty,  order,  siveetness,  ^*c.  It  has 
already  been  suggested,  in  treating  of  material  substance, 
that  truth  addresses  itself  to  the  external  organs  of 
sense  in  the  phcnomenoa  harmony,  and  that,  beside 
harmony  of  sound,  which  is  addressed  to  the  ear,  beauty 
is  harmony  addressed  to  the  eye,  and  siveetness  is  the 
same  phenomenon  addressed  to  the  organs  of  tasting 
and  smelling.  Harmony  never  exhibits  itself  to  the 
senses  but  in  connexion  with  other  phenomena,  the  ope- 
rations of  causes,  dilfereut  from  truth.     There  can  be  no 


OF  THOUGHT.  139 

«iusic^  without  sound ;  no  beauty,  without  bodily  form; 
no  sweetness  without  something  solid,  liquid,  or  airi- 
form.  But  tlie  music,  the  beauty,  and  the  sweetness 
are  phenomena  quite  distinct  from  the  sound,  the  solidi- 
ty, or  the  bodily  form.  But  music  it  may  be  said,  or 
harmony  of  sound,  requires  mind  for  its  production  ; 
that  tiiough  it  mny  be  admitted  that  music  is  necessarily 
produced  according  to  certain  rules,  or  truths,  although 
mind,  to  produce  liarmony,  must  possess  truth,  yet  the 
truth  is  not  able  uf  itself  to  produce  this  phenomenon, 
harmony  of  sound,  or  is  not  the  efficient  cause  of  it. 

It  is  very  certain  that  truth  is  not  the  efficient  cause 
of  harmony  of  sound,  or  of  the  complex  phenomenon 
called  music ;  but  truth  is  the  efficient  and  sole  cause  of 
simple  harmony.  Harmony  of  sound  is  a  complex  phe- 
nomenon ;  the  efficient  cause  of  sound,  is  power ;  but 
power  can  no  more  produce  harmony,  than  truth  can 
produce  sound.  Harmony  of  sound  requires  mind  for 
its  production,  but  simple  harmony  exists  independently 
of  mind,  though  it  is  not,  in  its  simple  state,  perceived 
by  the  senses.  Truth  is  always  consistent,  or  in  har- 
mony with  itself.  The  harmony  of  truth  with  truth, 
depends  on  nothing  1)ut  truth  itself.  Though  the  direc- 
tion of  mind  is  required  to  combine  liarmony  with  sound, 
simple  harmony  is  the  offspring  of  simple  truth. 

AVhen  harmony  is  perceived  by  the  organ  of  hearing, 
it  is  necessarily  combined  with  sound ;  but  harmony  is 
also  perceived  by  the  organ  of  taste,  and  then  it  is  com- 
bined with  the  phenomena  of  bodies,  in  the  complex 
form  of  sweetness.  Can  this  be  so?  Can  we  taste 
truth,  or  smell  it?  Why  not?  If  the  substance  of  har- 
mony cannot  be  tasted,  what  substance,  or  what  efficient 
cause  can  ?  Can  jjower  lie  tasted,  or  matter  ?  Power  is 
the  efficient  cause  of  a  phenomenon  which,  when  pro- 


140  THE  ALPHABET 

duced  oa  the  organ  of  taste,  excites  the  sensation  of 
acidity  ;  another  pheDomenoii  produced  on  the  organ  of 
taste  excites  the  sensation  of  sweetness ;  and  this  too 
must  have  its  efficient  cause.  But  it  is  hard  to  conceive 
this  to  be  the  same  thing  that  metaphysicians  call  triith. 
Why  ?  Have  Ave  not  truth  in  the  productions  of  human 
art?  Is  not  truth  essential  to  a  fine  picture,  or  a  fine 
piece  of  music?, and  are  the  productions  of  the  divine 
artist  less  true,  and  less  divine  than  those  of  the  human 
artist?  Human  art  produces  music, — divine  art  produces 
sweetness,  or  that  combination  of  substance,  the  opera- 
tion of  \yhich  is  termed  sweetness.  Undoubtedly  there 
is  some  mystery  in  these  things  ;  we  can  understand  but 
a  part  of  the  ways  of  the  great  architect  who  builds,  and 
adorHs,  and  amply  stores  this  world  of  ours.  But  wc 
are  permitted  to  see,  and  all  the  world  of  mankind  do 
perceive^  the  several  distinct  elementary  efficient  causes 
of  the  phenomena  which  present  themselves  to  the  or- 
gans of  sense.  Sweetness  is  doubtless  the  product  of  a 
combination  of  the  efficient  cause  of  harmony,  with  an- 
other substance  as  a  vehicle.  The  divine  artist  certainly 
forms  these  combinations  in  nature  with  the  design  of 
exciting  the  pleasing  sensation  of  sweetness;  but  is  this 
more  incredible  than  that  the  human  artist  should  create 
harmony  of  sound.  The  divine  mind  does  not  work 
without  rule,  or  without  regard  to  truth:  He  forms  those 
combinations  according  to  the  eternal  rules  of  harmony. 
^Tlie  Lord  possessed  me  in  the  beginning  of  His  way, 
^'before  his  works  of  old." 

We  have  already  hazarded  the  opinion,  that  material 
substance,  or  hydrogene  is  the  efficient  cause  of  contrac- 
tion, and  that  contraction  is  the  object  and  exciting  cause 
of  the  sensation,  called  the  sensation  of  acidity  ;  also, 
that  spiritual  substance  is  the  same  with  caloric,  and  is 


OF  THOUGHT.  141 

tlie  basis  of  tbe  phenomenon  called  imngency,  or 
tcarmthf  wLen  addressed  to  the  osgaH  of  taste.  Nei- 
ther of  tiresc  simple  substances  then  is  tbe  basis  of 
sweetness.  We  aie  not  sufBciently  versed  in  chemistry 
(o  be  able  to  discuss  this  subject  with  perfect  success,  or 
to  identify  with  certainty  the  basis  of  sweetness  in  the 
laboratory,  but  may  hazard  an  expression  of  the  belief 
that  the  base  of  the  alkalies  is  the  basis  of  sweetness. — 
Tbe  alkalies  are  sweet  to  the  taste:  they  are  the  purl- 
liers  of  the  exiernal  world,  dduted  with  water  they 
take  away  the  foulness  of  the  skin  and  the  cloatliing ; 
they  oppose  decomposition,  or  putrefaction  in  animal 
matter;  they  oppose  the  acetous  fermentation  in  liquids; 
and  they  neutralize  the  acids,  forming  with  them  a 
variety  of  chrystaline  compounds.  The  base  of  the 
alkalies  is  probably  the  cause  of  that  regular  harmoni- 
ous disposition  of  particles,  called  chrystalization.  Me- 
tals and  minerals,  beside  tlie  chrystaline  form  of  their 
particles,  exhibit  other  evidence  that  they  contain  tins 
base.  They  have  the  property  of  neutralizing  the 
acids,  and  of  forming  compound  salts,  having  a  general 
reseml)lance  to  those  formed  by  the  alkalies  with  the 
acids.  The  same  effect  requires  the  same  cause,  the 
metals,  and  all  substances  forming  salts  with  acids 
must  contain  the  base  of  the  alkalies,  or  tlie  basis  of 
sweetness. 

If  the  alkalies  oppose  decomposition  in  animal  mat- 
ter, they  are  doubtless  tbe  cause  of  the  strong  resistance 
to  decomposition  in  some  other  bodies.  Tbe  precious 
stones  and  metals  will  owe  the  stability  of  their  exist- 
ing forms,  and  consequently  their  value,  (o  this  same 
principle,  the  base  of  the  alkalies.  The  material  sub- 
stance, or  gravitating  principle  is  one,  it  is  t'je  same  in 
all  tbe  metals,  and  if  each  metal  were  a  simple  sub. 


142  THE  ALPHABET 

stance,  there  coulil  be  no  variety,  there  could  then  be 
but  one  metal.  But  there  are  a  variety  of  phenomena 
attcndins;  them,  some  of  wliicli  necessarily  "depend  ou 
other  substances  than  simple  matter.  Such  arc  their 
brilliaucy,  their  various  colors,  their  diflcrcnt  degrees 
of  malleability,  solubility,  and  fusibility. — Their  attrac- 
tion for  the  acids,  and  for  caloric,  while  they  are  not 
ailected  by  the  alkalies,  is  presumptive  evidence  that 
they  already  possess  the  alkaline  base. 

We  will  hazard  a  few  more  remarks  with  a  view  to 
trace  tliis  substance  through  some  other  of  its  forms,  or 
combinations.  There  is  reason  to  believe,  that  the 
simple  principle  called  iiitrogene  is  the  same  with  the 
])asc  of  the  alkalies.  The  facts  on  which  this  conjec- 
ture is  founded  are  these  :  nitro^ene  combined  with 
hjdrogene  forms  anwioma,  one  of  the  alkalies  ;  but 
hydrogene  has  no  alkaline  properties,  therefore  the  base 
of  this  alkali,  or  that  on  an  hicli  its  alkalescence  de- 
pends, is  t)je  nltrogene.  Another  fact  which  strength- 
ens this  conjecture  is,  that  nitrate  of  potash^  which  is 
compounded  of  an  alkali,  with  nitrogene  and  oxijgene^ 
is  among  the  most  powerful  antiseptics  known.  If 
mtrogevc  is  the  base  of  alkalies,  then  both  the  consti- 
tuents of  nitrate  of  potash  contain  this  base. 

The  base  of  the  alkalies,  or  the  basis  of  sweetness,  is 
of  course  an  immaterial  substance,  or  a  principle  essen- 
tially dift'erent  from  that  of  gravitation  and  repulsion,  its 
distinguishing  qualities  are  not  gravity  and  solidity. 
Hence  it  is  obvious  that  this  substance  cannot  be  mea- 
sured by  its  weighty  but  that,  like  caloric,  it  will  require 
a  peculiar  instrument  for  ascertaining  its  comparative 
quantities.  It  is  obvious,  too,  that  v/henever  it  appears, 
in  a  solid  form,  it  is  necessarily  combined  with  matter, 
or  hydrog^ne.     And  it  farther  appears  from  the  caustir 


OF  THOUGHT.  143 

city  of  the  alkalies,  that  they  contain  oxijs^ene^  which 
substance  wouUl  seem  to  be  a  peculiar  compound  of 
liydrogene  aucl  caloric^  and  perhaps  it  is  one  of  the 
primitive  creations,  or  combinations,  which  never  is  de- 
composed. It  is  to  all  these  various  circumstances,  and 
perliaps  some  others,  that  the  alkalies  owe  their  variety 
of  forms. 

If  these  conjectures  are  well  founded,  it  is  highly 
probable  that  the  nitrogene  as  well  as  the  oxygeiie  gas 
of  the  atmosphere,  is  decomposed  in  breathing,  and  may 
be  necessary  te  animal  life,  notwithstanding  that,  alone, 
it  is  deleterious.  This  has  been  already  conjectured  by 
some  Ciiemists.  As  the  nxygene  supplies  the  principle 
of  life,  the  nitrogene  will  tend  to  maintain  health ;  it 
will  regulate  the  action  of  the  principle  of  life ;  it  w  ill 
oppose  putrescence  in  the  blood,  and  in  the  system  ge- 
nerally. In  all  this,  the  basis  of  sweetness  in  the  phy- 
sical world,  is  analogous  to  the  basis  of  harmony,  or  to 
truth  in  the  moral  and  metaphysical  w  orlds ;  or  to 
speak  more  correctly,  the  basis  of  sweetness  belongs  to 
the  metaphysical  world  as  really  as  truth;  they  are 
both  invisible  to  the  senses,  and  to  the  mind  also,  and 
are  perceived  only  in,  or  through  their  phenomena. — 
And  they  are  alike  in  their  effects;  sweet  substances 
are  not  liable  to  putrescence,  or  decomposition ;  and 
truth  is  imperishable,  and  transmits  to  future  ages  what- 
ever is  connected  with  it.  Divine  truth  is  the  tree  of 
life,  "its  leaves  are  for  the  healing  of  the  nations."^ — 
"Wliosoever  heareth  my  words,  and  belie  vest  them, 
"shall  never  die.*'  This  was  said  by  him  who  is  truth 
itself. 

Truth,  it  has  been  s:tid,  exists  only  when  perceived. 
The  same  doctrine  has  been  held  respecting  the  jjheno- 
mena  perceived  by  the  senses;  it  reduces  all  the  pheno- 


144  THE  ALPHABET 

meua  of  nature  to  sensations.  Sweetiiiiss,  say  these 
philosophers,  is  a  sensation,  and  can  exist  no  \\  here  but 
in  the  mind.  This  is  confounding  the  sensation,  with 
the  object  of  the  sensation.  A  certain  philosopher  has 
told  us,  that  the  heat  which  burns  the  finger,  is  not  in 
the  fire,  but  in  the  finger.  lie  reasons  thus,  "The  pain 
"produced  by  holding  the  finger  in  tlie  fire,  is  not  in  the 
**fii'e,  for  pain  is  a  sensation,  and  sensation  exists  no 
"where  but  in  the  mind.  But  heat  also  is  a  sensation, 
"and  therefore  is  not  in  the  fire,  but  in  the  mind.''  But, 
with  deference,  heat  is  not  a  sensation  :  heat  is  the  ob- 
ject and  exciting  cause  of  a  sensation.  The  sensntion 
is  not  heat,  but  the  perception  of  the  heat.  Pain  is  a 
general  term  for  a  class  of  sensations ;  the  sensation  of 
heat  is  a  particular  sensation,  and  the  heat  exists  inde- 
pendently of  the  sensation,  or  of  being  perceived. — Nei- 
ther is  sweetness  a  sensation,  but  it  is  the  object  of  a 
sensation.  Sweetness  is  a  phenomenon,  an  operation 
perceived  by  the  organ  of  sense.  The  sensation  of 
sweetness,  is  the  perception  of  sweetness.  Every  one 
knows  what  perception  is,  and  that  perception  is  not 
sweetness,  nor  sweetness,  perception.  Does  truth  exist 
when  it  is  perceived?  then  it  must  exist  always,  and 
every  where,  independently  of  being  perceived;  for  at 
what  time,  or  in  what  place  does  it  cease  to  be  a  truth, 
that  two  and  two  are  erpial  to  four. 


CHAPTER  V. 


OF  THE  ESSENCE  OF  GOD. 


We  approach  this  subject  Avith  profound  awe. ' 

O  thou  who  touched  Isaiah's  lips  with  a  live  coal 
from  off  thy  altar,  guide  my  pen.-^Sooncr,  "let  my 
"'^right  hand  forget  its  cunning,"  than  it  give  utterance 
to  error,  or  to  an  impious  thought. 

Perhaps  the  title  of  this  chapter  may  displease  or 
alarm  the  sensitive  christian,  if  he  has  not  entered  fully 
into  the  spirit  of  what  has  gone  before:  if  he  has,  his 
inferences  respecting  the  constitution  of  the  divine  Es- 
sence will  accord  with  what  follows.  But  some  will 
exclaim,  "Who  can  by  searching  find  out  God :  who 
"can  find  out  the  Almighty  unto  perfection  ?  His  way  is 
"in  tiie  deep, — His  path  in  the  deep  waters, — His  judg- 
"ment5  are  a  mighty  deep, — His  counsels  arc  unsearch- 
"able." — We  bow  a  sincere  and  solemn  assent. — But 
although  these  are  solemn  truths,  they  are  not  intended 
to  preclude  inquiry  respecting  the  nature^  or  essence  of 
God;  on  the  contrary,  the  holy  scriptures  themselves 
make  it  an  imperious  duty  to  know  God.  "For  this  is 
"life  eternal,  to  know  thee  the  only  true  God,  and  Jesus 
"Christ  whom  thou  hast  sent."  There  arc  the  most 
fearful  denunciations  against  those  who  know  not  God. 
It  appears  then,  that  in  one  respect  we  cannot  "find  out 
"the  Almighty  unto  perfection ;"  and  that  in  another  we 
can,  and  do  know  the  "living  and  true  God." 
19 


146  THE  ALPHABET 

The  inquiry  then  is,  in  what  respect  is  it  that  we,  can- 
not find  out  the  Almighty;  and  in  what  sense  is  it  that 
the  kno\y ledge  of  God  can  he  acquired?  In  pursuing 
this  inquiiy  we  shall  take  the  holy  scriptures  for  our 
guide  ;  for  though  it  is  through  the  senses  and  tlie  facul- 
ty of  reason  that  we  discover  originally  the  simple  ele. 
mcnts  of  all  things,  it  is  to  revelation  we  owe  the  know- 
ledge of  the  constitution  of  the  Creator  of  all  things. 
And  we  trust  it  w  ill  appear,  or  that  it  has  already  ap- 
peared, that  Power,  Siiirit^  and  Truth  constitute  the 
Essence  of  God. 

We  desire  to  have  it  clearly  understood,  that  we  do 
not  pretend  to  any  pliilosophical  discovery,  or  to  know 
any  thing  respecting  the  constitution  of  the  divine  Es- 
sence, more  than  is  revealed  in  sacred  writ.  All  that 
is  intended  here,  is  to  point  out  the/«cf,  that  the  know- 
ledge actually  possessed,  or  derived  from  revelation,  in- 
cludes a  knowledge  of  the  Essence,  or  Substance  of  the 
Divine  Being. 

In  what  respect  then  is  it  that  we  cannot  ^'find  out  the 
^^Almighty?" — The  things  relating  to  God  which  wc 
cannot  find  out  or  comprehend,  are  His  "thoughts'' — 
His  *^ways" — His  ^'judgments" — His  counsels" — His 
^^path." — "As  the  heavens  are  high  above  the  earth,  so 
"are  my  thoughts  above  your  thoughts,  and  my  wai/s 
"above  your  ways."  "His  path  is  in  the  deep  waters." 
"His  counsels  are  not  known."  "His  judgments  are  a 
"mighty  deep."  Neither  can  we  comprehend  the  ex- 
tent, or  the  immensity  of  the  being  and  operations  of 
God,  nor  the  infinity  of  His  duration.  "Where  wast 
"thou  when  I  laid  the  foundations  of  the  earth."  "Hast 
^'thou  perceived  the  breadth  of  the  earth?  declare  if 
^^thou  knowest  it  all."     "Where  is  the   w^ay   where 


OF  THOUGHT.  147 

"liclit  dwelleth?    and  as  for  darkness^    where  is  the 
place  thereof?"* 

But  in  what  respect  is  it  that  God  can  be,  and  is,, 
known  to  the  liiiman  mind  ?  What  is  it  to  know  God? 
Is  it  to  know  tliat  infinite  Power,  Intelligence,  and 
Truth  belong  to  Hiin,  but  without  daring  to  know  the 
meaning  of  the  terms,  without  presnming  to  inqnire 
what  is  the  precise  character,  or  predicament  of  these 
tilings,  without  inquiring,  whether  Poicer  and  Truth, 
are  constituents  of  His  Kssence,  or  are  only  attributes^ 
and  either  may,  or  may  not  be  exercised  in  conjunction 
Avith  Spirit  ?  Is  it  to  acquiesce  in  the  metaphysical 
dogmas  of  the  schools,  as  to  Avhat  may  be  affirmed  of 
the  constitution  of  the  divine  Essence,  without  inquu'ing 
whether,  or  not,  those  dogmas  arc  in  accordance  with 
revelation  and  with  reason  ?  It  is  in  the  exercise  of 
reason  that  we  discover  tiie  existence  and  the  predica- 
ment of  the  elementary  substances,  power,  spu'it,  and 
truth ;  but  it  is  certainly  not  from  reason,  nor  from  [)hi- 
losophy,  but  from  the  sacred  scriptures  that  we  derive 
the  knowledge  of  the  constitution  of  the  divine  Es- 
sence. 

Some  things  relating  to  God,  some  of  His  thoughts, 
nmj/s,  S^c.  are  not  revealed,  and  if  they  were,  probably 
we  could  not  comprehend  tliem.  His  thoughts  are  too 
high,  and  His  counsels  too  deep,  to  be  reached  by  onr 
limited  capacities. — Some  things  are  revealed — His  in- 
finity, and  immensity — but  we  are  nnable  to  compre- 
hend them.  But  some  things  are  revealed  which  we 
can  and  do  comprehend.  The  constitution  of  the  di- 
vine Being  or  Essence  is  revealed,  and  though  we  can- 
not comprehend  the  iniquity  or  immensity  of  the  con- 


♦  Job. 


148  THE  ALPHABET 

stituents  of  that  Essence^  wc  cau  and  do  compiTliend 
their  nature. 

It  is  revealed  in  sacred  writ,  that  Power,  Spirit^,  and 
Truth  belong  essentially  to  God ;  but  it  has  been  de- 
monstrated that  Power,  Spirit,  and  Truth  arc  suh- 
stanceSf  or  essences;  therefore  these  elementary  es- 
sences constitute,  or  enter  into  the  constitution  of  the 
divine  Essence.  But  human  reason  is  ade(juale  to  the 
comprehension  of  the  nature  of  these  simple  essences. 
Though  we  do  not  comprehend  tlie  infinity  or  immen- 
sity of  power,  we  do  knoAV  very  well  the  nature  of 
power,  or  the  essence  of  power.  It  is  the  essence  of 
power  to  contract  and  repel.  The  efficient  cause  of 
contraction  and  repulsion  is  the  essence  of  power.  And 
though  we  cannot  comprehend  the  eternity  of  the  divine 
Spirit,  nor  how  that  Spirit  fills  all  space,  yet  it  is 
known  that  the  power  to  perceive  is  the  essence  of 
Spirit.  And  we  do  know  or  clearly  conceive  of  the 
nature,  or  essence  of  Truth ;  though  we  do  not,  nor 
shall  we  ever  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of  all  trutli. 

To  know  God,  is  to  know  His  nature ;  it  is  to  know 
the  dispositions,  or  tendencies  of  His  Mind,  or  Being ; 
it  is  to  know  what  are  the  phenomena,  or  the  necessary 
operations  of  His  Mind  or  Being,  if  we  may  so  speak. 
It  is  to  know  that  He  does  what  he  pleases  "in  the  ar- 
"mies  of  heaven,  and  amongst  the  inhabitants  of  the 
"earth ;"  that  He  knows  all  things,  past,  present,  and 
to  come ;  that  He  abhors  iniquity  ;  that  He  loves  truth 
and  uprightness  ;  that  He  compassionates  the  unliappy  ; 
and  that  He  despises  the  proud.  These  are  the  opera- 
tions, or  the  phenomena  of  the  divine  Mind, — and  when 
the  phenomena  of  any  being  are  Jaiown,  the  nature,  the 
essence  of  that  being  is  known.  If  God  does  ivliat  He 
will,   in    the   ai-mies    of    heaven, — He    must    possess 


OF  THOUGHT.  149 

almighty  foicer;  if  He  kuow  all  things,  Repossesses 
spirit,  or  intelligence ;  if  he  love  truth,  then  truth  must 
])e  a  part  of  Himself,  or  a  constituent  of  His  Essence. 
if  every  action  of  divine  power,  is  directed  by  spirit, 
or  intelligence,  and  governed  by  truth,  then  Power, 
Spirit,  and  l^-uth  constitute  the  divine  Essence. — But 
if,  as  it  seems  to  be  believed,  Spirit  were  the  only  sub- 
stance, or  essence  in  the  divine  Being,  and  power,  and 
truth  were  attributes,  tlicn  it  would  seem  that  the 
operation  of  Spirit  would  be  the  only  necessary  opera- 
tion of  tlie  divine  Being,  tiiat  Spirit  may  exercise  power 
at  pleasure,  and  that  truth  may,  or  may  not,  influence 
(he  operation.  This  direful  consequence  is  implied  in 
the  principle,  that  God  is  a  simple  Essence.  If  Spirit 
were  the  only  essence  of  the  divine  Being,  He  would 
not  then  be  essentially  or  necessarily  holy  and  true. 

Whenever  the  divine  Essence  is  spoken  of,  that 
which  is  meant  is  either  the  Power,  the  Spirit,  or  the 
Truth  of  God,  or  all  these  united  ;  or  there  is  no  mean- 
ing, nor  specific  idea  annexed  to  the  terms.  The 
essence  of  any  being  or  thing,  is  that  which  makes  that 
being  or  thing  to  e  what  it  is.  It  may  be  affirmed 
without  fear  of  contradiction,  that  Power,    Spirit,  and 

Truth,  make  the  Supreme   God  to  be  what  He  is. 

We  speak  with  reverence.  In  fiict,  these  substances, 
and  their  operations  constitute  all  that  is  known  of 
God.  If  there  is  any  other  Essence  of  Deity,  if  there 
is  any  substratum  of  Power,  Spirit,  and  Truth,  that 
subatratum  must  be  the  efficient  cause  of  these  thin"-s, 
for  this  is  the  idea  of  a  substratum.  But  is  it  actually 
known  that  there  is  an  efficient  cause  of  Power,  Spirit, 
and  Truth  ?  Is  any  one  of  these  things  of  sucIj  a  char- 
acter as  to  require  a  cause,  or  to  indicate  that  a. cause  is 
necessary  to  its  existence.     No,  certainly.     Who  ever 


150  THE  ALPHABET 

ihoiiglit  of  a  cause  of  tlje  Spirit  of  God,  or  a  cause  of 
Truth,  or  a  cause  of  Almiglity  Power? 

But  it  is  often  asserted  tliat  the  human  mind  is  inca- 
pable of  comprehending  the  nature  of  the  divine  Es- 
sence, or  of  discovering,  or  understanding  what  is  (he 
divine  Essence.  This  musl,  or  should,  be  predicated 
on  some  priuciple  already  known.  For  one  who  knows 
nothing,  or  professes  to  know  nothing  of  a  matter,  to 
pretend  to  point  out  what  can,  or  what  cannot  be  known 
of  that  matter,  is  preposterous.  If  it  has  actually  been 
ascertained  that  human  reason  is  inadequate  to  compre- 
hend the  nature  of  the  divine  Essence,  tliat  discovery 
must  have  been  made  by  a  comparison  of  the  thing  to 
be  comprehended,  with  the  human  faculty  f<n'  compre- 
hending.— of  human  reason,  with  the  divine  Essence. 
But  this  would  imply  a  previous  knowledge  of  the  di- 
vine Essence,  the  very  knowledge  that  is  disclaimed, 
and  which,  it  is  asserted,  cannot  be  acquired.  So  that 
the  assumption — human  reason  cannot  comprehend  the 
nature  of  the  divine  Essence,  is  irrational. 

Before  it  can  be  rationally  affirmed  of  any  being,  that 
he  is  incapable  of  knowing  what  is  the  divine  Essence, 
we  should  be  acquainted,  not  only  with  the  capacity  of 
that  being,  but  also  with  the  nature  of  the  divine  Es- 
sence. We  might  with  propriety  pass  a  judgment  of 
this  kind  on  some  mind  inferior  to  our  own.  AVe  may 
have  ascertained,  that  a  horse  is  incapable  of  compre- 
hending a  syllogism.  But  if  a  horse,  without  exploring 
the  ground  and  making  the  experiment,  should  pro- 
jiouncc  respecting  himself  and  his  species,  that  none  of 
them  are  able,  or  ever  will  be  able  to  get  within  a  cer- 
tain inclosure,  should  we  not  jnonounce  this  judgment 
of  the  horse  irrational.  And  it  would  certainly  be  in- 
consistent with  the  enterprizing  character  of  the  horse. 


OF  THOUGHT.  151 

Just  such  a  judgment  is  it,  when  pronounced  by  man, 
upon  man,  that  he  is  incapable  of  ascertaining  the  na- 
ture of  any  specified  object.  He  is  irrational  in  at- 
tempting to  make  a  comparison  between  any  object,  and 
the  capacity  of  mail,  unless  he  first  ascertain  the  nature 
of  that  object. 

It  is  not  genuine  philosophy  that  pretends  to  antici- 
pate the  possible  limit  of  her  own  career,  or  to  deter- 
mine beforehand  what  can  or  cannot  be  known.  If  an 
angel  from  heaven  should  stoop  down  and  tell  us,  that 
we  are  incapable  of  comprehending  the  meaning  of  the 
terms  which  designate  the  divine  Essence, —  or  if  reve- 
lation told  us  so,  then  indeed  it  would  become  us  to  re- 
frain from  inquiry.  But  we  ought  then,  modestly  to 
lay  aside  the  term  divine  Essence,  a  term  that  could 
signify  nothing  to  us.  And  we  should  feel  ourselves 
sink  below  the  scale  of  being  in  which  we  had  believed 
ourselves  placed ;  we  should  feel  that  we  cannot  really 
be  made  in  the  image  of  God,  since,  if  that  were  so, 
the  nature  of  man — undepravcd,  would  be  similar  to 
the  nature  of  God,  and  so  far  as  we  understand  our 
own  nature,  or  the  constituents  of  our  being,  we  should 
understand  that  of  our  Creator. 

Power,  Spirit,  and  Truth,  in  man,  are,  though  finite, 
the  same  in  nature,  or  in  essence  with  Power,  Spirit, 
and  Truth  in  Him  who  is  infinite  in  all  His  perfections. 
The  infinity  and  immensity  of  the  divine  Being  are  not 
objects  of  philosophy,  they  are  no  part  of  that  which  is 
properly  called  the  nature  of  the  divine  Essence.  They 
are  the  mathematical  properties  of  the  divine  Essence ; 
and  there  can  be  no  comparison  between  them  and  the 
mathematical  properties  of  a  finite  being.  But  we  are 
authorized  by  the  Word  of  God  to  say,  that  the  nature 


152  THE  ALPHABET 

of  finite  man,    is    tlie  same   with   the  nature  of  that 
which  is  infinite. 

Power,  Spirit,  and  Truth  are  perceived  by  reason 
to  be  self-existent  efficient  causes,  and  this  is  the  very 
idea  of  Deity.  These  efficiencies,  unconnected,  are 
reason's  gods.  We  cannot  demonstrate,  on  phik)S(j- 
phical  principles,  that  these  three  are  united  in  One 
Supreme.  The  knowlcge  of  this  fact  we  owe  entirely 
to  revelation.  But  if  Power,  Spirit  and  Truth  ar« 
essences,  or  efficient  causes,  and  if  tliese  three  consti- 
tute the  Being  of  God,  then  the  Hebrew  word,  Elohim, 
is  intelligible  ;  there  are  then,  in  one  sense,  three  gods  : 
or  there  are  three  independent  efficiencies,  infinite  and 
eternal,  in  the  Oue  Omnipotent,  Omniscient,  and  in- 
finitely Holv  God. 


It  would  seem  a  necessary  appendage  to  the  fore- 
going, to  inquire  what,  or  who  is  he,  Avho  is  called 
the  Son  of  God. 

It  appears  to  be  assumed  as  a  first  principle  in  the 
philosophy  of  this  subject,  that  the  relations  of  ••'Father  * 
and  "Son**  in  the  divine  Essence  is  a  deep  mpteriff 
and  that  a  knowlege  of  the  distinctive  character  of  the 
^*Son*'  is  unattainable  in  the  present  state  of  things. 

It  is  the  boldest  presumption  to  attempt  to  be  wise 
above  what  is  2critten,  or  to  substitute  our  own  un- 
founded imaginations,  for  the  true  philosophy  of  the 
gospel.  At  the  same  time  it  is  a  reprehensible  negli- 
gence, to  pass  over  that  whicii  is  expressly  revealed, 
without  an  attempt  to  comprehend  it,  where  there  is  no 
accompanying  clause  v.hich  forbids  too  bold  a  scrutiny. 
"Without  controversy,  great  is  the  mystery  of  godli- 
^•ness — God  manifested  in  the  flesh,"  &c.     But  with 


OF  THOUGHT.  IS$ 

humility  we  woukl  venture  to  observe,  that  the  sacred 
scriptui'es  evidently  assume,  that  human  reason  is  ade- 
quate to  comprehend  many  of  the  facts  which  they  re^ 
cord,  and  this  one  in  particular,  that  Jesus  is  the  Son 
of  God.  This  fact  is  in  [lart  what  St.  Paul  alludes  to 
when  he  speaks  of  '"'the  mystery  which  was  kept  se-t 
"cret  since  the  world  began,  but  now  is  made  mani- 
«fost."* 

The  Jews  were  addressed  on  this  subject  by  oui* 
Saviour,  as  though  there  were  no  question  but  that 
they  perfectly  understood  the  terms,  "Father"  and 
"Son  ;"  and  though  they  were  enemies  to  his  person 
and  character,  and  though  they  charged  him  with  blas- 
phemy when  he  spoke  of  God  as  being  his  Father^ 
they  never  caviled  at  his  assertions  as  incomprehensi- 
ble. If  there  had  appeared  to  them  any  mystery  in 
the  assertion,  that  he  was  the  Son  of  God,  or  any  thing 
which  they  could  not  reconcile  to  what  they  had  learned 
from  the  law  and  the  testimony  concerning  the  nature 
and  perfections  of  God,  they  had  doubtless  turned  it  to 
account  in  their  opposition.  But  the  terms  "Father" 
and  "Son"  arc  figures  which  were  familiar  to  tho 
Jews,  and  they  do  not  seem  to  have  ever  conceived  the 
thought  of  raising  an  objection  to  the  fact,  from  the 
language  in  which  it  was  expressed.  While  our  Sa- 
viour was  on  earth,  he  called  on  the  Jews  and  all 
others  to  believe  that  he  was  the  Son  of  God ;  and  it 
was  demanded  of  them  to  believe,  not  merely  because 
he  testified  the  fact,  but  because  of  the  works  which  he 
did — because  his  character  and  manners  were  rational 
evidence  of  his  origin,  or  his  imrentage,  ^^If  ye  be- 
"lieve  not  me,  believe  the  works."    They  were  bound 

*  Romans  xvi,  35,  . . 

%0 


154  THE  ALPHABET 

ill  duty  and  in  reason  to  infer  from  his  works,  that  he 
was  the  Son  of  God;  and  it  was  their  condemnation 
that  they  did  not  helieve  his  works.  But  they  could 
not  have  heen  condemned  for  not  drawing  this  infer- 
ence, if  they  had  not  heen  capable-  of  compreheii<ling 
the  import  of  it.  Those  who  were  not  disaffected,  did 
in  fact  deduce  this  very  inference. — ^'•liabbif  thou  art 
"the  Son  of  God."  We  are  called  on  still  to  believe 
the  same  thing,  on  the  same  ground;  and  all  genuine 
Christian  faith  includes,  necessarily,  some  apprehen- 
sion of  the  nature  of  the  fact,  that  Jesus  is  the  Son  of 
God. 

From  the  general  imi)ort  of  the  metaphorical  terms 
father  and  son,  and  from  all  that  is  declan  d  in  sacred 
writ  respecting  tlie  "Father"  and  the  "Son,"  it  would 
appear,  that  the  relation  of  Father  and  Son  in  the  di- 
vine Essence,  is  the  relation  of  Cause  and  t.ffect, — or 
that  the  "Son"  is  tJie  eternal  Operation,  of  the  eternal 
Cause  or  "Father." 

"We  shall  inquire  first  what  is  the  general  signifi- 
cation of  the  terms /a^Aer  and  son.  And  if  we  should 
adduce  ever  so  many  instances,  it  would  be  found,  that 
in  every  case,  the  relation  of  father  and  son,  or  of  parent 
and  child,  is  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  or  of  agent 
and  operation.  The  following  are  a  few  of  the  innu- 
merable instances  which  might  be  adduced.  God  is 
called  the  Father  of  Sjnrits,  because  he  is  the  Cause 
of  the  individ  ial  existence  of  spirits,  or  minds.  He  is 
ca.led  the  Father  of  mercies,  because  mercy  is  a  con- 
stant and  necessary  operation  of  his  Mind.  Satan  is 
called  the  father  rf  lies,  because  he  was  the  first  who 
framed  a  lie,  and  is  the  prime  instigator  of  all  lies. 
The  terms  have  the  same  signification  in  the  following 
metaphors:— /flf/f" J'.?  of  the  church,  daughters  of  Zion, 


OF  THOUGHT.  155 

born  of  the  Spiint,  sons  of  thunder,  sons  of  Belial, — 
wisdom  is  justified  of  her  children. 

God  is  said  to  be  the  Father  of  all  tilings,  that  is, 
the  first  Cause  of  all  things.  By  a  similar  figure  the 
operation  of  the  first  cause  is  called  the  Son. — He  is 
called  also  the  image,  aud  the  manifestation  of  the 
Father,  the  express  image  of  His  person.  Now  the 
image  of  any  cause  can  he  nothing  else  than  the  effect 
or  operation  of  tbat  cause.  There  is  no  other  way  in 
which  a  cause  can  j)resent  its  image,  or  in  which  it  can 
manifest  itself,  than  either  in  its  action,  its  operation,  or 
in  its  more  remote  effect,  a  fixed  product  of  that  opera- 
tion. Power,  Spirit,  and  Truth  constitute  the  ''Fa- 
rther,'' or  first  Cause;  and  the  operation  of  these  three 
efficient  causes  united  in  One  Supreme,  constitute  the 
^-Son."  The  Son  is  said  to  he  co-eternal  witli  the 
"Father;*"  so  is  the  operation  of  the  first  cause  co-eter- 
nal with  that  cause.  The  eternal  "Son,"  is  the  eternal 
operation  of  the  Father,  or  fii'st  cause,  or  causes — Elo- 
him. 

The  operation  of  any  being,  or  of  any  cause,  is  the 
offspring,  and  the  image  of  that  being  or  cause,  l^he 
operation  of  Power,  Spirit,  and  Truth  combined  iu 
One  unchangeable  Being,  is  the  Son  or  Offspring  of 
that  Being,  in  the  same  sense  that  the  operation  of  a 
man-s  mind  is  the  ofl'spring  of  his  mind.  And  the 
"Son'-'  is  the  image,  or  character  of  the  "Father"  in 
the  same  sense  that  the  though.ls,  and  feelings,  and  ac- 
tions of  a  man,  form  the  image  or  character  of  the  man. 
The  "Sou"  is  the  operation,  or  more  strictly  speaking, 
he  is  perhaps  the  product  of  the  operation,  a  consolidat- 
ed living  record  of  the  thoughts,  and  actions,  and  aftec. 
tions-r-if  we  may  say  so,  of  the  "Father;"  as  the  me- 
mory and  mind  of  a  man  is  made  up  of  a  consolidated 


156  THE  ALPHABET 

living  record  of  his  past  thoughts,  feelings,  and  actions. 
We  hope  to  he  indulged  while  we  endeavor  further  to 
illustrate  this  position. 

In  the  physiolog}"^  of  the  human  constitution  we  learn, 
that  the  animal  hody  is  sustained  and  has  its  original 
growth  from  the  action,  or  the  various  operations  of  tlie 
organs  which  constitute  the  system  of  animal  life.  The 
body  is  thus  formed, — and  the  mind,  or  the  brain  and 
nervous  system,  or  tlie  external  and  internal  organs 
of  sense  and  jierception  are  formed,  or  have  their 
growth  and  maturity  from  the  operations — the  tlioughts, 
feelings,  and  actions,  which  take  place  in  this  system, 
and  w  hich  are  excited  in  it  by  the  stimulus  of  the  im- 
pressions of  external  objects  upon  the  organs  of  sense. 
The  late  discoveries  of  phrenologists  tend  to  con- 
firm this  theory,  and  to  prove  that  the  brain  and  nerv- 
ous system  form  the  mind  with  all  its  habits  and  asso- 
ciations. 

The  brain  and  nerves,  or  the  mind,  is  the  subject 
of  our  ideas  and  sensations,  and  every  idea,  being  a 
motion,  or  vibration,  or  configuration  in  the  brain,  con- 
solidates a  portion  of  the  nervous  fluid  in  which  it 
takes  place,  and  leaves  in  that  consolidated  part,  a 
trace  of  the  idea,  or  mode  of  action  which  gave  it  birth ; 
or  to  be  more  explicit,  the  idea,  or  action  of  the  brain 
consolidates,  or  produces  a  minute  nervous  fibre,  with  a 
form  exhibiting  the  idea,  or  mode  of  action  which  gave 
it  form  or  existence,  and  with  a  tendency  to  repeat  that 
mode  of  action  whenever  it  is  stimulated.  Every  repe- 
tition of  the  idea  will  increase  the  bulk  and  consis- 
tency of  the  nervous  fibre;  in  the  same  way  that  the 
actions  of  the  muscular  system  increase  the  bulk  and 
strength  of  the  muscles.  This  consolidation  of  ideas, 
|n  time  forms  the  brain  or  mind,  every  part  of  which 


OF  THOUGHT.  157 

ret;\iiis  a  facility  and  tendency  to  repeat  the  ideas  or 
modes  of  action  by  which  it  was  formed.  This  facility 
and  tendency  to  repeat  former  ideas,  is  that  which  is 
called  memory,  and  habit  of  thinking,  or  association  of 
ideas. 

Thus  the  body  is  formed  by  the  actions  or  operations, 
and  the  consolidations  of  the  animal  fluids ;  it  will  of 
consequence  exhibit  in  itself,  in  its  figure  and  constitu- 
tion, the  nature  or  manner  of  the  action  of  those  fluids, 
or  of  the  operations  by,  and  in  which  it  was  formed. 
This  is  a  natural  consequence ;  and  it  is  proved  by 
facts,  by  the  diseases  and  deformities  produced  in  the 
animal  frame  by  morbid  action,  or  by  a  wrong  direction 
of  the  fluids. — Just  so  the  mindj  or  brain,  having  been 
formed  or  consolidated  by  the  thoughts,  affections,  and 
actions  which  have  taken  place  in  the  nervous  fluid,  it 
will  exhil)it  in  its  form  and  character,  a  tablet,  or  record 
of  those  thoughts,  and  affections,  and  of  its  own  reac- 
tion upon  the  ideas  excited  within  it. 

The  brain  then,  or  the  mind,  is  a  living  record  of 
our  former  ideas  and  sensations ;  it  will  exliibit,  in  its 
form  and  habits,  that  w  hich  is  otherwise  called  our  ha- 
bits of  thinking,  and  our  prevailing  sentiments  and  pro- 
pensities.  The  mind,  as  well  as  the  body,  is  formed 
of  power  and  spirit,  or  matter  and  spirit ;  and  we  may 
very  reasonably,  indeed  we  are  bound  in  reason  to  ad- 
mit the  evidence  of  this  analogy  between  the  body  and 
mind,  in  reasoning  of  the  constitution  or  formation  of 
the  latter.  The  brain  then,  or  mind  with  all  its  ac- 
quirements, is  the  offspring  of  the  operations  of  the 
united  substances  of  which  it  w  as  originally  formed ; 
and  it  is  evolved  in  those  operations,  or  in  the  reaction 
of  these  substances  upon  the  ideas,  or  the  stimuli  pre- 
sented to  it  through  the  organs  of  sense — as  a  plant  is 


158  THE  ALPHABET 

evolved  in  the  reaction  of  the  genu  upon  the  nourish- 
ment it  receives. 

Anil  would  it  not  be  a  most  rational  hypotkesis^  that 
there  exists  a  record,  a  living  record  of  all  the  actions 
of  the  divine  Mind,  of  all  the  operations  of  His  Power, 
Spirit^  and  Truth?  Is  it  not  a  necessary  conclusion 
from  the  existence  of  such  a  Being  as  is  the  true  God, 
that  His  operations  from  all  eternity  are  recorded,  or 
consolidated  somewhere,  and  tiiat  this  record  will  ex- 
hibit the  character,  the  express  image  of  the  operationSj 
and  also  of  the  agent,  the  divine  Mind. 

Every  star  and  planet  God  has  formed,  is  a  record, 
the  operation  of  His  power,  and  every  rational  being  is 
an  exhibition  of  His  wisdom  and  goodness,  as  well  as 
of  His  power.  These  are  called  ihe  "sons  of  God ;" 
but  these  are  not  the  "Only  Son,"  or  the  "express 
image." — Those  creatures  are  formed  and  left  to  the 
natural  exercise  of  their  own  powers  and  tendencies, 
only  under  the  continual  superintendence,  and  the  occa- 
sional controul  of  the  Creator.  As  these  creatures  are 
distinct  from  the  God  who  made  them,  so  their  opera- 
tions are  their  own,  or  distinct  from  His  operations. 
But  in  the  "Son,"  every  action,  thought,  and  feeling — 
every  operation  is  the  very  Operation  of  the  "Father." 
It  is  sometimes  the  operation,  and  sometimes  it  is  the 
living  record  of  the  operation,  that  is  signified  or  allud- 
ed to  in  the  term  Son.  This  is  a  fact  attested  by  the 
apostles.  "The  Word  was  made  fesh  and  dwelt 
^•araong  us." — "That  which  was  from  the  beginning, 
"which  we  have  heard,  Avhich  we  have  seen  with  our 
'^eyes,  which  we  have  looked  upon,  and  our  hands  have 
"handled  of  tlie  Word  of  life.*'  That  part  of  speech 
which  is  called  the  verb,  literally,  the  word,  represents, 
or  is  the  sign  of,  operation;  but  the  ''Word'^  spoken 


OF  THOUGHT.  159 

of  by  the  apostle,  is  the  operation  itself.  This  at  least 
appears  to  be  the  most  easy  and  natural  interpretation 
of  the  apostle's  language ;  and  we  are  not  aware  of  any 
serious  objection  to  it.  Every  general  term  has  some 
general  signification,  or  there  is  something  common  to 
all  the  things  represented  by  tiiat  term.  But  the  gene- 
ral signification  of  the  term  irord  is  well  known. 
Words  are  sis;ns^  the  signs  of  things.  The  words  of 
a  language  arc  the  arlificml  sii^ns  of  both  substances 
and  their  operations  ;  but  phenomena,  or  visible  opera- 
tions, are  the  natural  signs  of  invisilde  substances,  or 
efficient  causes.  Operations  then  come  properly  under 
the  denominatioM  of  words,  or  they  belong  to  the  class 
of  objects  called  words.  In  this  sense,  motion  is  the 
word,  or  the  language  of  power,  or  it  is  that  by  which 
power  makes  itself  known ;  and  perception  is  the  word^ 
or  the  language  of  spirit,  or  that  by  which  spirit  is  made 
known. 

In  the  Gospel  by  John  it  is  said  :  ^'In  the  beginning 
"was  the  Word,  and  the  Word  was  M'ith  God." — The 
Word  which  was  in  the  beginning,  with  God,  was  the 
operation  of  God,  for  it  is  farther  said,  "By  Him,"  the 
Word,  "were  all  things  made  that  were  made,  and 
"without  Him  was  not  any  thing  made."  It  is  a  neces- 
sary truth,  that  by  the  operation  of  God,  or  of  the  First 
Cause,  all  things  were  made  that  were  made,  and  that 
without  that  operation  there  was  not  any  thing  made. 
It  is  impossible  to  conceive  that  any  thing  more,  or  less, 
than  the  operation  of  God,  or  of  infinite  Power,  Spirit, 
and  Truth,  could  have  been  employed  in  the  creation  of 
the  world.  But  St.  John  says.  All  things  were  made 
by  the  Word.  Hence,  the  Word,  and  the  operation, 
are  the  same. 


J60  THE  ALPHABET 

It  is  agreed  on  all  hands  that  the  '''Word"  is  the 
same  with  the  "Son.''  And  it  is  also  a  self-evident 
truth,  that  nothing  less  than  the  "Word,"  or  the  ope- 
ration^  of  infinite  Power,  Wisdom,  and  Truth,  is  re- 
quired, to  redeem  mankind  and  to  defend  the  redeemed 
from  all  their  enemies,  moral  and  physical. 

We  are  informed  in  the  sacred  oracles  that  Jesus 
Christ  is  the  "Son  of  God.*'  It  is  certainly  intended 
that  we  should  comprehend  the  meaning  of  this  afSrma- 
tion.  The  fact  affirmed  is  an  ol)ject  of  Christian  faith  ; 
but  how  could  the  Christian  helieve  and  confide  in  that 
which  he  did  not  comprehend.  The  apostle  John  says, 
"Whosoever  shall  confess  that  Jesus  is  the  Son  of  God, 
"God  dwelleth  in  him,  and  he  in  God."  Now  to  con- 
fess this  without  annexing  any  definite  signification,  or 
idea,  to  the  words,  and  to  make  the  confession,  at  the 
same  time,  a  criterion  of  the  genuineness  of  our  own 
or  another's  faith,  and  of  our  being  in  God,  would  he 
absurd.  It  is  necessary  that  we  conceive,  or  compre- 
hend what  we  confess,  otherwise  the  confession  is  not 
the  effect,  and  evidence,  of  our  being  enliglitened  from 
above,  or  of  our  being  "in  God." 

There  is  a  native  love  of  mystery  in  the  human 
mind,  which  is  gratified  by  seeing  things  darkly,  or 
through  a  mist.  Truth  is  a  natural  enemy  to  this 
propensity,  and  when  she  comes  to  interrupt  its  gra- 
tification, she  is  apt  to  he  treated  as  an  intruder.  The 
moon  is  much  less  useful  or  necessary  to  man,  than 
the  sun,  yet  how  enchanting  is  a  moon  light  scene ; 
and  if  the  glorious  sun  should  suddenly  and  unexpect- 
edly arise  in  its  splendor  to  chase  the  illusions  of  the 
scene,  would  it  not  excite  a  sensation  similar  to  what 
is  felt  at  the  entrance  of  an  unwelcome  visiter.  That 
Jesus  is  the  "Son  of  God,"  is  given  as  matter  of  fact, 


OF  THOUGHT.  161 

it  is  s;iven  also  as  the  foundation  of  the  church.  "Peter 
'^^saith  unto  him,  thou  art  the  Christ,  the  Son  of  the  liv- 
"ing  God.  Jesus  saith.  On  this  rock  will  I  build  my 
"church.''  If  this  fact,  or  truth,  be  the  foundation  of 
the  church,  it  must  be  plain  and  palpable ;  if  it  were  an 
incomprehensible  mystery,  it  were  then  an  unfathomable 
deep,  that  would  swallow  up  the  church. 

But  there  is  still  onougli  of  mystery  connected  with 
this  su!)ject  to  gratify  a  reasonable  love  of  the  sublime. 
What  subject  is  it,  either  in  nature  or  in  grace,  that  1% 
not  mysterious,  wlien  we  attempt  to  look  through  the 
pljenomena  into  tlie  invisible  world.  But  the  "myste- 
ries" of  the  gospel  are  not  all  represented  as  incompre- 
hensiide  things  ;  we  are  not  forbidden  to  approach  them 
with  the  understanding's  eye.  Tlic  parable  of  the 
^•^sower"  is  one  of  tbese  mysteries,  but  it  was  intended 
for  ins(ruction,  for  a  light,  a  •f'^candle,"  which  was  not 
intended  to  be  put  "under  a  bushel."  The  disciples 
asked  their  master  after  he  had  spoken  this  parable, 
why  he  spake  to  the  multitude  in  parables  ;  and  he  an- 
swered, "It  is  given  to  yon  to  know  the  mysteries  of 
"the  kingdom  of  lieaven,  but  to  them  that  are  without  it 
"is  not  given." 

It  seems  then  from  the  scriptures  themselves,  that  a 
^mystery"  is  not  a  tbing  which  is  necessarily,  or  in  its 
nature,  incomprehensible,  or  wholly  without  the  sphere 
of  human  investigation.  A  subject  is  sometimes  ren- 
dered mysterious,  by  the  application  of  the  same  word, 
to  things  wliicli  arc  circumstantially  diflerent,  though 
essentially  the  same.  The  apostle  John  observes,  "IS'o 
"man  hath  seen  God  at  any  time."  Yet  our  Lord  says, 
^^He  that  hath  seen  me,  hath  seen  the  Father."  These 
two  affirmations,  though  apparently  contradictory,  must 
be  perfectly  reconcilable,  for  they  are  from  the  lips  of 
SI 


162  THE  ALPHABET  OF  THOUGHT. 

truth  itself.  And  they  have  a  parallel  in  the  common 
and  familiar  language  of  life.  It  is  common  to  say  we  see 
substances,  but  it  is  well  known  that  we  do  not  see  sub- 
stances, that  is,  we  do  not  see  them  with  the  bodily  eye; 
yet  we  do  perceive  them  with  the  eye  of  reason ;  and  it 
is  true,  that  whoever  sees  the  phenomena  or  operatinis 
of  a  substance,  perceives  the  substance.  "He  that  hath 
"seen  me,  hath  seen  the  Father,"  tliat  is,  he  that  hath 
seen  or  discerned  the  real  character  of  the  "Son,"  that 
be  is  holy,  and  just,  and  good,  and  wise,  hath  seen  the 
real  character  of  the  "Father,"  that  He  is  holy,  and 
just,  and  good,  and  wise.  He  who  hath  seen  the  opera- 
tion of  the  Father,  hath  seen  the  Father,  or  the  efficient 
cause  of  the  operation. 

The  written  word  of  God,  consists  of  the  artificial 
signs  by  which  He  makes  himself  known;  but  the 
operation  is  the  natural  sign,  or  natural  word.  The 
children  of  men  are  favored  with  both  these  signs. 
"God  who  at  sundry  times  and  in  divers  manners  spake 
"in  times  past  unto  the  fathers  by  the  prophets,  hath  io 
"these  last  days  spoken  unto  us  by  His  Son."  The 
prophets  conveyed  to  us  the  knowledge  of  God  by 
words,  or  artificial  signs ;  but  in  the  "Son"  we  have 
the  natural  sign,  the  express  image,  the  very  thoughts, 
feelings,  and  actions  of  the  Most  High  exhibited  before 
our  eyes.  "The  Father  who  dwelleth  in  me,  He  doeth 
"the  works."  He  condescends  to  exhibit  to  us  the  very 
manner  of  His  thinking,  feeling,  speaking  and  acting. 

We  have  endeavored  to  touch  this  subject  as  cauti- 
ously and  as  lightly  as  might  be,  consistently  with  per- 
spicuity, and  with  fidelity  to  the  cause  of  truth.  It  had 
not  been  touched  on  at  all,  but  that  the  subject  of  the 
constitution  of  the  divine  Essence^  was  necessarily  in- 
volved in  the  subject  of  the  elementary  principles  of 
metaphysics. 


J 


V 


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